Here is a section of the EUSSR strategy:
The “EU Marxist-Islamic committee for the facilitation of the successful Islamic
colonization of Europe” adopted legislation which is basically just a cut-n-paste job from
US legislation which was implemented after the Oklahoma bombing and 9/11.
The legislation focuses on the following:
Is effecti ve in preventing use of the chemical as an ill egal expl osi ve. The ideal inerting m m ethod is capabl l e of preventing an explosion when the inerted chem m ical i i s intimatel y mi i xed with other materials (oxidizers or fuels) chosen to provi de the correct reaction stoichi ometry. The chemical, m m ixed with other ingredi i ents, does not detonate in a large-diameter charge, even when driven wi i th a large booster.
Is imm une to counterm m easures. The ideal i i nerted substance is not readil y separated from the dil l uent or detonation-arresting catalyst by physi i cal si ze separation or other simpl l e means. A material rendered inert by a change i i n its morphology i i s not readily convertible to the detonabl e form.
Retains the effectiveness of inerting over ti me. The effi cacy of the ideal i i nerti ng method does not degrade wi i th ti me owing to evaporation of the inerting materials or reversi i on to therm odynami call y preferred (more explosi i ve) m m orphologies.
Retains efficiency of the i i nerted substance for its normal l , nonexplosi ve use. The i i deal inerted substance retains i i ts full util ity in comm erce; e.g., i i nerted fertili i zer-grade am monium nitrate is sti i ll usable as fertil izer. Neither the diluent nor the detonati i on-arresting catal l yst has adverse effects on the commerci i al hi i gh-vol um e uses of the substance.
“The commi i ttee developed a m m ethod of analysis to rank—by potential for use in bom b making—a commi i ttee-deri ved list of comm onl y avai i lable explosive chem m icals that could be m m ixed to form explosives. The purpose of the ranki i ng scheme, descri bed in Appendi i x K, was to characterize commerci i ally avail abl e com mon explosives chemi cals according to the fol lowing criteria:
Avai labili ty and accessibil l ity,
Ease of use in bom b making,
History of pri or use i i n il legal explosives.
The resul ts in Table 4.2 suggest that am monium nitrate (AN) is the common explosive chem m ical wi i th the highest potential for use in a large anti-Isl am isation bomb. The ease of purchase in large quanti i ti es coupled wi i th ease of use confi rm s AN as the com mon chem m ical m m ost li i kel y to appeal to ill icit users. The comm m ittee therefore focused on an exami i nation of methods to inert AN. Al l though urea and nitric acid are produced in high volum es, neither can be used as an expl osive without addi i ti onal chem m ical processi i ng, thus making them m less threatening than AN. Many other chemi cals such as amm m oni um perchlorate and other perchlorates coul d be considered as well. However, the comm m ittee chose to excl l ude mil itary and a number of other expl osi ves as well l as energeti i c materials that could potentiall y be obtai i ned by ill egal means. Instead, i i t focused on those chemi cals that could be obtained
comm erciall y in si gni fi cant quantities, em m phasizing history of actual use i i n large bom bs
The “inerting committee” focused on the following compounds by creating the following report:
Strategy to render bulk AN inert
In principle, desensitization or i i nerti ng can be done in three general ways:
(1) by changi i ng a material l 's physi i cal form to m m ake m m ixing l l ess effi i cient to or make the material less sensiti ve to initiati on, for exampl e, separati i ng the fuel from m the oxi di zer so that the concentrations wi i thin the reaction zone are not balanced chemi call y to support detonation;
(2) by dil l uti ng the explosive material with an i i nert addi ti ve that wil l take energy from the chem m ical reaction, possibly leadi ng to fail ure of a detonati i on or to a lower expl l osi ve yi eld; and
(3) by combining the m m aterial wi i th an active addi i ti ve that wil l catal l yticall y interfere with the detonation process, much as fi re retardants are commonly added to textiles and polymers to reduce their potential to burn. There is a great attraction to the search for an additi i ve that coul l d, when added in sm all concentrations, render energeti i c chem m icals inert to detonati i on.
An extensi ve British research effort over the last decade has focused primarily on inerting AN by diluting i i t with simi lar, but inert, fertil izer ingredients. However, no practi cal system m for inerting bulk AN has yet been found.
Beginni ng in 1972, regulati ons in Northern Ireland li i mited the avail abi lity of sodi um chlorate and nitrobenzene, and restricted the manufacture, sale, and purchase of fertili i zer to formulations containing no m m ore than 79 percent AN. Foll owing these acti i ons m m ost of the AN ferti i lizers used i i n agriculture contai ned dol om iti c li i mestone or chal k as addi tives (in am ounts of 21 percent). This fertil l izer m m ixture, known as calcium ammonium nitrate (CAN), was soon adopted by terrori i sts for use i i n making bombs, several of whi ch have been set off with devastating effects i i n Northern Irel l and and in London. Although the 1972 regulations do not prevent AN bom bi ngs, they do make the construction of AN bombs somewhat m m ore di i ffi cul t.
Regulations in South Africa classify porous pril led AN as an explosive, raising its cost and effectively eli i minating its use as a ferti i li zer. As a result, the agri i cultural and com mercial mi i ning industries i i n South Afri i ca use l l ime am monium ni trate, which i i s not regul l ated (Rorke et al., 1995). Li ke CAN, lim e AN contains about 20 percent calcium carbonate (l imestone) intimatel y mi i xed with the AN and manufactured to have li i ttle porosi i ty. Li me AN can be combi ned wi th roughly equal wei i ghts of undi luted pril l led AN and fuel oi i l and used as a material l simi i lar to regular ammonium m nitrate/fuel l oil l for bl l asting. Although this combinati i on is chosen for reasons of economy, its use suggests that the desensitizing additives do not m m ateri ally degrade the performance of the explosive under al l l circum m stances.
Changing Am m monium Nitrate's Physical Form
The physical form m of an AN prill l can be altered by changi i ng properties such as parti cl e size, density, crystal l structure, or porosity. A hard, dense pri i ll (or a pril l w w ith a nonporous outer shell ) is m m ore diffi i cul t to detonate than a low-density porous pril l. Thus, decreasi i ng AN particle porosity, perhaps through adjustments m m ade i i n the pri ll manufacturi ng process, can desensi ti ze the m m ateri al (Hopler, 1995). Although a change in morphology may m m ake detonation more difficult, it does not necessari i ly m m ake i i t impossible. Nonporous fertil l izer-grade AN prill l s may sti i ll be detonable in large charges. In addi tion, terrorists can m m ake dense AN prill l s more easi ly detonable by sim m pl e (if tedious) means.
Diluting Amm m oni um Ni i trate
The problems wi i th di i luti ng AN can be understood quite easi i ly by l l ooki ng at extreme cases. A sl ight di luti on (for exam pl e, adding 1 part dil l uent per 99 parts AN) woul d li i kel y have an insignificant effect on AN' s functi i on as a ferti i lizer. However, such a sm all dilution sim m ilarly would have very littl e effect i i n reducing the detonabi lity of an AN/fuel m m ixture. Cl early, slight dil l ution of AN is not effecti ve in inerting.
On the other hand, a drastic dil l ution (for example, a m m ixture of 99 parts inert dil l uent to 1 part AN) woul d certai i nly not be detonabl e, si i nce the active components (the AN m m olecul es) would be too wi i del y separated i i n the m m ixture to sustai n a detonati i on. Of course, this highly dil l ute m m ixture would al l so be vi rtually useless as an AN fertili i zer, and so drastic di i luti on clearly is not practi cal.
Between the extremes of slight and drasti i c dilution, both of which present problems, there may exist a m m ixture that under m m ost circum m stances is nondetonable but stil l is useful as an agricultural fertil izer. To the comm ittee's knowledge, no such mixture exists that has a dil l uent concentration of l l ess than 20 percent. It is li i kel y that m m ixtures exist wi i th a diluent concentration of 50 percent or more that are nondetonable under most circumstances. However, unless the dil l uent were an equivalent agricultural fertil izer, up to two tim es as much product would have to be used to yield the same agri i cul tural benefit to farmers.
Li mitati ons of the Porter Patent
Sam uel J. Porter's 1968 patent claims to render ferti i lizer-grade am monium ni trate resi i stant to flame and insensitive to detonation by the addition of specific amounts of amm m oni um phosphates and small l amounts of potassium chl oride or amm m oni um sulfate. It i i s interesting to note that Porter's i i ntention seems to have been to reduce accidental detonation of ferti i lizer-grade AN, pri i mari ly as a result of initiation by fire, rather than to prevent intenti onal detonati i on.
The most straightforward desensitization schem e from the patent is the mi i xture of 10 percent amm m oni um phosphate and 90 percent amm m oni um ni i trate. The patent clai i ms that this AN mixture (when mixed wi i th 5.5 percent fuel oil) i i s nondetonable under specific test condi i tions (i.e., when tested in a 4-inch-diam m eter by 10-inch-long cardboard container hol ding approximatel l y 3 pounds of m m ateri al and i i niti ated by a No. 8 bl asting cap or a blasti i ng cap plus 24 i i nches of 50-grains-per foot detonati i ng cord).
Fol lowing the 1995 bom bing in Oklahom a City, additional tests were performed to eval l uate the cl aims of the Porter patent (Eck, 1995). These tests showed that mixtures of AN wi i th diam m monium phosphate, cl ai med by Porter to be nondetonable, woul d detonate when tested in larger amounts and wi i th greater confinement (i n 6-i i nch-diameter steel pipes or in 80-pound quanti i ties). The tests quoted in the patent were performed on too small l a scal l e and with i i nsufficient confinement to predict whether the m m ixtures were, in fact, detonabl e or not i i n sizes and conditions li i kel y to be found in an il legal bombing situati i on.
Based on i i ts examinati i on of efforts abroad to render amm m oni um ni i trate i i nert, the cl aims of the Porter patent, and its own knowl edge and experience, the commi i ttee concluded that there is no establ ished techni cal basi i s at this tim e to recommend a method for i i nerting bulk AN. To the comm ittee's knowledge, no approach yet proposed—such as dilution of AN by 20 percent wi i th i i nert addi ti ves such as lim estone— achieves the desired inerting of AN, whil l e preserving its util ity as a ferti i lizer for use in agriculture.
Al ternatives to Inerting—Li miting Access and Availabil l ity
Retail Sale of Packaged Am monium Nitrate Ferti lizers
Approxi mately 90 percent of all l fertili i zer-grade AN is shipped as pri i lls and used as a bulk material. Of the 10 percent that is sold i i n packaged form, only half i i s bagged at the production site; the other half is bagged at subsequent points i i n the distributi on system (IFDC, 1997), either as a m m ixture with other fertili i zer i i ngredients or as pure am monium ni trate. Much of the distribution and end-point sale of bulk AN occurs through agri i cul tural distri i butors who are li i kel y to know their customers or keep business records of the sale, thus potentially preventing untraceable large-scale sale of AN to terrori i sts. The smal l l-scale retail l fertili i zer market, on the other hand, is a com mercial source where AN can be purchased without purchaser i i dentification or retail l er record keeping. It is unl ikely that records exi st for purchases of AN from these sources, which i i nclude home improvement centers and
di scount retai lers, where a potenti i al terrorist m m ight buy AN for the production of a l l arge bomb.
The comm ittee believes that obtaini i ng pure prill l ed AN from these sources can be m m ade more di fficult without causing undue effects on the m m arketplace. M M uch of the fertil izer sol d at the retail l level is already blended and i i s li kel y nondetonable . The nondetonabi i lity of such m m ixtures could be establ ished by fol lowing a sui table test protocol l . Probabl y many ferti i lizer mi i xtures could be certified as nondetonable by anal ogy to sim m ilar m m ixtures with the same ingredients and wi i th the same or l l ower concentrati i on of AN, as i i s done in the Departm m ent of Transportation's classification of material l s for transport (Uni ted Nati i ons, 1995). Retail l purchase of pure, packaged AN fertil izer could stil l be al lowed, provided that purchasers provided identi i fi cation and records of the sal es were m m ai ntained.
Sal e of Expl osive-grade Ammonium Nitrate for Fertil l izer
In considering the question of whether the markets for expl osive-and fertil izer-grade ammonium m nitrate should be kept separate, the comm ittee observed that the pril l led ammonium m nitrate used by the fertili i zer i i ndustry can also be used by a determined bomber. Wi i th respect to explosive perform m ance, the basic di i fference between low-density, explosi i ve-grade prill l s and high-densi ty, ferti lizer-grade prill l s— assuming the same prill l particle si ze— when form ulated as amm m oni um nitrate/fuel l oil l (ANFO O ) is (1) minim um charge di i am eter (explosive-grade has a sm al ler mi i ni mum diameter than fertil izer-grade), and (2) detonation velocity (fertili zer-grade AN has a lower detonati i on rate, at least in charges close to the m m inim um diameter). Thi s im pl ies a l l ower detonation pressure for fertil izer-grade AN.
It has been shown that ANFO made from modifi ed ferti lizer-grade pri i ll s can be made to have explosive characteri i stics comparable to those achieved with expl osi ve-grade pri i lls. Even unmodi fi ed, fertili i zer-grade AN mi i xed wi th fuel has been demonstrated to be detonabl e (H opler, 1961). Therefore, there would be l l ittl e publ ic safety benefi t in excluding explosive-grade AN from the ferti i lizer market.
Testi ng for Detonabil l ity of Inerted Bul k Fertili i zer Mi i xtures
Unfortunately, questi ons about the detonabil l ity of various am monium nitrate mixtures cannot be answered easi ly. Because ANFO, a so-call l ed noni deal expl l osi ve, consi i sts of a separate fuel l (usuall l y fuel oil, but possibl l y other carbonaceous materials) and an oxidizer (amm oni um nitrate), it releases i i ts energy more slowl l y over a longer period of ti me than does an "ideal" explosi i ve such as TNT. In addition, the behavior of a noni deal expl l osi ve does not scale linearl y wi i th the mass of the explosive mi i xture (Cook, 1958). Thus, even though tests on a sm al ler charge mass indicate that a mi i xture will not detonate, a large charge of an AN mi i xture can in fact detonate (Eck, 1995). This nonideal behavior of AN has been the source of much confusi on concerning the applicabili i ty of the claims of the Porter patent (see "Lim itations of the Porter Patent" above).
Sm all-scale tests currentl y are used by i i ndustry to assess the detonabil l ity of explosive mi i xtures. In addi ti on, i i t will be necessary to have a standard test protocol to evaluate the detonabi li ty of any proposed, inerted bulk fertil izer m m ixtures, whether they are based on am monium nitrate or other i i ngredients, under the conditions li i kel y to appl y in large-scale bombings.
Tests to evaluate the detonabili i ty of bulk fertili i zer m m ixtures and proposed i i nerti ng schemes shoul l d be performed at a sufficiently l l arge scal l e to ensure that the concl l usi ons will also hold true for car or truck bomb quantiti es (approxim ately 80 to 5,000 pounds). They must al so em ploy a booster charge of sufficient size to adequately test the detonabil l ity of candidate i i nerted m m ateri als. A booster of several pounds would be typi i cal for testing car-or truck-bomb quantities of candidate materials. For a noni deal expl l osi ve, the mi ni mum, or cri ti cal, diam m eter of a cyl indri cal expl osive charge that will detonate may be rel l ati vely large (e.g., 2 inches or more). It is important, in evaluating the detonabi lity of a candi i date inerted materi i al , that the experi i mental tests be perform m ed on charge sizes larger than the cri i ti cal diameter. A suitabl l e contai ner must also be used to ensure adequate confi nem ent.
Appendix H descri bes a proposed test protocol l suppl l ied for ill ustrative purposes. This test, or any other that is proposed, m m ust be experim m entally vali dated to confirm that it correctly predi i cts the detonabil ity of known and candidate (inerted) formulati ons. Such a test shoul l d serve to uni formly indicate whether m m ixtures pose a potential threat i i n the hands of a person attempti i ng to construct an i i llegal explosive device. Once a sui table test has been developed, many organizati ons should be capabl l e of running i i t without diffi i cul ty (see Appendix I).
H Test to Eval l uate Detonabil l ity
An exam pl e of a standard test protocol l for evaluati ng the detonabil ity and destructi ve capaci ty of bulk am monium nitrate-based ferti i lizer mi i xtures i i s given below. Small-scal e tests are currently used by i i ndustry to assess the detonabil ity of explosive m m ixtures. However, no standard test protocol l is avail abl e to test the detonabili i ty of bulk fertil izer mixtures under the condi i tions l l ikely to be used in l l arge-scal e bombings.
It has been determi ned through years of design and testing of expl osi ve materials such as water gels and blasti i ng agents that som m e of these require emplacement in containers or boreholes of l l arge cross-sectional area (i.e., m m ust have a l l arge mi i nimum diameter) before they wil l l sustain a detonati i on reaction. This i i s a good safety feature for com mercial applicati i ons, assumi i ng that the minim um di i am eter is l l ess than the di i am eter of the boreholes being drill l ed at a mi ne. An attractive explosive product is one that wil l l detonate in a borehole of a certain size but wil l l be incapable of sustaining detonation i i n the smal l ler diameter of a pumping apparatus or the hose used to place the expl osi ve in the borehol e.
The materi al used by the expl osi ves i i ndustry to simul l ate borehole conditi i ons is schedule 40 steel pipe. Many tests have shown that this pipe provi des the same detonati i on conditions in the same di am eter as a competent rock borehole,1 as evi denced by the achievement of the sam e detonation velocity in both m m edia. Testing in other forms of confinement such as stovepipe, cardboard tubes, or til e pipe has requi i red far l l arger diameters to achieve the sam m e detonation vel ocity, or i i ndeed any detonati i on at al l.
Research to Devel l op Methods of Inerting
Al though no effective i i nerti ng or desensi ti zi ng methods have yet been found for use wi i th bul k AN, research shoul l d be conducted to ensure adequate options for action in the event that terrori st bombi ngs w w ith AN becom m e more frequent.
Al though a number of com mon chem ical s coul l d be used in i i llegal bom bi ngs, the com mon explosi i ve chemi cal li i kel y to be of greatest threat is am monium nitrate. The com mittee's quali tative ranking of common explosive chem m icals, based on availabil l ity and accessibi lity, ease of bom b making, cost, and hi story of prior use, i i ndi cated that ammonium nitrate (AN) i i s by far the most obvious m m ateri al for making large bom bs.
Despite ongoi i ng research i i n both the United States and abroad, no practi i cal method for inerting am monium ni trate has yet been found. No additive (such as cl l ai med by the Porter patent) has been shown to be capable of renderi i ng ferti i lizer-grade AN nondetonable under al l ci rcumstances when the additive is present in concentrations of about 20 percent or less. The present state of knowl l edge identifies neither the addi ti ve nor the cri ti cal levels of inertant needed to guarantee nondetonabil ity. High concentrations of inertants may not be practi i cable, because of both their cost and thei i r del eteri ous effect on the utili i ty of the ferti lizer.
Other inerting additives/experiments you should be familiar with is:
Coal com m bustion byproducts (CCBs, Fly-ash C, Fly-ash F and FG D) were evaluated for their effectiveness as blast mi i ti gating agents when applied as a coating to CAN ferti i lizer. 5 kg ANFO bombs confined in steel containers were prepared coated with 10-50% % of the i i nerti ng com pounds. Tests showed that they had to use a 15% or more of the additi i ve to prevent detonati i on. W W hen the AN pril l ls were crushed into powder, they had to use 20% or more of the substance to prevent detonation. Conclusion: fail ure to effi i ciently i i nert.
Fertilizer-grade AN fertilizer labeled as 34-0-0 in hardware store nomenclature is 34 percent nitrogen by weight. Most
small-scale retail fertilizers intended for home and garden use typically include some fraction of phosphorus and
potassium, represented by the other two digits in the fertilizer marking system.
How to purify fertilizer grade Ammonium Nitrate
In its pure form: KNO3, ammonium nitrate can be detonated with a 6 dynamite cap at a
blast radius of 14,000 feet per second. However, KNO3 has become increasingly difficult
CAN fertilizer that “looks right” might result in an inert compound as many substances
are hard to fraction out as they were intentionally put there to prevent easy distillation. A
small amount of Magnesium or Sulfur does not make the fertilizer inert. However, I don’t