48
366
Interaction with Other Approaches to Language
周e distinction between propositions and illocutionary acts does make sense, since
we can see the distinction in action in this and any number of other cases. It is a valuable
distinction. But it is not “pure”; that is, it does not separate two aspects perfectly, in such
a way that there is no longer interaction or entanglement.
周is area of entanglement needs some explanation. Consider first a simple yes-no
question: “Does Sam smoke habitually?” According to Searle’s analysis, a speech like
this one can be broken up into two separate aspects: the underlying proposition and the
“illocutionary force.” 周e illocutionary force is the character of the speaker’s commitment
in the act of delivering the u瑴erance. In this case, the illocutionary force is asking a ques-
tion, and can be symbolized by the question marker, “?”. 周e underlying proposition is
“Sam smokes habitually,” but without the force of an assertion, a question, or any other
particular action on the part of the speaker. 周ese two, the proposition and the speech
action, can be roughly separated. But is the separation “pure” and complete?
Searle himself recognizes a remaining impurity when he notes that with questions
that ask “how?” or “what?” or “why?” the “propositional” aspect consists not in a full
proposition but in an incomplete proposition. For example, consider the question, “Why
did he do it?” 周e illocutionary force is to ask a question, and is represented by the
question marker, “?”. 周e underlying proposition, freed from the influence of the act
of asking, would be “He did it because . . .” But we have to supply something else. 周e
proposition in this case is incomplete, because the word “why” within the question asks
the respondent to supply some particular reason, which will form part of the proposition
when it is given assertive force.
49
In addition there are other, subtle interactions. Assertions are typically made about
states of affairs from the past, whereas commands and requests are typically made concern-
ing potential states of affairs in the future. In assertions, the reference and the predication
can o晴en be made quite definite: “周is tree branch fell down in the last storm.” But an
order concerning the future may sometimes presuppose conditions that affect the abil-
ity of the order to refer and to predicate. “Tomorrow cut down the bo瑴om tree branch
on this tree” presupposes that you will still be alive tomorrow to perform the task, and
that the tree branch in question will be there waiting (rather than having fallen down in
a storm tonight, or having been cut down by someone else during the night).
In his sample case about Sam smoking, Searle neatly avoids some of the difficulties
about time by making the proposition “habitual.” “Sam smokes habitually.” It is not about
past or future time, but it is a general affirmation about all times. But there are still subtle
influences. Typically, an assertion that “Sam smokes habitually” focuses on the past,
about which the speaker knows. By contrast, the command “Sam, smoke habitually!”
focuses on the future, and is unlikely to be given as an order to Sam if Sam already smokes
habitually. So the predication “smokes habitually” is not quite the same in its temporal
relation to the real world in the two cases. In other words, when we try to reduce these
two propositional expressions to completely atemporal propositions, we must spell out
explicitly the temporal conditions, and we end up with two distinct propositions in
the two cases. “Smokes habitually” as an assertion means “smokes habitually (looking
49. Ibid., 31.
PoythressLanguageBook.indd 366
5/14/09 4:46:57 PM
47
367
Appendix H: 周e 周eory of Speech Acts
backward in time).” “Smoke habitually” as a command means “smoke habitually (look-
ing forward in time).”
50
For the sake of rigor, Searle wants an exact separation of the two components, as can
be seen from the fact that he introduces a rigorous symbolic notation:
周e general form of (very many kinds of) illocutionary acts is
F(p)
where the variable “F” takes illocutionary force indicating devices as values and “p” takes
expressions for propositions.
51
周e point is that “F” is notationally separated perfectly from “p.” Rigor is achieved by
ignoring the subtleties in natural language that involve entanglement of the two.
周e Ordinary Reader
And here, does the “ordinary” reader or listener o晴en have the advantage? Perhaps many
ordinary readers have tacitly known all along about speech acts. 周at is, they know the
difference between questions, requests, commands, songs, sermons, parables, and reports.52
Of course, these categories are “insider” categories that may then differ from one language
to another. But human nature has sufficient unity so that the ordinary reader still appreci-
ates to a considerable extent how different kinds of u瑴erances differ in their purposes. And
then he probably does be瑴er than the theoretical analyst, because he responds as a whole
person, who appreciates multidimensional purposes, rather than as an analyst, who stands
one step removed from full interaction with the textual communication.
周e analyst, by stepping back, achieves a kind of human analogue to transcendence.
But he remains finite, a flesh and blood human being. His own analytical activity is part
50. Searle may escape using the route of idealization already mentioned: he is not actually
talking about any actual language, including English, but about idealized propositions that are
exact in meaning. But now we are traveling into the area of artificial language that may have no
implications for any actual language.
Another kind of idealization takes place when we move from live performative expressions
like “I promise . . .” to the theoretical idea of illocutionary force. If we wish, we may make explicit
what kind of speech act we are performing, by adding a “performative” expression such as “I as-
sert,” “I promise,” or “I ask.” But in these cases, the performative expression is itself qualified by
a larger context, so that it is not perfectly “pure” and isolatable. “I ask you, ‘Are you going?’” does
not usually mean exactly the same thing as “Are you going?” It may connote by its explicitness
that the speaker is being more formal or official. He already knows the answer, or he is trying to
force an answer from a reluctant addressee, or he indicates that in some other way the relation
between speaker and addressee is peculiar. His main commitment is still to ask a question, but
the way that he asks has additional emotive, conative, and phatic implications (see Jakobson,
“Closing Statement,” 353–358).
51. Searle, Speech Acts, 31.
52. J. L. Austin, introducing his lectures on speech acts, modestly comments, “What I shall
have to say here is neither difficult nor contentious; the only merit I should like to claim for it is
that of being true, at least in parts” (Austin, How to Do 周ings with Words, 1).
PoythressLanguageBook.indd 367
5/14/09 4:46:57 PM
50
368
Interaction with Other Approaches to Language
of a larger situation, which is in turn subject to analysis that uncovers purposes and as-
sumptions and sins of which he is not yet aware.
53
Philosophical Purposes in Speech-act 周eory
We may also consider the more long-range purposes of speech-act theory. One of its
short-range purposes, as we said, is to focus on and make clear the context of u瑴erances
in human action. At that point its purposes overlap with those of linguists, especially
sociolinguists and linguists who focus on “pragmatics,” that is, the use of language in
the context of human action.
54
Are there then any notable differences that differentiate
speech-act theory from the work of linguists?
Nowadays there are many interdisciplinary crossovers. So we would be oversimplify-
ing to say that speech-act theory belongs to the tradition of philosophical investigation
of language. But there is still something to be learned here. Ludwig Wi瑴genstein did not
use the terminology of “speech acts,” but in his later period his examination of “language
games” shows a瑴ention to language use in a context of human action, and in the broader
context of “forms of life.” “Forms of life” are next door to what we have discussed concern-
ing the diversity of human cultures. Wi瑴genstein, then, begins reflection on speech acts
without using the terminology. And what is his purpose? 周ere may be many purposes,
but one is to dissolve philosophical conundrums by examining the ways language is used
in ordinary life and in philosophy.
55
And so we come again to the problem of transcendence. Philosophy sometimes asks
deep and searching questions about wisdom. It asks the big questions about reality, knowl-
edge, and the human condition. One way that we might approach such questions is through
reflection that focuses on metaphysics; that is, we focus on what is, and on what is reality.
Classical Greek philosophy primarily followed this route. But Immanuel Kant declared
this route to be impossible because of the limits of human reason. For Kant, epistemology,
that is, the study of what can be known and how it can be known, becomes the primary key
for answering the other big questions, and—significantly—for showing which questions
are impossible to answer because of the limitations of our finite condition.
Contemporary philosophy shows a turn from epistemology to language. If we know
how language functions, we may be able to dissolve or dispense with questions that arise
from ill-use of language. Limitations in language play a role here analogous to the role
played in Kantian philosophy by limitations in human reason.
53. 周e best forms of deconstruction have a profound awareness of this problem of analysis.
Human analysis can never be complete, and human beings never have a final point of view that
terminates the possibility of a further step of standing back.
54. Gabriel Falkenberg notes that, mainly due to Searle’s work, “problems such as those of
illocutionary forces, u瑴erance meaning and context interpretation are in safe keeping in linguistics
proper today [1990]” (Falkenberg, “Searle on Sincerity,” in Burkhard, ed., Speech Acts, Meaning,
and Intentions, 130).
55. We may observe a similar interest in J. L. Austin, How to Do 周ings with Words, in that
he explicitly addresses philosophers (2, 38); and in John R. Searle, in the very title of his book:
Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language.
PoythressLanguageBook.indd 368
5/14/09 4:46:57 PM
47
369
Appendix H: 周e 周eory of Speech Acts
Speech-act theory, as used in the philosophical tradition, can then potentially serve
as a key to understanding language. Speech-act theory is richer than the earlier tendency
to think only in terms of disembodied propositional truths. But it can be a key only if it
does not truncate the full richness of language. Truncating that richness would be likely
to have the long-range effect in philosophical reasoning of truncating the world about
which language can be used to speak. And so speech-act theory, precisely because it
does not capture the full richness of language, cannot capture either the full richness of
personhood, or the full richness of God the infinite person in whose image we human
persons are made. No, if we expect speech-act theory to provide the first few steps, if
not the complete ladder, to transcendence, we will either be disappointed or will delude
ourselves into accepting a counterfeit claim to transcendence.
周e danger also arises that some people may treat speech-act theory as if it were an alterna-
tive rather than an added dimension that would supplement a focus on propositional truth.
56
For many people who want to avoid the responsibility of submi瑴ing to objective truth, it
would be convenient if all questions about truth could be transformed into a subdivision
of sociological analysis, where we look at what people do to other people through words.
Unfortunately, questions about truth will not go away. Truth claims occur directly within
the common speech act of assertion, where a person makes a claim about truth.
57
At its best, speech-act theory can be an insightful contribution to a larger whole, by
focusing on one dimension of human action. But it runs up against limitations when we
try to make it into a tool for achieving philosophical wisdom. 周e genius of speech-act
theory is to teach us to pay a瑴ention to the meaning that u瑴erances receive through
embedding in a larger context of human purposeful action. But context, its strength, is
also its weakness. Sentence-level u瑴erances occur in the context of larger discourses.
Discourse takes place in the context of human action. Human purposeful action takes
place within the context of culture, and culture in the context of cultures, in the plural. And
cultures occur in the context of a world and a world history whose interpretation differs
from culture to culture. And that, as the postmodern relativists have seen, can lead to an
ultimate relativism in the whole human project. In the end, such relativism at a high level,
relativism generated by multiple cultures, injects relativism back down into the meaning of
any speech act—unless there is a transcendent adjudication of truth. God gives wisdom;
God brings reconciliation between man and God and between cultures.
56. Paul Helm expresses this concern eloquently in an Internet posting, “Propositions and
Speech Acts,” <h瑴p://paulhelmsdeep.blogspot.com/2007/05/analysis-2-propositions-and-
speech-acts.html, May 1, 2007. J. L. Austin makes it clear that in his view particular speech acts
presuppose or imply a host of truths (Austin, How to Do 周ings with Words, 45–46). So Austin
clearly does not make his approach an alternative to a concern for truth, but rather a supplement
or complement to it.
57. Moreover, the sociological analysis concerning what people do to one another has a deep
interest only because it makes definite claims. 周ese claims, either tacitly or explicitly, are claims
concerning truth.
PoythressLanguageBook.indd 369
5/14/09 4:46:58 PM
38
370
A
P
P
E
N
D I
X
I
-
Reaching Out to Deconstruction
Look carefully then how you walk, not as unwise but as wise,
making the best use of the time, because the days are evil.
—Ephesians 5:15–16
H
ow can we use our appreciation of language as we interact with other people,
including those outside the Christian faith? How do we talk with people who
have thought hard about language, but have denied its relation to God?
Deconstruction
For example, what would it be like to reach out to one particular group, namely, the
advocates and practitioners of “deconstruction”? I pick them because they have thought
about language and have much to say about language. At the same time, many of them
do not believe in the God of the Bible. Many of their views are akin to what we have seen
in postmodern contextualism.
1
Deconstruction is notoriously hard to define.
2
For our purposes, we do not need a
definition, because we are not trying to capture the whole of deconstruction but only
to single out a few concerns and to indicate points of contact that a dialogue could
pursue.
1. See appendices A and B.
2. For a helpful introduction, see Heath White, Postmodernism 101: A First Course for the Curious
Christian (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos, 2006); John D. Caputo in Jacques Derrida, Deconstruction
in a Nutshell: A Conversation with Jacques Derrida, edited with a commentary by John D. Caputo
(New York: Fordham University Press, 1997).
PoythressLanguageBook.indd 370
5/14/09 4:46:58 PM
Documents you may be interested
Documents you may be interested
