destination, review license exceptions and consider catch-all prohibitions for end uses, before he can
determine whether a license is required. Even then, a detailed review of the EAR may not provide an
exporter with a definitive answer, and the exporter must request a Commodity Classification from the
Despite the voluminous and complex nature of the DOC’s EAR, DOE’s Part 810 regulations are most
often identified by U.S. exporters as the primary source of confusion, concern and delay. The Part 810
regulations, although concise, are based on vague statutory language that DOE’s Part 810 regulations do
little to clarify. Consequently, U.S. companies – even those with considerable experience in exporting
nuclear technology – often find the requirements of Part 810 confusing.
These broadly drafted regulations require U.S. persons to obtain an authorization from the Secretary of
Energy for activities that involve the “direct or indirect production of special nuclear material.” DOE and
its predecessor agencies have interpreted this requirement to apply to all technology related to light water
reactors, because plutonium is produced during the irradiation of fuel in the reactor, as well as
enrichment, reprocessing and heavy water technology. Because of the expansive wording of the DOE’s
Part 810 regulations, their applicability to many activities concerning nuclear power reactors is often not
evident. DOE also imposes other requirements, such as controlling the provision of certain nuclear
technology to foreign nationals within the United States, that are not expressly stated in the regulations.
Finally, DOE has never issued formal guidance regarding its interpretation of the regulations, other than
advisory opinions that the agency provides to individual exporters.
The allocation of nuclear export authority to four Federal entities – DOE, NRC, DOC and DOS – does
not have a counterpart in other countries. The multiple agency structure, in addition to creating
complexity and confusion for exporters, may also affect distribution of resources among the agencies to
process export license applications efficiently. For example, the agencies responsible for administering
nuclear export controls in Russia, Japan, the ROK and France are the trade control agencies of these
countries – the equivalent to the DOC in the United States. These agencies, like the DOC, appear to have
the budgets, resources and sophisticated systems that are necessary for administering export licenses in an
efficient and timely manner. For example, Japan’s METI has three divisions under its Trade Control
Department that carry out defined export license functions. The DOE’s NNSA, on the other hand, has a
single office – the Office of International Regimes and Agreements – that is responsible for administering
Part 810 controls. This office, currently comprised of three individuals who all have other functions and
responsibilities within the NNSA, is severely understaffed to address the requests for Part 810 specific
authorizations that it currently receives as a result of the global nuclear renaissance and U.S. companies’
efforts to meet the increasing demand for nuclear-related services outside of the United States.
This general lack of resources has a significant impact on an agency’s ability to process requests for
export licenses efficiently, and frequently has a negative impact on the ability of vendors to win overseas
contracts and perform those contracts. For example:
The DOE does not have a transparent system for applicants to track the status of Part 810 applications
and their processing. An applicant must repeatedly contact the Office of International Regimes and
Agreements to inquire about the status. Once the application is no longer with the Office of
International Regimes and Agreements, that office must make inquiries with other offices at NNSA or
other agencies to determine the status of the application. Sometimes, this office is not in a position to
provide accurate status updates because it depends on the accuracy of information coming from
another office or another agency. This opaque process has a negative effect on exporters who must be
able to make business decisions based on the status of their Part 810 applications. U.S. exporters are
often under pressure to advise customers or potential customers of the timelines for receiving Part 810
approval, and are thus unable to comply with these requests.
The DOE does not have an electronic system for filing export license applications such as the DOC’s
SNAP-R system. Electronic export license application systems are provided by some of the other
nations. For example, Yestrade, operated jointly by the ROK’s Ministry of Knowledge Economy
(MKE) and the Korea Strategic Trade Institute (KOSTI), allows for classification and issuance of
export licenses for strategic items online. This type of online system enhances the efficiency and the
ease with which exporters can apply for licenses.
The burdensome interagency review process required for issuance of Part 810 DOE authorizations and
Part 110 NRC licenses also appears to be unique to the United States. Such a process exists in Russia, but
only for exports of critical nuclear commodities, and the Russian process is made more efficient by a
requirement for each agency to submit its views within 10 days and to focus only on its area of
Finally, Section 57(b) of the Atomic Energy Act and DOE’s Part 810 regulations require that each
specific authorization issued under Part 810 must be signed by the Secretary of Energy. This requirement
does not appear to be matched in any other nuclear export control regime and results in significant delays
in the Part 810 authorization process.
The U.S. nuclear export licensing process suffers in some ways from its antiquity. The U.S. export
control agencies have functioned as separate bureaucracies for decades. Other countries such as Japan,
the ROK and Russia have nuclear export regimes that were established or heavily revised to address
nuclear exports only during the past decade. These countries have had the benefit of creating export
control regimes that focus on efficiency and take into account lessons learned and established
Export License Processing Time. Foreign supplier countries place a stronger emphasis than the U.S. on
the importance of expediting the export licensing process. The Japanese, ROK and Russian regimes
allow a range of 15-90 days for processing export license applications. The French regime is the only one
that more closely approximates the U.S. regime by allowing nine months to process export applications.
The Japanese, ROK and Russian regimes impose processing timelines by legislation or regulation,
depending on the regime. In some cases, the regulators are provided with extensions to address additional
questions and other issues. Even with these extensions, the regulators appear to be under an obligation to
process the applications in a time period as close as possible to the mandated processing times.
In contrast, in the United States, the DOE’s processing time for applications for a specific authorization to
export nuclear technology and provide nuclear technical assistance to foreign entities ranges between six
months to well over one year. The NRC usually requires a year or more to process license applications
for initial exports of reactors, reactor components and nuclear fuel, and approximately nine months for
applications for subsequent exports. In the United States, processing times are not mandated by
legislation or regulations.
Executive Branch procedures established by the DOE, DOS and DOC, as
required by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA), specify time periods for actions by these
agencies, the Department of Defense and the NRC for each step of the license review process. However,
the procedures provide significant flexibility for agencies in reviewing and processing applications for
export licenses and specific authorizations pursuant to 10 CFR Part 810. For example, the procedures do
not provide a timeline for DOE to review and prepare an analysis and preliminary staff recommendation
on each application for transmission to the agencies that must also review the application. And since the
Information concerning the average time required by French export licensing authorities to process applications is not readily
The Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA) requires timely consideration of export license applications and calls for
procedures that provide for the NRC to “immediately initiate review of any application” and “to the maximum extent feasible . . .
expeditiously process the application concurrently with the executive branch review while awaiting the final executive branch
judgment.” Among other things, these procedures must also provide that the Commission “shall inform the applicant in writing
of the reason for delay” if the Commission “has not completed action on the application within sixty days after the receipt of an
executive branch judgment that the proposed export . . . is not inimical to the common defense and security.” Sec. 126(b)(2) of
the AEA, 42 USC 2155(b)(1). However, these provisions do not constitute a statutory deadline for the NRC’s action.
procedures allow the reviewing agencies to determine that they require additional time to complete their
review, the timelines envisioned by the procedures appear to be exceeded more often than they are met.
As a result, few applications are processed within the timeframes envisioned by the Executive Branch
procedures. In some instances, the time period required by the NRC to rule on license applications has
not met deadlines specified in applicable 123 Agreements, such as the 123 Agreement with the European
Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM).
Finally, the opportunity for members of the public to request a hearing or petition to intervene in NRC
export licensing proceedings appears to be a unique feature of the U.S. export control regime that has in
some cases acted as an impediment to the performance by U.S. vendors of contracts for the delivery of
reactors and nuclear fuel. Some prospective foreign customers may perceive that this aspect of the NRC
export licensing process will cause long delays in the issuance of export licenses, based on the record of
the NRC’s delay in the processing of certain export license applications in the 1970s and 1980s.
delays resulted primarily from the legal ability of individuals and organizations to file petitions in
opposition to applications for export licenses and the ensuing delay resulting from the NRC’s
consideration of the petitioner’s arguments in support of the petition and the applicant’s opposing
arguments. In a few instances, opponents have challenged the NRC’s denial of their petition to intervene
in opposition to an export license application by filing petitions for review in a U.S. Court of Appeals.
Our research did not disclose any comparable right of public participation in the foreign nuclear export
Application of Technology Controls. DOE’s Part 810 controls on exports of technical data and
technical assistance are more broadly worded than the NSG’s controls on information for the
“development,” “production” and “use” of controlled commodities. Thus, DOE has authority, under 10
CFR Part 810, to control a broader range of activities by U.S. persons than is provided by national laws
that control technology exports based on the NSG Guidelines. For example, DOE has previously
exercised control over economic analyses of nuclear technologies and procurement assistance to foreign
nuclear power programs. The tailored definitions of “development,” “production” and “use” under the
NSG Guidelines would make it much more difficult to exercise this type of broad application of controls
strictly on the basis of the Guidelines. The difference in the two approaches is most evident when
comparing the DOC’s technology controls with respect to “dual use” items, which essentially implement
the NSG standard, to DOE’s controls under Part 810. Experience with both sets of regulations suggests
that the DOC’s threshold for technology controls is higher than the DOE’s threshold for applying its Part
Multiple Export Licenses. All of the foreign nuclear export control systems surveyed provide for
multiple export licenses, in many cases to exporters with approved export compliance programs:
The Russian regime provides for a multiple export license issued to exporters that have internal export
control systems accredited by FSTEC for multiple exports of a certain type of commodity to one or
more destinations, without the need to list specific end-users.
The Japanese regime provides for bulk export licenses to exporters with internal control systems based
on METI’s Internal Compliance Program for multiple exports of less sensitive goods and technology
to “White” countries.
The ROK regime provides for a general comprehensive export license to exporters designated as
“Compliant Traders,” permitting multiple instances of export during a prescribed period of a specified
item to Region A countries. The ROK regime also provides for a validated comprehensive export
license, which permits multiple exports to Region B countries if such item will be directed
continuously to the same importer.
For example, NRC approval of Westinghouse’s application to export a reactor to the Phillippines in 1977 took approximately
The French regime provides a global export authorization allowing an exporter unlimited shipments of
specific items to specific recipients or countries.
The U.S. nuclear export control regime provides certain general licenses and authorizations. However, in
the case of Russia and France, the multiple export authorizations appear broader than the general
authorizations available to U.S. exporters under Parts 110 and 810 in that they are not restricted by
country and, in Russia’s case, allow for multiple exports to multiple destinations.
Requirement for a Bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreement. The U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1954,
as amended (42 USC 2153), and the NRC’s export-import regulations (10 CFR Part 110) require, in
effect, that a 123 Agreement be in force with the recipient nation (or group of nations) to satisfy the
NRC’s export criteria for exports of source material (natural uranium and thorium), special nuclear
material (enriched uranium, U-233 and plutonium) and major nuclear power reactor components, as
specified in items 1-4 of Appendix A to Part 110. A linkage between 123 Agreements and U.S. nuclear
exports is established by section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act, which provides in pertinent part as
follows: “No cooperation with any nation pursuant to [specified sections of the Act] shall be undertaken
until” an agreement for cooperation has been submitted to Congress and has been brought into force.
Limited exceptions to this mandate may be found, including the Secretary of Energy’s issuance of
specific authorizations pursuant to 10 CFR Part 810 to allow U.S. persons to assist power reactor
programs in some countries (including Russia) that did not have an agreement for cooperation with the
United States. However, the DOE’s Part 810 regulations provide that the existence of a 123 Agreement is
one of the key criteria evaluated in the issuance of a specific authorization. As knowledgeable DOS
officials have noted, the U.S. statutory regime regarding nuclear exports “provides few tangible incentives
to other countries to accept the controls that it requires.”
The stringent controls required in 123
Agreements have in some cases hindered the conclusion of such agreements with other countries. Indeed,
several 123 Agreements have required more than a decade to negotiate.
As discussed in Section IV of this report, the four countries surveyed do not require that a bilateral
nuclear cooperation agreement be in place before nuclear exports are carried out. In practice, however,
these countries have concluded bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements with most of the states that are
significant importers of nuclear components and materials supplied by vendors in these countries. A chart
listing these agreements is provided as Appendix C to this report.
Reprocessing Consent Rights. In addition to retransfer consent rights, U.S. 123 Agreements require
U.S. consent rights for reprocessing used fuel. U.S. 123 Agreements require that nuclear material
transferred pursuant to these agreements and special nuclear material produced through the use of
transferred nuclear material and certain equipment (e.g., plutonium that is produced through the
irradiation of fuel in reactors) may only be reprocessed upon agreement of the parties.
A chart comparing reprocessing consent rights of the countries surveyed is provided as Appendix D. As
shown in the chart, the U.S. is the only country of those surveyed to consistently include the reprocessing
consent provision in its agreements:
The ROK included reprocessing consent language in its agreement with the UAE, but this
requirement is not present in other publicly available bilateral agreements that we reviewed, such as its
nuclear cooperation agreement with Argentina and the recent agreement between the ROK and Japan,
which entered into force in January 2012.
Ronald J. Bettauer, “The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978,” 10 L
. 1105, 1178 (1978).
We refer only to “new” agreements concluded after the passage of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978.
Japan includes reprocessing consent language in its agreements with most, but not all, non-Nuclear
For example, its recently signed cooperation agreement with Kazakhstan does not
include reprocessing consent language. Further, the Japanese government’s clause is applicable only
to transferred nuclear material and special fissionable material produced through the use of this
material. Unlike U.S. nuclear cooperation agreements following enactment of the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA), it does not apply to special fissionable material produced
through the use of supplied equipment.
France and Russia have not included reprocessing consent language in their bilateral agreements for
cooperation that we were able to review.
Many existing and aspiring nuclear energy nations regard the reprocessing of used nuclear fuel as a
sovereign right that is recognized by Article IV of the NPT. Beyond the sovereignty issue, customer
nations generally require flexibility in the management and disposition of used fuel. They recognize that
consent rights exercised by a supplier nation may prevent them from reprocessing used fuel in domestic
facilities or retransferring used fuel to another nation for reprocessing or other disposition. As models for
fuel disposition are likely to evolve, government officials and utility executives in countries developing
new nuclear power projects may prefer to avoid restrictions that could preclude future commercial
benefits. In addition, far-reaching U.S. consent rights over reprocessing and enrichment have been of
concern to some countries because they fear that such consent may not be provided on a case-by-case
basis in a timely and predictable manner.
Rigid U.S. consent requirements for retransfers, enrichment
and reprocessing activities make U.S. companies less desirable as suppliers.
Government-Industry Relationship and Government Participation in Export Promotion. A number
of foreign export control regimes appear to be more favorable to exporters than the U.S. regime because
the suppliers in such countries are primarily, if not exclusively, government-owned nuclear vendors. For
example, the Russian regime requires the exporter to obtain assurances from the appropriate
governmental authority of the end-user. This requirement streamlines the export application review
process by placing the burden of obtaining governmental assurances on the exporter. However, this
method appears to be possible only in a regime where the exporter was either owned by the government
or had substantial governmental ties. A U.S. exporter, as a privately-owned company, is not in a position
to obtain assurances from a foreign government.
In addition, foreign exporters that are government-owned are in a better position to understand the
intricacies of national export control regimes and obtain expert opinions on the applicability of these
regimes, as necessary. The government-industry relationship also provides for (1) encouraging that
priority attention be given by licensing agencies to promulgation of regulations that are less likely to be
burdensome on exporters, and (2) effective and efficient processing of export licensing applications, and
thus enhancement of the exporters’ ability to be competitive in foreign procurements for nuclear
commodities and services.
Areas where Foreign Export Control Regimes Are More Burdensome than the U.S. Regime
Controls on Retransfers. The U.S. nuclear export control regime is not as strict as some of its
counterparts with respect to retransfers of certain controlled items and technology. Foreign regimes such
as the ROK and Japan are more strict than the United States in the conditions that they impose on
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) defines a “Nuclear Weapon State” (NWS) as a country that
had manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1967. Thus, by this definition, the
only NWS countries are China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States.
“Historically, such consents have been accorded on a case-by-case basis, introducing great uncertainty into programs requiring
multi-billion dollar investments.” Jonathan B. Schwartz, “Controlling Nuclear Proliferation: Legal Strategies of the United
States,” 20 L
retransfers of controlled items, and also go beyond the requirements of the NSG Guidelines with respect
For example, U.S. DOE regulations and practice provide that DOE-controlled technology, once exported
to a country not listed on the DOE’s 810.8(a) restricted list, cannot be retransferred to countries listed in
10 CFR 810.8(a) (restricted countries) without prior U.S. Government approval. Conversely, as DOE
officials have confirmed, DOE-controlled technology can be freely retransferred to non-810.8(a)
countries. For example, DOE-controlled technology, once transferred from the U.S. to France (a non-
810.8(a) country), cannot be retransferred to China (an 810.8(a) country) without U.S. Government
permission, but can be retransferred to Japan (a non-810.8(a) country) without obtaining an authorization
from DOE or other U.S. governmental approval.
In contrast, the ROK regulations require ROK government permission before a retransfer of ROK
technology can occur to any destination. This means that a French company, for example, that purchases
ROK-controlled nuclear technology cannot retransfer that technology to any destination without needing
to obtain prior consent from the ROK government. This is a much more restrictive requirement than that
contained in U.S. regulations and practice.
Likewise, the Japanese government has sought assurances from the United States that certain Japanese-
controlled nuclear technology shall not be retransferred from the United States to any destination without
prior consent from the Japanese government.
Both the ROK and the Japanese regimes also go beyond the requirements of the NSG Guidelines in their
controls over retransfers. The NSG Guidelines provide that suppliers should retransfer Trigger List items
only upon assurances from the recipient’s government that in the case of retransfer, the recipient of the
retransfer will provide the same assurances as those required by the supplier for the original transfer. This
requirement is commonly satisfied by recipient countries by exchange of Notes Verbale that provide the
requisite assurances or by reference to nuclear cooperation agreements. No prior consent by the country
that supplied the items is required under the NSG Guidelines for retransfer of those items.
General Licenses. General export licenses provided under the Russian and French regimes are broader
than those available under the U.S. system. The Part 110 and 810 general licenses and authorizations and
the DOC’s EAR provide U.S. exporters with the advantage of being able to export many items and related
technology without obtaining prior approval from the U.S. Government. For example, under the Russian
system, an exporter would require a license for an export of a minor nuclear reactor component such as a
reactor pressure tube and related technology to any destination, including the U.S., EU countries or
Canada. The NRC’s regulations allow the export of a reactor pressure tube to 26 countries under a
general license (i.e. no prior NRC approval), and the DOE’s regulations allow export of technology
related to reactor pressure tubes to countries, other than the 88 listed on the 810.8(a) restricted country
list, under a general authorization (i.e. no prior DOE approval). Furthermore, the DOC’s EAR provides
for exports, without a license, of Balance of Plant (BOP) components to most destinations other than
certain embargoed and otherwise restricted countries.
These general licenses are also more expansive than the bulk export licenses provided under the Japanese
and ROK regimes. The Japanese and ROK multiple export licenses are similar in form to U.S. general
licenses in that they are available for exports to a selected group of countries with a proven non-
proliferation track record. However, these Japanese and ROK licenses require prior government approval
and are only available to exporters with certified export compliance programs. The U.S. general licenses
are available to any exporter and do not require prior government approval. In addition to the general
licenses available under the U.S. nuclear export control regime, the specific licenses provided can also be
very expansive. The DOE specific authorization can be issued for a broad scope of activities and is valid
for five (5) years, with additional five-year extensions. The NRC also may issue export licenses for
exports of multiple items over a specified time period, typically up to five years.
Although the general licenses for minor reactor components available under the U.S. regime are in some
respects more permissive in comparison to the general or bulk licenses available under other regimes,
they have a narrow scope and would appear to benefit U.S. exports primarily where a U.S. vendor has
supplied a complete nuclear steam supply system (NSSS). Since minor components needed for
construction of the reactor would be embraced within the scope of the NRC specific license authorizing
export of the reactor, this general license mainly benefits U.S. vendors with respect to subsequent supply
of replacement components. Thus, this general license may not significantly assist U.S. vendors in
competing for contracts except to the extent they are able to complete to provide such replacement parts.
EXPORT CONTROL REGIMES OF SELECTED COUNTRIES
(1) General Basis for Export Control Regime
The export control regime of the Russian Federation was developed largely in the last decade. Before
1998, the Russian Federation did not have a comprehensive export control law.
Russia’s export control regime was established under the auspices of the Federal Law on Military-
Technical Cooperation of the Russian Federation with Foreign States of 1998 and the Federal Law on
Export Control of 1999. In general, it establishes comprehensive controls that take into account Russia’s
trade-related objectives. Specifically, Russia’s export control regime seeks to enable Russian exporters to
sell goods to foreign markets while allowing Russia to comply with its international export-related
commitments, including its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(NPT), as well as its obligations as a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).
The Russian Federation’s nuclear export control regime is comprehensive and prescriptive.
(2) Legal Basis for Export Control Regime
Two laws govern the Russian nuclear export control regime: the Federal Law on Military-Technical
Cooperation with Foreign States, and the Federal Law on Export Control. In addition, the Russian
government periodically issues resolutions which incorporate supplemental regulatory documents
providing highly prescriptive regulation of nuclear-related exports. Presidential Decrees also shape some
of the controls. The controlled nuclear-related commodities and technologies are listed in two control
lists, which correspond exactly to the NSG Trigger and Dual-Use Lists. The only observed variance from
the NSG lists was the provision of more detail in the notes section of each item listed. The applicable
laws, resolutions, decrees and control lists are listed in Appendix A.
(3) Responsible Authorities and Agencies
As with other export control regimes, several agencies of the Russian Government are involved in the
Russian nuclear export control system. There is only one regulatory and licensing agency: the Federal
Service for Technical and Export Control (FSTEC), which administers most aspects of nuclear export
controls, with some input from the Export Council of State Atomic Energy Corporation, “Rosatom.”
Input from other branches of the government is only required for highly sensitive exports. This
streamlined approach appears to allow for efficient processing of applications.
The roles and responsibilities of the relevant Russian authorities and agencies are:
The President of the Russian Federation defines basic policy guidelines, ensures coordination among
the various government agencies involved in the export control process and approves commodity and
technology control lists.
The Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation enacts laws in the field of export control.
The Government of the Russian Federation (Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister and Federal
Ministers) enacts resolutions regarding the export process, including licensing, and organizes the
implementation of state policy in the field of export control.
The FSTEC issues export and import licenses.
The Export Council of State Atomic Energy Corporation, “Rosatom,” takes part in the examination of
contracts for the supply of controlled commodities. Applications for export licenses are subject to the
results of this examination.
In cases of exports of “critical nuclear commodities” (equivalent to U.S. Sensitive Nuclear
Technology and Restricted Data), the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also
take part in the examination.
(4) Applicability of Regime
The applicability of the Russian regime appears to be consistent with that of the United States and other
nuclear export control regimes. In accordance with Resolution of the Government of the Russian
Federation No. 973 of December 15, 2000, on the Export and Import of Nuclear Materials, Equipment,
Special Non-Nuclear Materials and Related Technology, export controls of the Russian Federation apply
to all legal and physical persons located within the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation who engage in
the export of nuclear materials, equipment and technology.
Resolution No. 973 warns exporters explicitly that they cannot circumvent the export control regime by
piecemeal exports of nuclear-related components.
(5) Export License Requirements
a. Types of Licenses
The Russian nuclear export control regime allows for the issuance of two types of licenses: single export
and multiple export. The ability to obtain a multiple export license carries significant advantages for the
exporter: once the license is obtained, the exporter can export a certain type of commodity to multiple
destinations without a need to list the end-user. For example, a Russian company that manufactures a
reactor coolant pump can obtain a multiple export license to export that reactor coolant pump to ten
different companies in ten different countries without listing the specific companies on its license
application. This type of license is not available in the U.S. regime. A U.S. exporter of a reactor coolant
pump is required, under the NRC’s Part 110 rules, to obtain a separate license for each export of that
pump to specific end-users.
The types of licenses and the conditions they carry are described in more detail below:
Single Export License
Issued for implementation of exports under a single contract and lists the country of end-user, the
seller and the buyer.
Validity: depends on circumstances, but not more than 1 year. The exporter can apply for extensions.
Multiple Export (General) License
Issued for multiple exports of a certain type of commodity to one or more destinations. A specific
buyer does not need to be listed. The license contains a limitation on the quantity of commodities that
can be exported.
Issued only by a decision of the Government of the Russian Federation (i.e., concurrences from
several ministries required – see below for further discussion).
Can be granted only to exporters that have internal export control systems accredited by FSTEC.
General license for export of critical nuclear commodities (uranium with assay of 20 percent or
higher, plutonium, equipment for chemical reprocessing of spent fuel, isotopic enrichment of uranium,
production of heavy water, conversion of enriched uranium and plutonium, their main components,
Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 973 of Dec. 15, 2000 on the Export and Import of Nuclear
Materials, Equipment, Special Non-Nuclear Materials and Related Technology, as amended, at par. 10.
and technologies related to these materials, equipment and main components) can be issued only if
such export is contemplated by a nuclear cooperation agreement.
Validity: depends on circumstances, but not more than 1 year. The exporter can apply for extensions.
b. Conditions for Granting a License
The Russian nuclear export control regime imposes varying sets of conditions: conditions that apply to
exports to Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) other than India that have a safeguards agreement with
the IAEA, conditions that apply to exports to India, conditions that apply to exports to NNWS that do not
have a safeguards agreement with the IAEA, and conditions that apply to exports of certain sensitive
nuclear commodities to Nuclear Weapon States (NWS).
Some of the conditions for granting a license are the same as those of other nuclear supplier countries,
such as the requirement for the recipient country to have a safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Other
conditions are more specialized. For example, the exporter itself is responsible for obtaining peaceful
use, retransfer and other assurances from the foreign government. This requirement allows for more
efficiency in the process because it shifts the burden of obtaining foreign government assurances from the
government bureaucracy to the exporter, which will likely proceed with more urgency in obtaining the
assurances. However, this requirement can only work in a country such as Russia or France, where the
nuclear industry is fully or mostly owned by the government. In the U.S., a private company such as GE
or Westinghouse is unlikely to be in a position to obtain foreign government assurances.
As discussed further in this section, Russia’s retransfer assurance requirements, as set out in the Russian
regulations, mirror NSG requirements. However, nuclear cooperation agreements concluded between
Russia and other countries may impose conditions that are stricter than those set out in the regulations.
For example, the Russia-India agreement provides for the NSG-type of retransfer assurances (e.g., the
recipient government will secure the same assurances from the third party that it provided to the exporting
government) plus a requirement that the recipient government obtain the exporting government’s consent
prior to retransfers. This aspect of the Russia-India Agreement for Cooperation is attributable to the fact
that India is not a party to the NPT. This retransfer consent provision of the Russia-India Agreement is
not typical of other Russian nuclear cooperation agreements.
The conditions for granting a license are described in more detail below.
(1) Exports to Non-Nuclear Weapon States other than India
The exporter must have a provision in its contract with the foreign end-user that restricts the end-user from
using the controlled commodity for production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
The recipient country must have an agreement with the IAEA for the application of safeguards to all its
peaceful nuclear activities.
The exporter must present to FSTEC assurances from an authorized governmental agency of the recipient
country. The assurances can be presented to FSTEC on a spot basis, or by reference to corresponding
provisions of a nuclear cooperation agreement between Russia and the recipient country. The assurances must
the controlled commodities shall not be used for production of nuclear weapons and other nuclear
explosive devices or for any military purpose;
the controlled commodities shall be subject to IAEA safeguards;
the controlled commodities shall be physically protected in accordance with the IAEA requirements;
the controlled commodities shall be re-exported or transferred beyond the jurisdiction of the recipient
state to any other country only on the above conditions; and
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