63
What developing country Governments can do to promote the organic agriculture sector
17
Data
The demand for data about the organic sector is high for marketers, researchers, extension services
and ultimately Governments. In most countries, including developed countries such as the United
States, there is no central collection even of basic data such as the number of farmers and what they
grow
20
. A country with only one certification body (e.g. Denmark or Norway) will more or less
automatically get a lot of relevant data collected in one place, but it is not always the case that the data
is made available. Costa Rica collects data for production, but market figures are based on estimates
from an NGO. Export market data is often easier to collect, especially as the certification bodies
normally issue transaction certificates for each lot, and therefore all trade is documented. Egypt and
Chile can produce fairly accurate data for exports, but not for the domestic market. In unregulated
markets, or markets where there is no common definition of organic, such as Thailand and Malaysia,
an additional complication for data collection is the question “Who is really organic?” FAO collects
data in the Organic Agriculture Information Management System (Organic-AIMS) available at
www.fao.org/organicag
, and IFOAM annually publishes the World of Organic Agriculture, both of
which are dependent on submissions by individuals from the countries. A consortium of institutions is
attempting to develop a European Information System for Organic Markets. Ultimately, any
Government that wants to develop the sector needs to assure baseline data and a system to monitor the
development of the sector. Initially, this is likely to be best achieved through the organic movement in
the country, and Governments should consider supporting them in their data collections. When the
sector is more developed, measures to include “organic” data in public agriculture statistics should be
considered.
RReeccoommmmeennddaattiioonn 99.. Data about organic production and markets needs to be
collected over the years, analysed and made available to the sector and policymakers.
Organic regulations, standards and certification
Standards
There are currently two international standards for organic agriculture, the Codex Alimentarius
Guidelines for the production, processing, labelling and marketing of organically produced foods (GL
32 – 1999, Rev. 1 – 2001) - CAC/ GL32
21
- and the IFOAM Basic Standards (published as part of the
IFOAM Norms, latest revision July 2005
22
). There are perhaps 70 countries with some kind of official
standards and another 100 private sector standards. Most of the standards are quite similar. Some of
them clearly reference the mentioned international standards (e.g. the Indian regulation is basically
identical to the IFOAM standards of 2002, the Brazilian regulation uses the list of inputs from Codex,
Malaysia’s standards reference both), but a number of them also reference other foreign standards, in
particular the EU regulation (e.g. South Africa).
Of the case studies, Costa Rica, Chile and Denmark have mandatory organic standards, i.e. standards
that have to be followed by anyone who markets organic foods. In Costa Rica, private bodies also
have their own standards. Chile has had a voluntary official standard since 1999, which became
mandatory in 2006. In Thailand, there are both private standards and voluntary governmental
standards. In Malaysia there is a voluntary official standard, but most certified products are imported
and certified to the standards of the exporting country. There is no indication that the voluntary
official standards are in much use. At the same time, the South African standard for organic
agriculture has been drafted since 2001 but was never approved by the Government; nevertheless, the
standard is actively used in the domestic market in South Africa. In Egypt, products are certified to
the EU regulation, and to various private sector standards in the European Union – a few also to local
standards. In all the countries, producers for exports normally follow and are certified for conformity
to the export market standard. Even in Denmark, producers wanting to export to the United States
have to follow the NOP rather than the EU regulation. The cases highlight the fact that standards
20
For United States organic acreage, in February 2006 it was only possible to get data from 1997 and 2003.
21
Available at http://www.codexalimentarius.net/download/standards/360/CXG_032e.pdf
.
22
Available at http://www.ifoam.org/about_ifoam/standards/norms.html
52
Best Practices for Organic Policy
18
development cannot be done in isolation from market realities. A standard that is not demanded in the
marketplace has no value and can even create confusion and be an impediment to development.
Whether through mandatory regulation, voluntary public programmes or by the private sector, one
organic standard that is applied by all organic producers, certified or not, helps to build energy and
joint activities in the sector. It also facilitates extension and information to producers and consumers
alike. It can also form the basis for a common mark, one of the success factors for market
development. In order to ensure that the standard is actively used, the full participation of the organic
sector is needed. Also, there is a need to be clear about the scope of the standard and its intended use:
is it for the domestic market, the export market or both? How will it apply to imported products? It
should be recognized that for export markets, the simplest solution is to follow the standards of those
markets, and that standards in importing countries can be too demanding for the domestic situation.
For organic production, it is widely recognized that local conditions vary too much to have one
detailed international standard (UNCTAD-FAO-IFOAM 2005). The use of foreign organic standards
is convenient for trade, but most of the time definitively not for the producers, and in particular not for
smallholders. It is, of course, preferable to have a single standard that applies equally for domestic and
exports, but in reality it often means that the practical choices are either to adapt the domestic
standard so much to the exports that it is not any more appropriate for the local conditions or that
export access is made impossible because the standard does not fulfil the requirements of importing
markets
23
.
Brazilian organic movement and the internal market
The Brazilian organic movement is concerned that organic regulation should be adapted to the country’s
geographic, climate, social, political and economic environment. It should not create internal barriers by
adopting international standards established mostly by high-income countries. At present, a Brazilian
organic producer wishing to export must follow the importing country’s regulations. Consequently, a
Brazilian regulation is not necessary for exports. Instead, its purpose should be to develop a strong organic
internal market (Fonseca 2006).
Government can support the development of a domestic (or regional, as is shown later) organic
standard. It is recommended that, initially, such a standard be voluntary. Regardless if it is a
governmental standard or a private sector standard, the stakeholders and especially the practitioners
should be heavily involved in the development of organic standards. If the standards are private, the
Government should participate as an important stakeholder. It is also recommended that the initial
standard be developed with local market development in mind, and that it is not too demanding and
relatively easy to apply by producers and to verify by certification bodies or by other mechanisms. If
national standards are supposed to also apply for imports, they should reference Codex and IFOAM
standards as a basis for import acceptance.
RReeccoommmmeennddaattiioonn 1100.. A national or regional standard for organic production should be
developed, through close cooperation between the private sector and Government. It
should be well adapted to the conditions in the country and mainly focus on the
domestic market.
Certification
Third-party certification has been a very important tool for the development of the organic market.
Through certification, organic products are given a distinct credible image, which is particularly
useful in marketing situations with a distance between producers and consumers, e.g. sales through
supermarkets and in international trade. However, there is no direct evidence that third-party
certification is what the market or the consumers really ask for, and other kinds of quality assurance
23
It obviously depends heavily on the attitude of the importing country how significant the differences may be
between the standard of the importing exporting country, and still be considered to be equivalent.
75
What developing country Governments can do to promote the organic agriculture sector
19
mechanisms might also be useful. For international markets, certification can be considered a must as
all major markets require certification for products marketed as organic.
There are 70 countries that have a home-based organic certification organization. Most of Africa and
large parts of Asia still lack local service providers. There are only seven certification bodies
established in Africa: in South Africa, Kenya, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania and Egypt.
Asia has 117 certification bodies, but 104 of these are based in China, India or Japan. Most Latin
American countries have domestic certification bodies (see table 1).
Table 1. Organic certification bodies
Number of organic certification bodies
2005
2004
2003
Africa
24
7
9
7
Asia
117
91
83
Europe
157
142
130
Latin America and Caribbean
43
33
33
North America
25
84
97
101
Oceania
11
11
10
Source: TOS 2005.
In all seven case studies, there are domestic certification service providers. In all of them, foreign
bodies also offer certification. Domestic bodies normally dominate the certification for the local
markets, while the foreign ones are oriented towards the export market sector. Certification services
are available globally. For export purposes, the simplest solution is to buy the services from
international certification bodies. However, there are merits in a domestic certification body. Locally-
based bodies often play a big role in the local development of the sector and for the formulation of
locally-adapted standards. A branch of a foreign body is rarely engaged in local development in the
same way, and as the service they offer is mostly for the export market, they have little interest in
developing the local market. For producers wanting to access the home market, the only certification
thus available is to foreign standards and at a cost level more adapted to the export sector. In some
regards, a local body can also exercise more efficient controls; only an organization with local
presence can follow the market on a day-to-day basis and react quickly to important developments –
such as disease outbreaks, government pesticide distribution programmes – that can affect the
certification (Rundgren 2005). Government can support capacity development for local certification
bodies. This has been done e.g. in India, where the Agricultural and Processed Food Products Export
Development Authority (APEDA), organizes training for certification bodies.
Cost of certification is often quoted as an obstacle, especially for small producers, and sometimes also
requirements such as documentation. Certification costs often represents somewhere between 1 and 4
per cent of the value of the products, but can go even higher. Moreover, they apply also to the
conversion (transition) period when producers cannot yet sell their products as organic. In many
projects in developing countries, certification costs are paid for in whole or subsidized by
development projects or in a few cases by exporters or importers. (Damiani 2002, Giovannucci 2005,
EPOPA 2006). In many EU countries, as well as in the United States, there are government
programmes to support certification costs. In Denmark, Thailand and Malaysia government
certification is for free for the farmers and in Tunisia the Government covers up to 70 per cent of
certification costs (Belkheria and Kheder, 2006). In China, companies that are certified can get up to
24
The change between the years is only reflecting a difference in classification as regards to what constitutes a
certification body and what is just a local agent.
25
When the United States NOP was implemented, the number of certification bodies increased, as a number of
new organizations started to offer the service. However, over the years they realized that the organic
certification market was not lucrative, and accreditation requirements were too demanding, so they consequently
opted out of the certification business. The same pattern can be seen in Japan in 2006.
61
Best Practices for Organic Policy
20
US$ 4,000 from the state Government
26
. Were premium prices to fall, costs for certification would
need to be further considered.
Private or governmental certification?
In most countries, certification is provided as a private sector service. However, in a number of states
of the Unites States, and in Malaysia, Thailand, Denmark, Finland and China, there are governmental
certification services. The experiences and success of such governmental service seem to differ and it
is hard to make any generalized statement about whether this service should be private or
governmental. There are a number of potential advantages with private certification services such as
competition, service orientation, better links to the organic sector, etc. However, there are also merits
in a governmental certification system, mainly its stability and its automatic “acceptance” as being
independent.
When Governments supervise and approve private bodies with the purpose of reaching equivalence,
for example with the European Union, they will have to invest considerable resources. They have to
train staff and develop systems. In contrast, a direct governmental certification organization will not
be requested by trade partners to have external approval or accreditation
27
. If the sector is small and
there is not a market for more than one or two certification bodies, then the resources spent for the
total quality assurance system will be considerably less with a direct governmental certification than
with private bodies that are approved by the Government, as the latter creates an additional layer of
costs.
It should be noted that government certification bodies often have problems when it comes to
cooperation with private sector bodies in other countries, i.e. it is often difficult, formally but also
conceptually, for government bodies to enter into e.g. multilateral recognition agreement with private
entities in other countries or to submit themselves to the private sector IFOAM Accreditation
Programme. Some Governments may also have a credibility problem, i.e. that importing countries
actually have less confidence in a government service than a private sector service, e.g. because of
fear of corruption. The situations where there is considerable scope for government certification is in
particular where the Government has a strong agenda for organic, but where the private sector is weak
and where there is no certification service offered for producers for the local market. Government
certification would allow the private sector to focus on market development and other pressing issues.
Governments should be aware that there are greater expectations that certification shall be provided
for free or for a very low cost (for the farmers) if performed by Government, something that is also
reflected in the fact that most countries having government certification provide it for free or for a
subsidized cost.
Participatory quality assurance and other non-third-party quality assurance systems
Brazil and Bolivia (Fonseca 2006, TOS 2006) accept so-called “participatory certification” within
their regulatory systems. This is also under consideration in Costa Rica. It is a system for certification
that emphasizes the participation of stakeholders, including producers, in contrast with the “objective
and independent” approach favoured under international norms (IFOAM 2004). IFOAM uses the term
“Participatory Guarantee System” to make a clearer distinction. They are often specifically designed
for small producers. The standards used are often the same as for the third-party certified
production
28
. These and other non-third-party quality assurances are now spreading quite rapidly in
developed and developing countries alike. These systems often address not only the quality assurance
of the product, but are linked to alternative marketing approaches (home deliveries, community-
supported agriculture groups, farmers’ markets, popular fairs) and help to educate consumers about
products grown or processed with organic methods. Also from Thailand and South Africa (EPOPA
26
Wei Hua, personal message Feb 2006.
27
However, many countries with governmental certification chose to also establish accreditation mechanisms,
e.g. the United States, Thailand and China.
28
For the time being, there are no international norms for what constitutes such a participatory guarantee
system, and the variation in how they operate is high.
108
What developing country Governments can do to promote the organic agriculture sector
21
2006c), such alternative systems are reported. It is important that Governments do not, through overly
rigorous regulations, inhibit this development, as formal certification may not be what is demanded in
the domestic market.
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Governments should facilitate the access to certification
services, either by stimulating foreign certification bodies to open local offices or by
supporting the development of local service providers. In some countries, especially
where the private sector is weak, the Government could consider establishing a
governmental certification service.
RReeccoommmmeennddaattiioonn 1122.. Compulsory requirements for mandatory third-party
certification should be avoided as they will not enable other alternatives to emerge.
Other conformity assessment procedures, such as participatory guarantee systems,
should be explored.
Organic regulations
In a few countries and in some states in United States, Governments became involved in the 1980s in
establishing a regulatory framework for the organic market in order to protect consumers from
misleading claims and producers from unfair competition. The European Union established an organic
regulation in 1991
29
and the United States in 2002
30
. By 2005, 70 countries had organic regulations in
various stages of implementation (see table 2). The first regulations normally contained some basic
production standards and very simple rules for certification, if any. Regulatory objectives such as
strengthening the competitive position of domestic producers, increasing farm income, and protecting
the environment, have been added to the initial ones relating to truthful labelling. Most notably, in the
European Union, the regulation for organic marketing also forms the foundation for directed support
to organic farmers under the agro-environmental programmes of the Common Agriculture Policy.
Table 2. Overview of countries with organic regulations
Region
Fully implemented Final not implemented In draft
EU-25
25
Rest of Europe
6
5
1
Asia and Pacific
7
1
5
Americas and Caribbean
3
5
7
Africa
1
1
2
Middle East
1
-
1
Total: 60
43
12
16
Source: Commins, 2004 and Kilcher et al. 2006.
When they start to get interested in organic agriculture, most Governments embark on an “organic
regulation”. Of the seven cases, Denmark has had a mandatory organic regulation since 1987, Costa
Rica since 2001. Chile and Egypt are in the process of establishing their regulations, also mandatory.
In Thailand and Malaysia, Governments are pursuing voluntary regulations while in South Africa
there is no regulatory activity. These regulations are typically market regulations that try to limit the
use of a word, ”organic”, to products produced according to standards set by the Government and
certified by an organization approved by the Government. In OECD countries, these regulations are
often, but not always, triggered by a concern for the domestic market, while in most developing
countries, they have been installed mainly, and in some cases apply only, for exports. The main push
for organic regulations comes from producers or organic certification bodies that want to have fair
competition; consumers are rarely involved.
29
Council Regulation (EEC) 2092/91.
30
National Organic Program (7 CFR Part 205)12.
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68
Best Practices for Organic Policy
22
Three main reasons are quoted for why mandatory regulations are considered to be the right policy
response to develop the organic sector:
• giving organic agriculture a more respectable and credible image;
• access to export markets; and
• development of the local market.
Giving credibility to the sector
It is quite obvious that the introduction of an organic regulation means an official recognition of
organic, that will strengthen the sector, make it visible and credible and remove some biases against
organic both in the public and privates sectors. Once the Government has acknowledged organic
farming through an organic regulation, it is hard to ridicule or ignore organic farming. However, a
mandatory regulation is not the only way for a Government to accomplish this.
Export market access
The European Union, Japan and the United States have implemented systems for import approval of
organic products. As these are based on mandatory governmental regulations, it can be assumed that
the easiest way to get access to these markets is to implement similar systems also in the exporting
country and through equivalence get market access. However, in all three markets very few products
31
enter the markets through an equivalence agreement. Not even between these three markets is there
any equivalence agreement: Japan has granted limited equivalence to the European Union and the
United States, while neither the European Union nor the United States has granted any equivalence to
the others. Some countries have been granted equivalence by the European Union based on export
regulations, i.e. the use of the claim organic has not been regulated in the domestic market. Australia
and Argentina are two such countries. To negotiate equivalence is very resource-demanding and time-
consuming (UNCTAD-FAO-IFOAM 2007). Of the countries studied, only Costa Rica
32
has managed
to get limited EU approval
33
and Denmark has managed to get limited recognition by the United
States
34
.
The main way for products to get access to the United States and EU markets, is by certification by a
certification organization that has got acceptance in those markets (Bowen 2004)
35
. The case studies
also show that exports of organic products are flowing from the countries without regulations, e.g.
Chile, Egypt, Thailand and South Africa. In addition, there are promising markets for organic
products, which do not have mandatory regulations, such as South Africa, New Zealand, the Gulf
States, Malaysia, Singapore and the Russian Federation. The recent change
36
of the EU regulation on
organic will also make it easier for certification organizations to get direct recognition by the
European Union regardless if there are regulations in the country of operation or not.
Regulation is seen as a tool for assisting organic producers to access export markets through
equivalence agreements, but the real need is not obvious. In any case, it is not a quick solution (e.g.
Chile applied for EU recognition 2000 and this is still pending) and it is very resource consuming.
Often, the result of national regulation is just another layer of complication for producers, who apart
from having to fulfil the export market requirements, now also must fulfil a domestic regulation.
31
In the EU, the estimate is that less than 20 per cent of the imported products come from approved countries, in
Japan even less.
32
Of developing countries, the EU has since 1994 only approved Argentina and Costa Rica, and lately India.
33
This approval is partial, i.e. not all producers certified in Costa Rica are accepted, only those certified by two
(of a total of six) named certification bodies.
34
The Danish authorities have the mandate to certify producers to the NOP, i.e. the Danish system itself is not
recognized – only the ability of the inspection service to control production to the United States rules.
35
The details of the import regulations in the United States, the EU and Japan are complicated but well
explained in other papers and therefore not expanded on here. In addition, the EU and the Japanese systems are
in a process of change.
36
Council regulation (EC) no. 1997/2006, of 19 December 2006.
58
What developing country Governments can do to promote the organic agriculture sector
23
Finally, there is no need to make a mandatory regulation if the aim is to support the export sector; it is
sufficient to make a governmentally-supervised system for export marketing of organics. The key to
export market access lies in competent and qualified certification organizations and efforts to
strengthen them should have priority.
Development of domestic markets
The demand for a domestic organic regulation would arise from any of these situations or a
combination of them:
• The marketing of many different organic products claiming adherence to different standards
and thereby creating confusion in the marketplace;
• The widespread selling of non-organic products as organic in the marketplace, i.e. fraud or
consumer deception;
• Lack of confidence in the credibility of organic products by consumers; and
• Lack of confidence in the credibility of organic products by organic producers, fearing that
they compete with other organic producers that are not following the same standards.
Some believe that consumers will not trust organic products unless the Government has set standards
and a mandatory system of certification; this is also expressed in some of the case studies. However
there is little empirical evidence for this assumption. Until 2001, the United States market for organic
products developed to a US$ 7 billion value without a federal regulation in force (there were,
however, several state regulations). Also, the EU countries had developed quite an organic market in
the early 1990s, at a time when only Denmark and France had national regulations. Looking at
European Union (EU-12) averages for the period 1989–1991 (when there was no regulation), 1992–
1994 (just after the EU regulation was implemented) and 1995–1997 (when there were ample
subsidies allocated to organic farming), we see that the total growth of land under organic
management during these three-year periods were as follows:
• 1989
–
1991
107 per cent;
• 1992
–
1994
60 per cent; and
• 1995
–
1997
70 per cent.
Because of the weakness of the data, it is difficult to draw any far-reaching conclusion, but in any
case there is little support for the opinion that on an EU-wide level, the introduction of the regulation
dramatically changed the market conditions, or the spread of organic farming. Comparisons of
Denmark and France with early regulations (mid 1980s) with Sweden and Italy (with regulations from
1995 and 1992 respectively) also show no direct positive impact of regulation on the development of
the sector (Rundgren 2002).
From the case studies, it is hard to conclude anything about the merits of a mandatory regulation for
domestic market development. Only Denmark and Costa Rica have mandatory regulations, and there
is no indication that the domestic market in Costa Rica therefore is more dynamic than the domestic
markets in Egypt, Thailand, Malaysia or South Africa. Nevertheless, it sounds plausible that in a
situation with real market confusion and widespread fraud, in countries with a general high
confidence in Government, that a domestic market regulation might be of some use. Still, also in
countries with regulations in place for 10 years, there is consumer scepticism about the reliability of
organic products and there is also fraud. In countries with a widespread scepticism against
Government, one might even see some negative reactions on a governmental regulation
37
.
37
In the United States, there have lately been expressions from some organic activists that the USDA has “sold
out” organic to big industry, etc.
85
Best Practices for Organic Policy
24
An additional market development aspect regarding organic regulations has been that in some
countries other regulations may have impeded on the right to market a product as organic, e.g. the
wine classification system in France, pasta classifications in Italy and meat labelling rules in the
United States didn’t allow any further quality claims regarding a product than those defined by law.
An organic regulation has been important in order to clear those obstacles. Obviously, there are other
regulatory solutions to this situation than an organic market regulation, e.g. that the regulation causing
the problem in the first place is amended.
Alternatives to mandatory organic regulations
There are several regulatory options to protect the consumers and organic producers from false
marketing claims. Most countries already have regulations regarding truthful labelling and prevention
of consumer deception. Such rules can also be applied to organic claims. Since there are both Codex
Alimentarius and IFOAM international standards available, it is quite simple to clarify (either as
amendment to existing regulation or as instructions to the supervising authority) that in order for a
product to be sold as “organic”, it has to be produced according to internationally-recognized
standards. Another option is to use regulation to back a voluntary national standard (private or public).
Such a regulatory solution can either include requirements for certification or other conformity
assessment methods, or leave that open. This option is also trade friendly and will allow imports with
a minimum of official procedure.
If the country embarks on a mandatory organic regulation, it is of critical importance that such a
regulation is “farmer-friendly” and “trade-friendly”. In some countries with mandatory regulation,
there are special rules for small farmers, e.g. in the United States NOP, farmers selling organic
products for less than US$ 5,000 annually are exempt from certification, i.e. they can make the
organic claim, they have to follow the standards but don’t have to be certified. A badly drafted
organic regulation will most likely do more harm than good. To “import” an organic regulation, for
example from the European Union, is not likely to be successful as stated in the case study from
Thailand. In Annex 8, a number of regulatory options are further developed.
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Mandatory regulations should only be considered when the need
is clearly established and other simpler options have been ruled out. In the early stage
of development, a mandatory organic regulation is not likely to be a priority.
Regulations for domestic markets should be based on local conditions, and not mainly
on the conditions in export markets.
Implementation
There is widespread underestimation of the time and resources needed to put in place organic
regulations. In many countries (e.g. the United States and Brazil), the process from the original act or
standard until all pieces are put in place has taken 10 years. Many countries have passed mandatory
regulations on organic, but then failed to implement them. This is worse than having no regulation at
all, as an unimplemented mandatory regulation puts everything in limbo. If there is a law that requires
mandatory certification for organic products, governmental standards and government approval of
certification bodies, no organic marketing can take place unless all these components are
implemented. A domestic certification body can’t develop its business as they are not yet approved,
producers can’t apply for certification if the standards are not yet defined, and the Government can’t
approve certification bodies until it has established its supervision and approval system. All these
things also need budget allocation and trained staff. Lack of implementation is reportedly the main
factor for why countries fail to get approval as a third country by the European Union (Crucefix
2007).
Government should also consider working with and using existing institutions, e.g. instead of
establishing a resource demanding national accreditation system for organic, Governments may
choose to work with the International Organic Accreditation Service, an offshoot of IFOAM. This can
be for the whole accreditation service or for the technical assessment parts of the accreditation
91
What developing country Governments can do to promote the organic agriculture sector
25
process. Such cooperation with international organizations can also contribute to increased export
market access.
Imports
As soon as there is an organic market, there will also be imports of organic products
38
. Governments
are encouraged to ensure that requirements for imports comply with the TBT agreement. The
International Task Force on Harmonization and Equivalence in Organic Agriculture (ITF), a joint
initiative of UNCTAD, FAO and IFOAM, is in the process of developing useful recommendations for
how an organic regulation can be developed, based on international standards and being enabling both
for domestic markets and for international trade. Some of the recommendations are:
•• The organic production standards should be equivalent to a single international “reference”
standard (such as IFOAM or Codex Alimentarius);
•
•
It should use international requirements (standards) for conformity assessment;
•
•
Mutual recognition between certifiers and accreditors should be recognized in the regulatory
systems; and
•
•
Redundancy in conformity assessment (certification and accreditation) can be largely reduced
by one audit/inspection/evaluation leading to multiple approvals.
The producers of goods that are imported are almost never consulted as stakeholders in the regulatory
process, and in many cases national producers are outright hostile to imports. Therefore, there is an
apparent risk that imported products will be discriminated against in regulations. Some national
regulations that seem to be developed primarily to satisfy export market access can in their turn
become major hurdles for imports. For example, the Chinese regulation for organic has set the
standards for production so high that they should comply with the total requirements of the United
States, the European Union and Japan. However, this will also apply to imports to China, which in
this case establishes the highest entry barrier of them all (Ong 2006). For imports, instead of setting
up complicated procedures for approval of imports, certification bodies can be entrusted to assess to
what extent imports follow requirements equivalent to the domestic ones.
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The recommendations from the International Task Force on
Harmonization and Equivalence in Organic Agriculture (ITF) for regulatory solutions,
in particular those relating to import access, should be considered.
Assisting producers to comply with requirements
The ability of farmers to comply with standards and certification requirements is often low. Simple
“instructions” should be developed by Government or NGOs where the organic “dos and don’ts” are
presented in a way that is accessible for small-scale, often illiterate, producers, e.g. in pictorial form.
Ensuring proper understanding and assistance in implementation to low-resourced farmers is likely to
contribute to a more credible organic market, as many of the violations of organic standards emanate
from misunderstandings or lack of information.
Group certification is a concept developed over the last 10 to 15 years to allow producers to organize
themselves in groups with an internal control system. It is not formally recognized in most
regulations, however through a consultative process by IFOAM, it has reached more or less global de
facto acceptance, at least for producers in developing countries. With group certification, the role of
the external certification is mainly to verify that the internal control of the group is working rather
than inspecting the individual farmers. All cases except Chile and Denmark have systems for group
certification. Through group certification, producers can get access to and assistance in the
complicated organic certification. It can also result in substantial savings, e.g. in Costa Rica there can
be a difference in costs of several hundred dollars for a small farm. However, there are substantial
38
See in the section on market development about some of the merits of imports of organic products.
90
Best Practices for Organic Policy
26
demands for qualification and resources at the group level, which pose limitations to its applications.
IFOAM has developed a guide for the management of internal control systems and training manuals
39
.
In some places, e.g. in South Africa, these organic internal control systems are merged with other
quality management systems (e.g. EurepGAP) and training programmes are developed.
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Producers, especially smallholders, should be supported to
comply with standards, certification procedures and regulations. Special considerations
should be taken for certification of smallholders. Training programmes for farmer
groups to set up internal control systems should be supported.
Market surveillance
Assuming that the main reason to regulate the organic sector is to reduce fraud in the marketplace and
the misuse of organic claims by non-organic producers, it is remarkable that most organic regulations
have their emphasis in regulating the certified organic farmers, and that most of them are not clear
about the responsibility for market surveillance. Also regarding implementation, in most countries the
main resources are allocated to check the organic farmers and the certifiers, and very little resources
to check the marketplace. The market knowledge rests mainly in the sector itself and organic actors
will in most cases be the first ones to detect a scam or false claims. Therefore, it is recommended that
Governments work closely with the private sector to develop the market surveillance, regardless of
which regulatory framework is chosen.
Setting the objectives – agreeing on the problems
Before embarking on regulatory initiatives, Governments and the private sector should carefully
assess the situation and see what added value a regulation can bring. It is important that that there are
common objectives agreed upon and that there is a joint analysis of what the main problems to be
solved are, and to what extent these problems can be solved by regulations, or by other means. For
example, and as mentioned already, access to export markets is most often not achieved just by
making a regulation. For another example, there is often the perception that there is a lot of fraud or
false organic products sold, but the question is if that is really the case or if this perception is rather a
result of lack of cooperation and transparency in the sector. Further, it is obviously an illusion that
fraud will disappear just because there is a regulation in place
40
. It is important that the impact of the
regulation on all organic stakeholders is assessed and not only on the strongest lobby group, and that
all stakeholders participate in the consultations.
RReeccoommmmeennddaattiioonn 1166.. Before establishing regulations, Government should clarify the
objectives. Governments regulating the sector should develop the regulations in close
consultation with the sector and ensure that the regulation is enabling rather than
controlling in nature.
Market development
While there is, and has been for a long time, an underlying growth of 10 to 30 per cent in most
countries, some countries, e.g. the United Kingdom, experience periods of rapid increase maybe up to
50 to 60 per cent for a few years – often linked to a food scare – and then a couple of years of
stagnation. People have sometimes unrealistic expectations of the organic market. The organic market
is a quality market in a way that the lower grades often are impossible to sell as organic (unless for the
feed market or industrial use). The very top-end qualities (e.g. the finest wines, coffees, teas and
cheeses) at the same time, sell on other quality parameters than being organic, and the added value of
them being certified organic is fairly small.
Some crops are very easy to convert to organic production; perhaps they are already grown in systems
close to organic, e.g. small-holder coffee in most of Africa or extensive olive groves in the
39
Available at www.ifoam.org
.
40
There are clearly incidences of fraud also in the regulated markets.
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