(4) Proposed term of the license.
(5) A statement specifying whether the proposed exports will include information that constitutes a state
(6) Where applicable, copies of the license from the Federal Service for Ecological, Technological and
Nuclear Supervision Activity in the Field of Atomic Energy, issued by the manufacturer of the
(7) Documents providing the required assurances.
a. Requirement for Nuclear Cooperation Agreement
A bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement is not required for exports of nuclear and nuclear-related
materials, equipment and technology from the Russian Federation. However, under current Russian
export practice, the existence of a nuclear cooperation agreement between the Russian Federation and the
country of the end-user will greatly facilitate the application process. If a bilateral agreement is in place,
the applicant can satisfy the requirements for peaceful use, IAEA safeguards, physical protection and
retransfer assurances by reference to appropriate provisions of the agreement, rather than having to obtain
such assurances from the appropriate foreign governmental authority.
The Russian Federation has entered into nuclear cooperation agreements with such countries as Armenia,
Australia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Egypt, France, Indonesia, South Africa, South Korea, Syria,
United States and Vietnam. Some of these agreements appear to have the purpose of establishing
economic cooperation and promoting Russian nuclear exports, rather than serving as legal vehicles for
such exports, particularly since Russian law and practice has allowed exports of nuclear material and
components for power and research reactors to countries with which Russia did not have an agreement for
cooperation. For example, Russia exported enriched uranium to the United States well before the United
States and Russia executed a nuclear cooperation agreement in 2011. The same is true for Russia’s
longstanding supply of reactors and fuel to India before the execution of the Russia-India nuclear
cooperation agreement in 2010.
7. Export and Re-export Restrictions
a. Country-Specific Restrictions
Under the Russian regime, additional export criteria apply to India and countries that do not have in place
a safeguards agreement with the IAEA, as discussed above. However, unlike the United States and many
other supplier nations, Russia does not maintain a “restricted countries” or a “generally authorized
countries” list. This makes the Russian regime more restrictive in some respects and less restrictive in
other respects than the U.S. regime.
The U.S. regime provides certain license exceptions, general licenses and general authorizations for
exports of controlled nuclear material, equipment and technology to countries that have high non-
proliferation standards, are members of the NSG and/or have concluded bilateral nuclear cooperation
agreements with the United States. For example, the NRC’s regulations at 10 CFR 110.26 provide for a
general license (a license granted by regulations, with no requirement to seek prior approval from the
NRC) for exports of nuclear components that are within the scope of items 5 through 9 of the NRC’s
illustrative list at Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 110, to 35 countries, almost all of which are members of the
NSG and parties to nuclear cooperation agreements with the United States. Similarly, DOE’s Part 810
regulations provide a general authorization for transfer of technical data and assistance that is not
sensitive from a non-proliferation perspective, including commercial nuclear reactor technology, to
countries not listed on the DOE’s restricted country list at 810.8(a). Finally, DOC’s Export
Administration Regulations provide for a host of license exceptions and allow most DOC-controlled
nuclear-related items to be exported to most destinations without a DOC license.
The Russian nuclear export control regime is more restrictive than its U.S. counterpart in this respect
because it does not provide for similar license exceptions and general authorizations. Under the Russian
regime, all items listed in the control lists are controlled to all destinations and require export licenses.
At the same time, the Russian regime is less restrictive in controlling exports to countries with which
Russia does not have a bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement, many of which could not receive exports
of major nuclear components and nuclear material from U.S. nuclear exporters. For example, under the
Russian regime, export licensing requirements for nuclear exports to Vietnam are exactly the same as
export licensing requirements for nuclear exports to France. Under the U.S. regime, however, a U.S.
exporter of nuclear components cannot supply these components to Vietnam until the U.S. and Vietnam
conclude a bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement. Further, the same U.S. exporter may face delays in
obtaining a Part 810 specific authorization in order to engage in technical discussions with a Vietnamese
company because the DOE considers the existence of a nuclear cooperation agreement with the recipient
country to be one of the most important criteria in its review of whether to issue a specific authorization
pursuant to 10 CFR Part 810.
b. Technology-Specific Restrictions
Russia, like the U.S., has adopted a “deemed export” rule. The release of controlled technology to a
foreign national in the Russian Federation is “deemed” to be an export to the country of citizenship of the
foreign national and triggers export control requirements.
Russian export regulations control the provision of technical data and technical assistance in accordance
with the NSG Guidelines. As discussed in Section II of this report, the NSG Guidelines’ definition of
technology as information for the “development,” “production” and “use” of controlled items provides for
more circumscribed controls over technology than do DOE’s vaguely worded Part 810 rules.
c. Re-Export Restrictions
The re-export restrictions provided under the Russian regime are consistent with the NSG Guidelines. As
addressed above, the end-user must provide assurances that the controlled commodities or technology will
be retransferred only if the following conditions apply: (a) peaceful use; (b) application of IAEA
safeguards; and (c) physical protection. In practice, the end-user (customer) can satisfy these conditions
implicitly by having in place a nuclear cooperation agreement with the country to which the Russian-
controlled item shall be retransferred or by engaging in an exchange of diplomatic notes with the third
country. No permission from the Russian government is required for the re-transfer.
These NSG-compliant retransfer controls are less restrictive than those imposed by the United States and
some other countries, including Japan and the ROK, which, in addition to the conditions set out above,
require that the country that is the recipient of the technology obtain supplier country approval before
authorizing the retransfer of any supplied commodities or technology to third parties.
8. License Review Process and Timeframe
The Russian nuclear export control system provides for significantly shorter processing times than any
licensing system under the U.S. regime. As previously discussed, the Russian systems place much of the
burden of paperwork, classification and retransfer assurances on the exporter, reducing the agencies’ role
to review of information that is largely complete. Further, license application processing times are set by
the Russian regulations and are significantly shorter than processing times under the U.S. system. These
processing times are outlined below.
a. Single Export License
FSTEC will generally make its decision 3 days after it completes its examination of the application documents,
but usually not more than 45 days from the date of receipt of the application and supporting documents. The
45-day period can be extended if the application is incomplete and additional information is required.
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FSTEC is required to notify the applicant within 3 days of making the export license decision.
b. Multiple Export (General) License
No later than 10 days after the receipt of the application, FSTEC prepares a draft decision of the Government
of the Russian Federation for concurrence by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, the
Ministry of Industry and Trade, Rosatom, the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation and, if
necessary, other federal executive bodies.
The time required for the approval of the draft decision shall not exceed 10 days from the date of receipt of the
draft decision by each agency and Rosatom.
Each agency and Rosatom considers the draft decision only with respect to its own jurisdiction, without
conditioning approval of the decision on issues that are within the purview of other agencies/Rosatom.
The decision is issued within 5 days from the receipt of all concurrences.
Total processing time prescribed by statute: ~25 days.
1. General Basis for Export Control Regime
Japan has a long-standing nuclear export control policy based on assurances for peaceful use and non-
proliferation, including compliance with the NSG Guidelines. The Japanese nuclear export control
system is based on Japan’s Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act, as well as several orders and
ordinances. Interestingly, the Japanese regime commingles export controls over sensitive commodities
and technology with controls over foreign exchange activities. Japan’s lists of controlled nuclear
material, equipment and technology are consistent with the NSG Guidelines’ Trigger and Dual-Use Lists.
The Japanese nuclear export control regime was strengthened after September 11, 2001, and several high-
profile cases of illegal exports of sensitive commodities by Japanese firms. The current regime
recognizes the threat of nuclear proliferation and is based on the increased awareness that stringent export
controls are needed to prevent the diversion of nuclear-related commodities and technology to weapons
uses. Japan has cooperated with the United States on the strengthening of its export control regime and
has also taken a leading role in encouraging other countries in Asia to enact comprehensive nuclear export
control regimes by engaging in seminars and bilateral outreach activities, and by providing support for
their establishment of export control regimes.
2. Legal Basis for Export Control Regime
Although comprehensive in its controls, the Japanese nuclear export control system is not easy to
decipher. A careful review of the legislation and regulations, as well as presentations given by the
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), reveals a system of controls based on the NSG
Guidelines and a strong commitment to non-proliferation and preventing diversion of nuclear material,
equipment and technology for illicit uses. Aside from the legal structure of the Japanese regime, which is
structured differently from the U.S. export control regime, the actual system of export controls in Japan is
similar in many ways to the U.S. export control system administered by the DOC under the Export
Administration Regulations (EAR).
Japan regulates the export of nuclear-related commodities and technology under a single piece of
legislation – its general trade law, the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act, last amended in 2009. In
accordance with the Act, the Japanese government has issued several cabinet orders that describe
procedures for obtaining export licenses and approvals and include control lists. Further, METI issues
ministerial-level ordinances that provide detail and interpretations of listed items.
Japan’s list of controlled nuclear material, equipment, and technology is consistent with the NSG
Guidelines’ Trigger and Dual-Use Lists. A catch-all control, or end-use control, supplements the control
list by subjecting items not on the control list to export license application requirements based on end use
for the purposes of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) (e.g., based on reference to the Commodity
Watch List) or destination to a company on the Foreign End User List. This catch-all exception is very
similar to the catch-all exception and restrictions for exports to entities and individuals on Denied Persons
and other restricted lists set forth in the EAR.
A detailed listing of the applicable Japanese legislation, orders, ordinances and control lists is provided in
Hirofumi Tosaki, CPDNP, Japan Institute of International Affairs, “Export Controls in Asia: Unpopular But Indispensable
Measures for Non-Proliferation and Development,” presented at the First Meeting of the CSCAP Study Group on Countering the
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, May 28, 2005, Singapore.
3. Responsible Authority
METI is the single Japanese agency responsible for administering export controls and issuing export
licenses. METI, whose functions are generally similar to those of the U.S. DOC, is also responsible for
trade promotion. In addition, METI frequently conducts educational seminars on nuclear export controls
for Japanese industry and Asia-wide.
There are three units within METI, all under the Trade Control Department, responsible for export control
administration: (1) the Security Export Control Policy Division, responsible for export control policy
setting, legislation and overall administration; (2) the Security Export Licensing Division, responsible for
issuing licenses; and (3) the Security Export Inspection Office, responsible for enforcement, inspections
and educational activity to prevent illegal exports.
Channeling all of its export control efforts through a single agency allows the Japanese government to
administer its export control system with minimal bureaucracy.
In addition, Japan’s Center for Information on Security Trade Control (CISTEC) is a non-profit
organization dedicated to the promotion of export controls in Japan. CISTEC functions as a link among
government, industry and academia on export controls and non-proliferation. Specifically, CISTEC’s
mission is to make Japanese export control more efficient and effective, and it carries out this mission
through a variety of activities, including providing advice to industry, classification of commodities and
technologies, assisting companies with setting up compliance programs, compiling guidance on export
controls, providing training seminars for businesses, publishing companies’ results of self-classifications,
and maintaining an online database of export control-related information.
4. Export License Requirements
a. Types of Licenses
The Japanese licensing system is similar to the Russian system in that it allows for issuance of licenses
for multiple exports by exporters with approved internal control programs. The Japanese regime is
stricter than its Russian counterpart in that it only issues multiple export licenses, known as “bulk export
licenses,” for exports of NSG dual-use items and only to 26 low-risk countries. Although this exact type
of license is not available under the U.S. export control regime, the U.S. licensing requirements for NSG
Dual-Use items are similarly permissive. In the United States, NSG Dual-Use commodities and related
technology are controlled by the DOC in accordance with the EAR. Most of these items, although subject
to the EAR, do not require a license for export, absent exports for embargoed destinations or exports for
nuclear weapons or unsafeguarded uses.
Exports of all other controlled nuclear commodities and technology require an individual export license.
The types of licenses available under the Japanese system and their periods of validity are as follows:
Bulk Export Licenses
(1) General Bulk Export License
License under simplified application procedures for multiple exports of less sensitive goods
and technology (e.g., NSG Part 2 items) from approved exporters to end-users in low-risk
“White” countries (see “Restrictions by Country” below).
In order to qualify for a bulk export license, exporters are required to: (1) establish and submit
for METI approval an appropriate internal control system based on METI’s Internal
Compliance Program (ICP), (2) implement controls in strict compliance with the ICP, and (3)
participate in specific seminars held by METI. Exporters are required to report their
Office of International Affairs for Security Export Control, Trade and Economic Cooperation Bureau, “Government-Industry
compliance status to METI by answering questions in METI’s “Export Control Compliance
Self-check List.” In addition, METI conducts on-site inspections on bulk export license
This license may not be used for the exports to or through Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Libya or
Validity: 3 years and can be extended for an additional 3-year period.
(2) Special Bulk Export License
License under simplified application procedures for multiple exports of specific items (e.g.,
NSG Part 2 items) from exporters with registered ICPs to the same customers under a
continuous trade relationship.
Validity: 3 years and can be extended for an additional 3-year period.
(3) Special Bulk Export License for Overseas Subsidiaries
License allowing a manufacturer to make repeated exports of specific items it manufactured
to its overseas subsidiary (Subsidiary A) directly or through another overseas company
(Subsidiary B) as an importer.
Individual Export License
License required for all exports to which the bulk export license is not applicable: NSG Part 1
items, non-“White” countries, catch-all control.
Validity: 6 months.
b. Conditions for Granting a License
METI examiners apply the following licensing criteria in evaluating export license applications:
Will items actually reach the stated end-user?
Will the stated end-user really use the item?
Will the actual use exactly match the stated end-use?
Will the stated end-user strictly control the item?
These considerations are similar to licensing criteria under the U.S. regime. Both regimes regulate
commodities and technology based on the product, destination, end-user and end-use.
c. Requirement for Nuclear Cooperation Agreement
A nuclear cooperation agreement is not legally required for exports of nuclear and nuclear-related
materials, equipment and technology from Japan. However, Japan has entered into a number of bilateral
nuclear cooperation agreements with the United States and other countries, as noted below, and those
agreements govern exports that are subject to their terms. Compared to countries such as the United
States and France, Japan is party to relatively few bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements. However, in
line with the Japanese efforts to boost commercial nuclear exports, Japan has become increasingly more
active on the bilateral cooperation front, with four (4) bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements pending
before the Japanese parliament.
The status of Japan’s bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements is as follows:
In force: United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, France, China, EURATOM, Kazakhstan,
Republic of Korea, Jordan and Vietnam
Signed (yet to enter into force, under consideration by the Japanese parliament):
Russia (May 2009)
United Arab Emirates (substantially agreed)
India, South Africa, Turkey (under negotiation)
As demonstrated in Appendix C, a review of the most recent Japanese bilateral nuclear cooperation
agreements and those agreements pending before Japanese parliament reveals that Japan has adopted the
form and requirements of U.S. agreements. For example, the cooperation agreements that Japan has
signed with Jordan and Vietnam in the past year contain retransfer restrictions that, similar to U.S. nuclear
cooperation agreements, include retransfer requirements that go beyond the requirements specified in the
NSG Guidelines. These agreements provide that the recipient country must obtain the supplier country’s
approval before transferring the supplied item to another country (“third party”). In contrast, the NSG
Guidelines only require that the recipient state must obtain assurances from the third party equivalent to
those in the agreement between the supplier and the recipient (i.e., peaceful uses, IAEA safeguards and
5. Export and Re-Export Restrictions
a. Restrictions by Country
As discussed above, the Japanese nuclear export control regime applies restrictions by country of end-
user. Export destinations are divided into two categories: “White” countries and non-“White” countries.
“White” countries are 26 countries designated as low-risk due to NPT membership, participation in export
control regimes, and use of catch-all controls. To qualify, a country must be a member of all four
international export control groups: NSG, Australia Group (AG), Missile Technology Control Regime
(MTCR), and the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA). The “bulk export license” is applicable to exports of
nuclear commodities and technology to these countries.
The “White” countries are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, the ROK, Luxemburg, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, and the United States.
Nuclear exports to all other countries – the non-“White” countries – are subject to individual export
b. Restrictions by End-Use
METI frequently requires exporters to obtain an end-use certificate from the end-user of the controlled
commodity or technology that is proposed to be exported. The end-use certificate must include:
Confirmation of item’s end-use location and purpose/application;
Certification of peaceful use; and
Confirmation of no re-exports without exporter’s prior written consent (original exporter to consult
with METI regarding the retransfer).
c. Restrictions by End-User
Similar to the denied persons, entity and other restricted persons lists maintained by the U.S. DOC, METI
maintains the End User List, a list of foreign entities that are considered to have engaged in activities
related to the development, production, manufacturing or storage of WMD. If the export is to a listed
entity, submission of an export license application is required unless it is obvious that the goods are not
destined for use for WMD/military purposes.
d. Technology-Specific Restrictions
As is true of most NSG members, Japanese law applies NSG-compliant controls on exports of
information and software, including technical data and technical assistance, for the development,
production and use of controlled nuclear commodities. Technology or software transfers by intangible
means, such as telephone, e-mail or facsimile are also controlled.
In addition, in 2009, the Japanese government made several major revisions to the Foreign Exchange and
Foreign Trade Act. One of these revisions involved the enhancement of controls over technology
transfers. Before 2009, when the Act was revised, Japanese legislation and regulations controlled
transfers of technology by Japanese residents and held that a transfer of listed technology or software to a
non-resident was subject to the license requirement if the transfer took place outside of Japan. The 2009
revisions to the Act were made, according to commentators, because of today’s reality of technology
transfer via electronic media and the globalized nature of business. The new legislation requires as
(1) Technology transfers from Japan to a foreign country. Japanese law requires any person,
resident or non-resident, to obtain a license when transferring listed technology from Japan to a
foreign country. A license is not required, however, when the technology is for the person's own
use in the foreign country. In accordance with this requirement, a U.S. citizen who is on business
in Japan would be subject to the licensing requirement if s/he intends to transfer Japanese-
controlled nuclear technology from Japan to another country.
(2) Technology transfers within Japan. Japanese law requires Japanese residents to obtain a
license when transferring listed technology in Japan to a non-resident.
(3) Technology transfers within a foreign country. Japanese law requires Japanese residents to
obtain a license when transferring listed technology in any foreign country. A license is not
required, however, if the technology was sourced in a foreign country and the transaction is
completed only in a foreign country.
The definitions of “resident” and “non- resident” are as follows under the Japanese system:
Japanese nationals A person residing in Japan
A person working in Japan’s
diplomatic establishment abroad
A person who left Japan for the purpose of
working in a foreign office
A person who left Japan for the purpose of
staying abroad for more than two years
A person who has been staying abroad for more
than two years
Foreign nationals A person working in an office in
A person who has been staying in
Japan for more than 6 months
A person residing in a foreign country
A person who is an official of a foreign
government or an international institution
A diplomat, consul, or a person accompanying
or serving the diplomat or consul
Center for Information on Security Trades Central (CISTEC), “Overview of Japan’s Export Controls,” Feb. 2010.
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