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Since 2010, the Belarusian government has allocated resources for online surveillance
technologies.
84
In 2012, there were reports of Western firms supplying telecommunications
hardware and software that would allow the state to expand its surveillance of citizens. A report by
Index on Censorship states that the Swedish telecom companies TeliaSonera and Ericsson are
possible purveyors of this type of equipment, working through Turkish and Austrian firms that are
part-owners of Belarusian mobile telephone companies. The report also noted that the German
police had trained their Belarusian colleagues to use software that could track communications in
social networks.
85
Russian surveillance technologies are also employed in Belarus. In March 2010, Belarus acquired
the SORM (“system for operational-investigative activities”) surveillance system, and has reportedly
also purchased other Russian surveillance software that is designed to allow for monitoring of social
networks.
86
Decree No. 60 requires ISPs to maintain records of the traffic of all internet protocol (IP)
addresses, including those at home and at work, for one year. As a result, the state can request
information about any citizen’s use of the internet. As of 2007, internet cafes are obliged to keep a
year-long history of the domain names accessed by users and inform law enforcement bodies of
suspected legal violations.
87
In December 2012, the Council of Ministers abolished the requirement
that the customers of internet cafes must present their passports. Instead, cybercafe employees are
required to take pictures of or film visitors.
88
This regulation, “On personal identification of
internet cafe users,” came into legal force on January 28, 2013.
89
Restaurants, cafes, hotels, and
other entities are obliged to register users before providing them with wireless access, whether free
of charge or paid.
90
On July 17, police searched the apartment of the editor of the local independent website Orsha.eu.
The editor’s computer and memory cards were confiscated on suspicion that the website contained
a link to another website with pornographic content. The equipment was returned five months
later without any explanation.
91
In August, a correspondent of another independent regional
84
Мероприятия по реализации Национальной программы ускоренного развития услуг в сфере информационно‐
коммуникационных технологий на 2011–2015 годы [Measures on implementation of the National program of accelerated
development of information and communication technologies for 2011‐2015], http://www.mpt.gov.by/File/Natpr/pril1.pdf.
85
“Belarus: Pulling the Plug,” Index on Censorship, p. 16‐17, http://www.indexoncensorship.org/wp‐
content/uploads/2013/01/IDX_Belarus_ENG_WebRes.pdf.
86
Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan, “Russia’s Surveillance State,” World Policy Institute, Fall 2013,
http://www.worldpolicy.org/journal/fall2013/Russia‐surveillance.
87
“Совет Министров Республики Беларусь Положения о порядке работы компьютерных клубов и Интернет‐кафе”
[Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus. Regulations on computer clubs and internet cafe functioning], Pravo.by, April
29, 2010, http://pravo.by/webnpa/text.asp?start=1&RN=C20700175.
88
Alyaksey Areshka, “Authorities scrap passport requirement for Internet cafes’ visitors,” Belapan, December 27, 2012,
http://en.belapan.com/archive/2012/12/27/en_27122104b.
89
“Passport identification in cyber cafes to become obsolete?”, Belarusian Association of Journalists, January 29, 2013,
http://baj.by/en/node/19310.
90
Including the user’s name, surname, type of ID, ID number, and name of the state body which issued the ID, as per
Article 6 of the Regulation on computer clubs and internet café functioning,
http://pravo.by/main.aspx?guid=3871&p0=C20700175&p2={NRPA}.
91
“Equipment given back after 5 months’ check‐up,” Belarusian Association of Journalists, November 29, 2012,
http://baj.by/en/node/18627.
138
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ELARUS
website was summoned to the prosecutor’s office and questioned about an article by a local
opposition leader, which called for a boycott of the 2012 parliamentary elections and was published
on Westki.info. The prosecutor threatened the journalist with administrative responsibility for the
article, despite the fact that it was authored by another person.
92
Instances of extralegal intimidation and harassment for online activities continued to take place in
2012-2013. In April 2012, a girlfriend of one of the leaders of the “Revolution Through Social
Networks” internet group, which organized the 2011 “silent protests,” was taken from her
apartment by plainclothes police officers, interrogated for eight hours, threatened with death,
forced to record a video slandering her boyfriend Viachaslaw Dziyanau and herself, and was tried
and fined for “hooliganism.” While leaving the country after the process, she was body-searched
and her laptop and other electronic devices were confiscated at the border.
93
On May 8, 2012, a
customer was kicked out of an internet cafe in Minsk, insulted, and beaten up by the police for
reading the Charter 97 website.
94
In 2012, the authorities continued to harass active users of opposition communities on social
networks. On August 30, the KGB raided the apartments and detained the administrators of the
“We Are Sick of Lukashenka” online community, one of the largest on VKontakte. Created on the
eve of the 2010 presidential election, the group numbered 37,000 users, mainly 15 to 25 years old,
by August 2012. On the same day, the apartments of the administrators of a second community
were also raided. Known as “Only ShOS,” which stands for “Wish He would Die,” this community
had 15,000 members. The young activists were interrogated for four hours, threatened, and
beaten. Two were incarcerated for five to seven days for “hooliganism,” while the rest were
released. Simultaneously, hackers gained access to both online communities and removed their
content.
95
Nevertheless, the moderators created a backup VKontakte group, which already
numbers more than 4,000 users.
On February 17, 2013, two Belarusian students on their way back from Warsaw, where they
participated in a meeting dedicated to the “Day of Belarusian Wikipedia,” were detained in Brest.
The students were questioned and their personal belongings were inspected. The students were
released several hours later.
96
92
“Кастуся Шыталя распытвалі ў пракуратуры пра публікацыю, у якой згадваўся байкот,” [Kastus Shytal interrogated by the
prosecutor office about the publication mentioning boycott], Wetski.info, August 13, 2012,
http://westki.info/artykuly/13588/kastusya‐shytalya‐raspytvali‐u‐prakuratury‐pra‐publikacyyu‐u‐yakoy‐zgadvausya‐baykot.
93
“Лавышак: Мяне пагражалі вывезці ў лес і растраляць,” [Lavyshak: “I was threatened to be taken to the forest and shot
there”], Svaboda.org, May 4, 2013, http://www.svaboda.org/content/article/24569492.html; "The police threatened to take
me to the woods and shoot", http://udf.by/english/main‐story/59240‐the‐police‐threatened‐to‐take‐me‐to‐the‐woods‐and‐
shoot‐photo.html.
94
“Милиция избила витебчанина за просмотр сайта Хартии 97,” [Police beat a Vitebsk customer k for reading the Charter 97
website], Charter97.org, accessed on February 2, 2013, http://charter97.org/ru/news/2012/5/8/51879/pf.
95
Iryna Lewshyna, “Two young men linked to opposition online communities get jail terms,” Belapan, August 31, 2013,
http://en.belapan.com/archive/2012/08/31/571400_571404.
96
“Затрыманых студэнтаў‐вікіпедыстаў адпусьцілі” [Detained students ‐ “wikipedists” were released], Svaboda.org, February
17, 2013, http://www.svaboda.org/content/article/24904651.html.
139
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One observer suggests that the August crackdowns were related to appeals for a public boycott of
the September 2012 parliamentary elections, which the government considered to be both illegal
and a threat to its legitimacy. First embraced by some opposition political parties, the calls for a
boycott were taken up and advocated for by some internet communities.
97
Dunja Mijatovic, the
OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, condemned the persecution and noted that they
“show continued efforts to muzzle dissenting voices and clamp down on freedom of expression
online."
98
Instances of technical attacks against the websites of independent media and civil society groups
have continued to grow. Trojans are often used to spy on opposition activists and the independent
media. In April, Iryna Khalip, a prominent Belarusian journalist and correspondent for the Russian
newspaper Novaya Gazeta, received an infected file from an unknown user via Skype. The file posed
as a photo of a document with a list of questions to be discussed during an urgent government
meeting concerning the fate of her then imprisoned husband, former presidential candidate Andrei
Sannikov. This Trojan, sent by an unknown user, was investigated by independent experts and
found to have successfully infected 14 other computers, most of which belonged to Belarusian
opposition politicians and civic activists.
99
A similar tactic was used against the independent trade union of the Belarusian Radio and
Electronics Workers (REP). After the Skype and e-mail accounts of its leaders were hijacked with
Trojan software, the hackers pretended to be REP representatives and contacted the union’s Danish
partners in an attempt to obtain financial information regarding joint projects. This attack coincided
with the confiscation of a laptop of a REP activist, Andrej Strizhak, by border control officers, and
with verbal attacks against REP by state officials.
100
From July through August 2012, the website of “Platform,” an organization defending the rights of
prisoners, experienced repeated distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks. On August 7, 2012,
the site was inaccessible for six hours. On the same day, the deputy director of the organization was
detained near her house for allegedly “using bad language” in public.
101
On August 31, 2012,
unknown persons hacked the blog of the prominent opposition politician Viktar Ivashkevich on the
popular news website Belaruspartisan.org. A text insulting Iryna Khalip was posted on the blog on
behalf of Ivashkevich.
102
97
Vadzim Smok,“Internet Activism Under Siege in Belarus,” Belarus Digest, September 11, 2012,
http://belarusdigest.com/story/internet‐activism‐under‐siege‐belarus‐11112.
98
Tanya Korovenkova, “OSCE media freedom representative concerned about crackdown on online dissent in Belarus,”
September 4, 2012, http://en.belapan.com/archive/2012/09/04/en_15260904H.
99
“Хартыя выкрыла чарговы траян спецслужбаў,” [Charter unveiled another Trojan spread by intelligence], NN.by, April 25,
2012, http://nn.by/?c=ar&i=72400.
100
“Скайп и почтовый ящик профсоюза РЭП взломали,” [Skype and email account of REP trade union hacked], Praca‐by.info,
August 7, 2013, http://www.praca‐by.info/cont/art.php?&sn_nid=4805&sn_cat=1.
101
“Сайт “”Плятформы” зноў спрабавалі ўзламаць,” [“Platforma” website was attacked again], Svaboda.org, August 7, 2012,
http://www.svaboda.org/content/article/24669047.html.
102
Iryna Lewshyna, “Two young men linked to opposition online communities get jail terms,” Belapan, August 31, 2013,
http://en.belapan.com/archive/2012/08/31/571400_571404.
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On April 2, 2013, the website of the Mogilev branch of the Viasna Human Rights Center was
hacked and a fake article, containing threats by a human rights defender against an independent
journalist, was posted.
103
On April 23–26, 2013, four independent websites were hacked. On
April 23, the Charter 97 website experienced a DDoS attack and ceased to function for an hour.
The attacker was not identified, but Charter 97 attributed the attack to the Belarusian special
services.
104
On the morning of April 25, Belaruspartisan.org was attacked and a threatening letter
from anonymous hackers was posted on the site.
105
In the evening of that same day, the Viasna
Human Rights Center website was hacked. Several publications posted on the site were distorted
after attackers gained unauthorized access. The attack affected all three language versions of the
site.
106
On April 26, the website of the Belarusian Association of Journalists also experienced a
DDoS attack, which started half an hour after an article was published titled, “Why independent
websites are being hacked.”
107
Belarusian criminal law prohibits these types of “technical violence.” Specifically, Article 351 of the
Criminal Code, covering “computer sabotage,” stipulates that the premeditated destruction,
blocking, or disabling of computer information, programs, or equipment is punishable by fines,
professional sanctions, and up to five years in prison.
108
A special department at the Ministry of
Internal Affairs is tasked with investigating such crimes. In reality, a number of the attacks on the
independent websites and personal accounts of democratic activists have been linked to the
authorities. The government has stated its intention to accede to the Council of Europe’s
Convention on Cybercrime, but it has made no move to sign on to the Convention for the
Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data.
109
103
“Праваабаронцы выступілі з заявай наконт узлому сайта магілёўскай ‘Вясны’”[Human rights defenders made a
statement in connection with the hacker’s attack on Mogilev “Viasna” website], Belarusian Association of Journalists, April 4,
2013, http://baj.by/be/node/20342.
104
“Charter 97 under attack,” Charter 97, April 23, 2013, http://charter97.org/en/news/2013/4/23/68349.
105
“Belaruspartizan website cracked,” Belarusian Association of Journalists, April 25, 2013, http://baj.by/en/node/20617.
106
“Viasna’s website resumes work after hacker attack,” Viasna, April 26, 2013, http://spring96.org/en/news/62869.
107
“Сайт БАЖ подвергся хакерской атаке” [BAJ’s website experienced hacker’s attack], Gazetby.com, April 26, 2013,
http://gazetaby.com/cont/art.php?sn_nid=56172.
108
“«Белтелеком»: Возможно, независимые сайты блокировали другие организации” [Beltelecom: Independent websites
could be blocked by other organizations], Charter 97, January 10, 2008, http://www.charter97.org/ru/news/2008/1/10/2905.
109
Council of Europe, “Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data,” 1
January 1981, http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/QueVoulezVous.asp?NT=108&CL=ENG.
141
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RAZIL
B
RAZIL
Brazil’s Electoral Law, which prohibits online media and traditional broadcasters from
focusing on candidates for three months prior to an election, took center stage ahead of
the October 2012 municipal elections, resulting in increased takedown notices and
prosecutions of users found in violation of the law (see L
IMITS ON CONTENT
).
High-profile cases of intermediary liability—including criminal charges against Google
executives—attracted international attention in 2012 and 2013 (see L
IMITS ON
CONTENT
).
Retaliatory violence and intimidation of online journalists and bloggers increased in late
2012 and early 2013. Eduardo Carvalho, owner and editor of the Ultima Hora News
website, was murdered in November 2012 in connection with his online work (see
V
IOLATIONS OF
U
SER
R
IGHTS
).
Brazil’s cybercrime law went into effect and its reconfigured Azeredo Bill, which
establishes a framework for judicial takedown notices, was approved in April 2013 (see
V
IOLATIONS OF
U
SER
R
IGHTS
).
2012
2013
I
NTERNET
F
REEDOM
S
TATUS
F
REE
P
ARTLY
F
REE
Obstacles to Access (0-25)
7
7
Limits on Content (0-35)
6
8
Violations of User Rights (0-40)
14
17
Total (0-100)
27
32
*0=most free, 100=least free
K
EY
D
EVELOPMENTS
:
M
AY
2012
–
A
PRIL
2013
P
OPULATION
:
194.3 million
I
NTERNET
P
ENETRATION
2012:
50 percent
S
OCIAL
M
EDIA
/ICT
A
PPS
B
LOCKED
:
No
P
OLITICAL
/S
OCIAL
C
ONTENT
B
LOCKED
:
No
B
LOGGERS
/ICT
U
SERS
A
RRESTED
:
Yes
P
RESS
F
REEDOM
2013
S
TATUS
:
Partly Free
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RAZIL
Brazil, which was first connected to the internet in 1990, has made significant gains in expanding
internet access and mobile phone usage in recent years, offering tax incentives to the purveyors of
information and communication technologies (ICTs) for continued investment in Brazilian
infrastructure, and providing public access points (LAN houses) to citizens in order to facilitate
internet connectivity.
1
Despite such notable progress in increasing ICT availability, particularly via
mobile technologies—4G services were introduced to Brazil in late April 2013—Brazil still faces
challenges in its quest to reach internet penetration rates commensurate with the country’s
economic wealth.
According to the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), Brazil’s internet penetration rate
falls below the average enjoyed by North American and European countries, as does the number of
Brazilian households with computers. Among the primary reasons for these deficiencies are faulty
infrastructure, social inequality, and poor education. In order to combat such issues, the federal
government has executed several national policies over recent years, resulting in an increase in
social network activity and internet-mediated civic participation.
2
There is no evidence of the Brazilian government employing technical methods to filter or
otherwise limit access to online content; however, it does frequently issue content removal
requests to Google, Twitter, and other social media companies. Such requests increased in 2012
ahead of Brazil’s municipal elections, with approximately 235 court orders and 3 executive requests
imploring Google to remove content that violated the electoral law.
3
The law’s prohibition of any
content that ridicules or could offend a candidate directly impacted freedom of online expression
and played a pivotal role in two highly publicized cases of intermediary liability extending to
Google executives. Law 9.054 prohibits online and traditional media from publishing stories about
candidates for three months prior to elections. It also bans candidates from advertising on the
internet for the same period of time unless they are contenders for the office of president.
4
Additional challenges to online expression in 2012 and 2013 came from civil defamation suits,
increasing violence against bloggers and online journalists, and legal action by the judiciary and
government officials. The penalties for such charges extend to content removal and fines. Brazil has
1
Robert Hobbes Zakon, “Hobbes’ Internet Timeline v8.2,” Zakon Group LLC, accessed August 11, 2010,
http://www.zakon.org/robert/internet/timeline/; Tadao Takahashi, ed., Sociedade da Informação no Brasil: Livro Verde
[Information Society in Brazil: Green Book] (Brasilia: Ministry of Science and Technology, September 2000),
http://www.mct.gov.br/index.php/content/view/18878.html; National Education and Research Network (RNP), “Mapa do
Backbone” [Map of Backbone], accessed August 11, 2010, http://www.rnp.br/backbone/index.php.
2
Cetic.br, Communication Technologies, pg. 236, February 15, 2013, http://www.nic.br/english/activities/ceticbr.htm .
3
Sarah Laskow, “Google vs. Brazil: Why Brazil Heads Google’s List of Takedown Requests,” April 29, 2013, Columbia Journalism
Review, http://www.cjr.org/cloud_control/brazilian_takedown_requests.php?page=all&print=true.
4
http://www.article19.org/data/files/pdfs/press/brazil‐proposed‐electoral‐law‐restricts‐internet‐freedom.pdf; See also: Article
19, Press Release: Brazil: Proposed Electoral Law Restricts Internet Freedom, September 14, 2009,
http://www.article19.org/data/files/pdfs/press/brazil‐proposed‐electoral‐law‐restricts‐internet‐freedom.pdf, and Gabriel
Elizondo, “Brazilian Elections No Joke – Literally,” August 25 2010, AlJazeera,
http://blogs.aljazeera.com/blog/americas/brazilian‐elections‐no‐joke‐literally.
I
NTRODUCTION
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REEDOM ON THE
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RAZIL
also witnessed an ongoing trend in which private litigants and official bodies sue internet service
providers (ISPs) and ask for takedown notices to be sent to blogging and social-networking
platforms. As Brazil rises to the level of other leading global economies and comes closer to a
networked society, issues such as cybercrime and distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks,
access to public information, election campaigning on the internet, and intellectual property
protection are increasingly in the spotlight.
Although 2012 was witness to positive legislation regarding cybercrimes, the right to information,
and open governmental action plans, frustration has surrounded Brazil’s Marco Civil Bill, also
known as the “Civil Rights Framework for the Internet,” introduced to Congress in August 2011.
Congressional vote on this policy—which aims to guarantee access to the internet, safeguard
freedom of speech and communication, protect privacy and personal data, and preserve net
neutrality, among other provisions—was postponed five times during 2012. As of May 2013, a
vote had not yet occurred.
5
The main barrier to passage of the Marco Civil Bill has been Brazil’s
telecom lobby, which objects to some of the provisions regarding net neutrality.
Although development of information and communication technologies (ICTs) has increased in
recent years, Brazil still lags behind many developing countries in terms of relative proportion of
citizens with internet access.
6
Widespread adoption of household internet services has been
hindered by high costs, low quality, and regional infrastructural disparity. Despite these challenges,
a number of government initiatives predicated on increasing national internet penetration have
begun to bear fruit. The country’s mobile sector is thriving, and Brazilians are increasingly turning
to smartphones to connect to the internet. As of mid-2013, Brazil was home to the largest mobile
phone market in Latin America.
7
Internet penetration varies greatly among different geographical regions in Brazil due to
inconsistent infrastructure; access also varies from urban to rural areas. In 2012, Brazil’s aggregate
penetration rate was 50 percent.
8
The latest figures from the Brazilian Internet Steering Committee
portray disparate figures in urban versus rural areas: household penetration was measured at 43
percent in urban zones, compared to 10 percent in rural areas. Internet access is also less
widespread in urban areas in the Northeast (22 percent penetration) than in the Southeast (49
5
Murilo Roncolato, “Marco Civil é Adiado Pela Quinta Vez” [Marco Civil is Postponed for the Fifth Time] Link (blog), February
15, 2013, http://blogs.estadao.com.br/link/marco‐civil‐e‐adiado‐pela‐quinta‐vez/.
6
International Telecommunication Union (ITU), “Percentage of Individuals Using the Internet,” 2011, http://www.itu.int/ITU‐
D/ICTEYE/Indicators/Indicators.aspx#; and “Fixed (wired) Broadband Subscriptions,”
http://www.itu.int/ITUD/icteye/Reporting/ShowReportFrame.aspx?ReportName=/WTI/InformationTechnologyPublic&ReportF
ormat=HTML4.0&RP_intYear=2011&RP_intLanguageID=1&RP_bitLiveData=False.
7
Sergio Spagnuolo, “Brazil Launches 4G Wireless Service with Few Smartphone Options,” Reuters, April 17, 2013,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/17/brazil‐telecom‐smartphones‐idUSL2N0D32ON20130417.
8
International Telecommunication Union (ITU), Statistics: Percentage of Individuals Using the Internet, 2000‐2012, ITU, June 17,
2013, http://www.itu.int/en/ITU‐D/Statistics/Documents/statistics/2013/Individuals_Internet_2000‐2012.xls.
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A
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Documents you may be interested
Documents you may be interested
