92
F
REEDOM ON THE
N
ET
2013
B
AHRAIN
protests through social media websites such as Flickr and Instagram.
118
He was reportedly
sentenced to three years in prison on June 18, 2013.
119
The Bahraini authorities are remarkably responsive when enforcing the country’s tight online
restrictions. Human rights activist Said Yousif Al-Muhafdha (@SaidYousif) was arrested only 23
minutes after a photo of a protester’s shotgun injury was posted on his Twitter account. The photo
identified the injury as having taken place that same day in Manama, though in reality it was taken
several days earlier.
120
Al-Muhafdha was indeed monitoring a protest in Manama prior to his arrest,
tweeting media and information about attacks on the demonstrators by the police; however, he has
denied publishing that particular picture. He was charged under Article 168 of the Penal Code with
“willfully disseminating false news” that “resulted in protests and riots that disrupted security and
order on the same day.”
121
He was detained for one month before being released on bail, pending a
trial. On March 11, 2013 the court acquitted him of the charges, stating there was “no proof of [a]
connection between the riots and the picture he had posted.”
122
However, the public prosecution
has appealed against the acquittal and a second trial will start on July 1, 2013, in which Al-
Muhafdha could face a prison sentence.
123
In January 2013, the higher court of cassation upheld a series of harsh sentences originally passed by
a military court in June 2011, in which two bloggers were charged with possessing links to a
terrorist organization aiming to overthrow the government.
124
They were also accused of
disseminating false news and inciting protests against the government. The two users, Abduljalil al-
Singace and Ali Abdulemam, had already been detained for six months between September 2010
and February 2011. According to their own court testimonies
125
and media interviews, both were
also subject to torture while held.
126
Al-Singace, a prominent human rights defender, has been held
in detention since March 17, 2011 and his blog has been blocked since February 2009.
127
He was
sentenced to life imprisonment for “plotting to topple” the government in late 2011 and remains in
prison.
128
He was not allowed to testify before the court until his appeal, when he revealed that he
118
See: http://instagram.com/ahmedhumaidan/, http://www.flickr.com/photos/86494560@N05, and
http://500px.com/AhmedHumaidan.
119
See https://twitter.com/FreedomPrayers/status/349607068916924416.
120
“Bahrain: Light speed investigation leads to arrest of a tweep 23 minutes after sending his criminal tweet!” Manama
(Blogspot), December 22, 2012, http://manamacoac.blogspot.com/2012/12/bahrain‐light‐speed‐investigation‐leads.html.
121
“Bahrain: Charges Against Rights Defender Raise Concerns,” Human Rights Watch, January 3, 2012,
http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/01/03/bahrain‐charges‐against‐rights‐defender‐raise‐concerns.
122
“Activist cleared of Twitter post,” Gulf Daily News, March 12, 2013, http://www.gulf‐daily‐
news.com/NewsDetails.aspx?storyid=349145.
123
“'Public Prosecution' appeals against the acquittal of AlMuhafdha in the ‘false news broadcast’ “ , Alwasat news, April 13,
2013, http://www.alwasatnews.com/3871/news/read/763690/1.html
124
“Detained blogger Abduljalil Al‐Singace on hunger strike,” Reporters Without Borders, September 6, 2011,
http://en.rsf.org/bahrain‐one‐blogger‐sentenced‐to‐life‐22‐06‐2011,40507.html.
125
“Terrorist network first hearing – Trial
Testimonies – 28
th
October, 2010,” Bahrain Center for Human Rights, October 29, 2010,
http://bahrainrights.hopto.org/en/node/3540.
125
“Terrorist network first hearing – Trial Testimonies – 28
th
October, 2010,” Bahrain Center for Human Rights, October 29,
2010, http://bahrainrights.hopto.org/en/node/3540.
126
Ali Abdulemam describes the way he was tortured (minute 09:37), “People & Power – Bahrain: Fighting for change,” Al
Jazeera English, March 9, 2011, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IZdyiK‐Z5Do.
127
http://www.bahrainrights.org/en/node/2752. Alsingace’s blog is http://alsingace.katib.org.
128
“Bahrain upholds lengthy prison terms for journalists,” Committee to Protect Journalists, September 28, 2011,
http://cpj.org/2011/09/bahrain‐1.php.
108
73
F
REEDOM ON THE
N
ET
2013
B
AHRAIN
had been subject to torture.
129
Ali Abdulemam, the owner of Bahrain’s most popular online forum,
Bahrainonline.org, had been in hiding since March 17, 2011 during which time he was sentenced
(in absentia) to 15 years of prison.
130
However, he suddenly re-emerged in May 2013, having
escaped Bahrain to the United Kingdom through Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iraq.
131
Five policemen were put on trial for the death of the online journalist and moderator of the Al-Dair
online forum, Zakaryia Al-Ashiri, who died from torture while in police custody on April 9,
2011.
132
However, after a lengthy trial that lasted from January 2012 until March 2013, the court
acquitted all of those accused, furthering the widely held belief that members of Bahrain’s security
apparatus enjoy impunity for crimes against protestors.
133
Students and employees have received disciplinary action for comments they have communicated
via private text messages and social media. In May 2012, a student of the University of Bahrain was
suspended for a semester after writing ‘phrases that insult His Majesty the King’ on her mobile
phone and sending them to her colleagues. She was reported to the university management by one
of the recipients of her message.
134
Given that users can be prosecuted for being identified with an offending post or text, many users
are concerned about restrictions on using ICT tools anonymously. The TRA requires users to
obtain licenses to use Wi-Fi and WiMAX connections,
135
and the government prohibits the sale or
use of unregistered (anonymous) prepaid mobile phones. The country’s cybercafes are also subject
to increasing surveillance. Oversight of their operations is coordinated by a commission consisting
of members from four ministries, who work to ensure strict compliance with rules that prohibit
access for minors and require that all computer terminals are fully visible to observers.
136
Since March 2009, the TRA has mandated that all telecommunications companies must keep a
record of customers’ phone calls, e-mails, and website visits for up to three years. The companies
are also obliged to provide the security services access to subscriber data upon request.
137
Since the
application of “National Safety Status” (emergency law) in March 2011, citizens have been forced to
129
The full testimony of Dr Abduljalil AlSingace before the higher court of appeal on 29 May 2012 (Arabic)
http://bahrainrights.hopto.org/BCHR/wp‐content/uploads/2012/06/AJ.docx.
131
Peter Beaumont, “Bahrain Online founder Ali Abdulemam breaks silence after escape to UK,” The Guardian, May 10, 2013,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/may/10/bahrain‐online‐ali‐abdulemam‐escape.
131
Peter Beaumont, “Bahrain Online founder Ali Abdulemam breaks silence after escape to UK,” The Guardian, May 10, 2013,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/may/10/bahrain‐online‐ali‐abdulemam‐escape.
132
“Zakariya Rashid Hassan al‐Ashiri,” Committee to Protect Journalists, April 9, 2011, http://cpj.org/killed/2011/zakariya‐
rashid‐hassan‐al‐ashiri.php.
133
“After a year‐long show trial: no one is found guilty for killing blogger under torture in police custody,” Bahrain Center for
Human Rights, March 13, 2013, http://www.bahrainrights.org/en/node/5673.
134
Brian Dooley, “Bahrain Student Suspended for Phone Message,” Human Rights First, June 4, 2012,
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/2012/06/04/bahrain‐student‐suspended‐for‐phone‐message/.
135
Geoffrey Bew, “Technology Bill Rapped,” Gulf Daily News, July 20, 2006, http://www.gulf‐daily‐
news.com/NewsDetails.aspx?storyid=149891.
136
Reporters Without Borders, “Countries Under Surveillance: Bahrain.”
137
“‘Big Brother’ Move Rapped,” Geoffrey Bew, Gulf Daily News, March 25, 2009, http://www.gulf‐daily‐
news.com/NewsDetails.aspx?storyid=246587.
109
69
F
REEDOM ON THE
N
ET
2013
B
AHRAIN
allow security personnel to search their mobile phones at checkpoints. Recent instances of this
behaviour continue to be documented on YouTube.
138
In May 2011, new units were created within the IAA to monitor social media and foreign news
websites. According to the IAA’s director of publishing, the initiative aims to “further help project
the kingdom’s achievements and respond to false information that some channels broadcast.”
139
Although Bahraini cyberspace is highly monitored, no actions have been taken against the dozens of
progovernment users who continue to spread online threats against activists.
140
Some of these users
have publically defamed citizens by using social media to identify the faces of protestors and
circulate lists of “traitors.”
141
It is common for users tied to the opposition movement to receive
these types of extralegal attacks in a bid to disrupt their activities.
In July 2012, researchers discovered malicious software concealed in seemingly innocent emails
sent to Bahraini activists in April and May 2012. The surveillance software, named “FinFisher,” is
developed by the Munich-based Gamma International GmbH and distributed by its U.K. affiliate,
Gamma Group. One aspect of the software, “FinSpy,” can remotely and secretly take control of a
computer, taking screen shots, intercepting Voice-over-Internet-Protocol (VoIP) calls, and
transmitting a record of every keystroke.
142
The company has denied that it has sold its products to
the Bahraini government, claiming that the version of FinSpy deployed on activists was “old” and for
demonstration purposes only. However, evidence compiled by internet watch groups shows that a
newer version of the FinSpy software is also in use in Bahrain, suggesting the government is
receiving paid updates from the company.
143
Since 2010, evidence has also emerged surrounding
the use of spy gear maintained by Nokia Siemens Networks (NSN) and its divested unit, Trovicor
GmbH, to monitor and record phone calls and text messages.
144
Cyberattacks against both opposition and progovernment pages, as well as other websites, are
common in Bahrain. For example, in June 2012 a Facebook news page that belongs to opposition
138
See video: http://bahrainindex.tumblr.com/post/39738010314/policeman‐checking‐the‐private‐mobile‐content‐of‐a.
139
Andy Sambridge, “Bahrain sets up new units to monitor media output,” Arabian Business, May 18, 2011,
http://www.arabianbusiness.com/bahrain‐sets‐up‐new‐units‐monitor‐media‐output‐400867.html?parentID=401071.
140
“Bahrain: Death threats against Messrs. Mohammed Al‐Maskati, Nabeel Rajab and Yousef Al‐Mahafdha,” World
Organization Against Torture, December 7, 2011, http://www.omct.org/human‐rights‐defenders/urgent‐
interventions/bahrain/2011/12/d21549/.
141
See https://twitter.com/Jalad_Almajoos/status/292638655217020929. For a well‐documented account of the defamation of
opposition activists, please refer to Mahmoud Cherif Bassiouni et al., “Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of
Inquiry,” Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI), November 23, 2011, paragraph 1597,
http://files.bici.org.bh/BICIreportEN.pdf.
142
Vernon Silver, “Cyber Attacks on Activists Traced to FinFisher Spyware of Gamma,” Bloomberg, July 25, 2012,
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012‐07‐25/cyber‐attacks‐on‐activists‐traced‐to‐finfisher‐spyware‐of‐gamma.html and
“From Bahrain With Love: FinFisher’s Spy Kit Exposed,” CitizenLab, July 25, 2012, http://citizenlab.org/2012/07/from‐bahrain‐
with‐love‐finfishers‐spy‐kit‐exposed/.
143
“You Only Click Twice: FinFisher’s Global Proliferation,” CitizenLab, May 13, 2013, https://citizenlab.org/2013/03/you‐only‐
click‐twice‐finfishers‐global‐proliferation‐2/.
144
Vernon Silver and Ben Elgin, “Torture in Bahrain Becomes Routine With Help From Nokia Siemens,” Bloomberg, August 22,
2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011‐08‐22/torture‐in‐bahrain‐becomes‐routine‐with‐help‐from‐nokia‐siemens‐
networking.html.
110
27
F
REEDOM ON THE
N
ET
2013
B
AHRAIN
activists was taken over by a progovernment group.
145
Similarly, a progovernment website,
b4bh.com, was hacked in August 2012 for the second time by opposition activists.
146
Government-
associated websites are frequently targeted with distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, with
the most recent instance occurring on May 17, 2012 following the arrest of activist Nabeel Rajab.
The main perpetrator of such attacks has been the group “Anonymous,” which launched “Operation
Bahrain” through a press release published on February 17, 2011.
147
145
See Bahrainforums.com, June 8, 2012, https://bahrainforums.com/vb/%E5%E4%C7‐
%C7%E1%C8%CD%D1%ED%E4/978431.htm .
146 “Opponenets of Bahrain infiltrate locations belonging to the government,” [in Arabic], Jurnaljazira.com, August 11, 2012,
http://www.jurnaljazira.com/news.php?action=view&id=4834.
147
“Anonymous hits Bahrain after arrest of human rights activist Nabeel Rajab,” Examiner, May 5, 2012,
http://www.examiner.com/article/anonymous‐hits‐bahrain‐after‐arrest‐of‐human‐rights‐activist‐nabeel‐rajab.
111
120
F
REEDOM ON THE
N
ET
2013
B
ANGLADESH
B
ANGLADESH
Secularist blogger Ahmed Rajib Haider was murdered after calling for and promoting
protests against a convicted Islamist war criminal online (see V
IOLATIONS OF
U
SER
R
IGHTS
).
Police charged four bloggers with harming religious sentiment under the ICT Act
2006 (see V
IOLATIONS OF
U
SER
R
IGHTS
).
Regulators blocked YouTube for nine months after the anti-Islamic “Innocence of
Muslims” video sparked widespread criticism in September 2012; not all ISPs
complied (see L
IMITS ON
C
ONTENT
).
2012
2013
I
NTERNET
F
REEDOM
S
TATUS
N
/
A
P
ARTLY
F
REE
Obstacles to Access (0-25)
n/a 13
Limits on Content (0-35)
n/a 12
Violations of User Rights (0-40)
n/a 24
Total (0-100)
n/a
49
*0=most free, 100=least free
e
P
OPULATION
: 153
million
I
NTERNET
P
ENETRATION
2012: 6
percent
S
OCIAL
M
EDIA
/ICT
A
PPS
B
LOCKED
:
Yes
P
OLITICAL
/S
OCIAL
C
ONTENT
B
LOCKED
:
Yes
B
LOGGERS
/ICT
U
SERS
A
RRESTED
:
Yes
P
RESS
F
REEDOM
2013
S
TATUS
:
Partly Free
K
EY
D
EVELOPMENTS
:
M
AY
2012
–
A
PRIL
2013
112
61
F
REEDOM ON THE
N
ET
2013
B
ANGLADESH
As an emerging economy, Bangladesh has recognized information communication technologies
(ICTs) as core tools for development. Even with new media still a comparatively recent
phenomenon, however, officials have sought to control and censor online content—particularly as
the internet took center stage in major social and political events in 2012 and 2013.
Since opening up the country‘s electronic media to the private sector in the early 1990s, the
government has, at least officially, encouraged open internet access and communication. The ruling
Bangladesh Awami League under Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina is working towards a “knowledge
based networked society” under the “Digital Bangladesh by 2021” program launched in 2009.
1
The
program seeks to integrate internet access with development efforts in national priority areas, such
as education, healthcare, and agriculture. Private commercial stakeholders have also helped in the
proliferation of net usage. Bangladesh further benefits from a vibrant—though often partisan—
print and audio-visual media industry, but traditional journalists face physical threats and regulatory
constraints that are increasingly being replicated online.
Religious sentiments and ICTs were both subject to manipulation, which led to major violations to
internet freedom during the coverage period of this report. Authorities seemed ill-prepared at both
policy and regulatory levels for the turbulent political developments and used a combination of
punitive laws and ad hoc directives to curb expression on the internet, even while failing to offer
adequate protection to individuals and websites under threat for their online activities. Police
arrested four bloggers on the charge of harming religious sentiment, and regulators shut down their
blogs without a court order. YouTube was inaccessible for nine months after the government
blocked it in response to anti-Islamic content posted in 2012.
In October 2012, journalists traced attacks targeting Buddhist neighborhoods in the southeastern
district of Ramu to a Buddhist’s Facebook profile apparently altered to display anti-Islamic images
and incite local Muslims to retaliate; it’s not clear who was responsible for the alleged
manipulation.
2
In February 2013, domestic tensions escalated when a war crimes tribunal
sentenced Abdul Quader Mollah, leader of the country’s largest political Islamic party Jamaat-e-
Islami, to life imprisonment for crimes committed during the country’s 1971 war of independence
with Pakistan, including mass murder and rape.
3
Some thought the sentence was lenient, and tens
of thousands of protesters gathered around the Shahbag intersection in the capital, Dhaka, for more
than two months. Traditional social, cultural, and pro-independence political forces later joined
and strengthened the non-violent demonstration, causing some observers to compare it to the 2011
protests in Egypt’s Tahrir Square.
4
The Shahbag Movement, as it became known, was facilitated by
1
“Digital Bangladesh Strategy Paper, 2010,” Access to Information Program, Prime Minister’s Office, The People’s Republic of
Bangladesh, http://www.a2i.pmo.gov.bd/tempdoc/spdbb.pdf.
2
“A Devil’s Design,” The Daily Star, October 14, 2012, http://bit.ly/1eQ4GBn.
3
Tamima Anam, “Shahbag Protesters Versus the Butcher of Mirpur,” The Guardian, February 13, 2013,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/feb/13/shahbag‐protest‐bangladesh‐quader‐mollah.
4
Saurabh Shukla, “Shahbag Square Cheers for Change: Dhaka's Young Protesters Demand Ban on Extremism and Death for War
Criminals,” Daily Mail, February 28, 2013, http://dailym.ai/18e9tHR.
I
NTRODUCTION
113
74
F
REEDOM ON THE
N
ET
2013
B
ANGLADESH
blogs, Facebook, and Twitter, a convincing display of the power of ICTs to mobilize and
disseminate information.
5
Its opponents certainly thought so: Mollah’s supporters rallied in
response against a conspiracy by “atheist bloggers.”
6
On February 11, a pro-Jamaat-e-Islami blog
identified blogger Ahmed Rajib Haider as a Shahbag ringleader; armed assailants attacked and killed
Rajib outside his home four days later. These were troubling developments for a country still
striving to become a part of the connected global community.
The International Telecommunication Union reported internet penetration in Bangladesh at 6
percent in 2012.
7
Government estimates were closer to 20 percent.
8
Over 90 percent of users
access the internet through GPRS/CDMA services, which local regulators classify as narrowband.
The remainder subscribe to fixed lines, either through a traditional Internet Service Provider (ISPs)
or via one of two WiMax operators.
9
The government has established 4,501 Information Centers all over Bangladesh, with the goal of
ensuring cost-effective internet access and related e-services for the base of the pyramid
population.
10
No specific study has been done yet to analyze the user breakdown between urban
and rural population.
Mobile penetration was at 64 percent in 2012, with connections provided by six operators.
11
Grameen Phone, owned by Telenor, is the market leader with 42 percent of the total customer
base, followed by Orascom’s Banglalink with 26 percent, and Robi, under the Axiata company,
with 21 percent. The remaining three—Airtel, Citycell, and the state-owned Teletalk—have a
total customer base of 10 percent.
12
Right now, Teletalk is the only entity offering mobile
broadband to its comparatively small user base. Other operators offer 2G services, as the
government is yet to provide licenses for 3G/4G operations.
While ICT usage is increasing fast, Bangladesh is lagging behind globally. The World Economic
Forum’s 2013 global IT report ranked Bangladesh 114 out of 144 countries worldwide, with
infrastructure and the regulatory environment scoring poorly, though overall communication
5
The movement’s demands were diverse, including the death sentence for the war crimes conviction, and banning the
Bangladesh Jamaat‐e‐Islami party from politics. See, “Shahbag Grand Rally Demands Hanging to War Criminals, Banning Jamaat
(Updated),” The Independent (Dhaka), February 8, 2013, http://bit.ly/18zoSTZ.
6
Al Jazeera, “Bangladesh Opposition Protests turn Deadly,” February 22, 2013, http://aje.me/XF7s1z.
7
International Telecommunication Union, “Percentage of Individuals Using the Internet, 2000‐2012,”
http://www.itu.int/en/ITU‐D/Statistics/Pages/stat/default.aspx.
8
Association of Mobile Telecom Operators of Bangladesh, “Telecom and ICT: Key Enablers for Economic Development,”
presentation, March 25, 2013, www.amtob.org.bd.
9
Faheem Hussain, “License Renewal of Mobile Phone Services: What a Country Should Not Do (A Case Study of Bangladesh),”
Telecommunication Policy Research Conference, George Mason University, VA, USA, September 21‐23, 2012,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2032127.
10
Faheem Hussain, “ICT Sector Performance Review for Bangladesh,” LIRNEasia, 2011. Abstract available:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2013707.
11
International Telecommunication Union, “Mobile‐cellular Telephone Subscriptions, 2000‐2012.”
12
Bangladesh Telecommunication Regulatory Commission, accessed March, 2013, http://www.btrc.gov.bd/.
O
BSTACLES TO
A
CCESS
114
Documents you may be interested
Documents you may be interested
