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Rasid.com,
32
Yahosein.org, and Awamia.net.
33
Authorities also block the website of the Islamic
Umma Party, the country’s only underground (and illegal) political party, which has called for the
royal family to step down in return for a safe exit.
The CITC also censors individual social media pages that demand political reforms or basic civil
rights. These include the Facebook pages of Abdullah al-Hamid and Mohamed Saleh al-Bejadi, well-
known Saudi human rights activists and co-founders of the ACPRA,
34
as well as the Twitter
accounts of the Saudi journalist and blogger Hassan Almustafa,
35
Saudi human rights activist and
blogger Nouf Abdulaziz,
36
Saudi journalist and political activist Muhana al-Hubail, and the head of
the organization “Monitor of Human Rights in Saudi Arabia” Waleed Abo al-Khair.
37
Authorities have also occasionally moved to block entire online products and services for breaching
the country’s strict laws. In September 2012, the government threatened to block all of YouTube if
Google did not restrict access to the controversial “Innocence of Muslims” video containing an
offensive depiction of the Prophet Mohamed. Google later blocked the video in Saudi Arabia.
38
The
CITC also has an aggressive stance toward VoIP services that circumvent the country’s regulatory
environment and, by some indication, the surveillance apparatus. So far only Viber has been
blocked, though authorities have threatened to institute further restrictions.
39
BlackBerry services
were temporarily stopped on June 30, 2012 following glitches experienced by the BlackBerry
maker Research in Motion, according to Saudi Telecom Company (STC). There was no evidence
to suggest that the government was behind the short suspension.
40
In 2011, legislation was passed requiring that the owners of online news sites obtain a license from
the Ministry of Culture and Information.
41
While not all blogs and websites have complied with this
legislation, those that did not register with the ministry risk the possibility of closure at any time.
Numerous sites have been closed for copyright violations
42
or for featuring advertisements for
drugs.
43
In addition, several political opposition websites such as Humanf.org, Saudihr.org,
Hummum.net, and Alwaqa.com have ceased operations over the past year, presumably because of
pressure from the MOI. Reacting to a court verdict, in December 2012 the Ministry of Culture and
32
“A list of blocked sites from within Saudi Arabia” [in Arabic/English], Adala Center], December 22, 2012,
http://www.adalacenter.net/?act=sec&pg=39.
33
https://alkasir.com/map viewed March 2, 2013
34
“A list of blocked sites from within Saudi Arabia” [in Arabic/English], Adala Center, ],December 22, 2012,
http://www.adalacenter.net/?act=sec&pg=39.
35
See http://hasantalk.com .
36
See http://nofah.com/wordpress/.
37
See https://twitter.com/abualkhair.
38
“YouTube blocks ‘Innocence of Muslims’ in Saudi Arabia”, AlArabiya.net, September 19, 2012,
http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/09/19/238987.html.
39
“CITC blocks Viber”, Saudi Gazette, June 5, 2013,
http://www.saudigazette.com.sa/index.cfm?method=home.regcon&contentid=20130605168659
40
“STC: BlackBerry service stoppage problem solved and service to return progressively” [in Arabic], Al‐Madina Newspaper,
June 30, 2012, http://www.al‐madina.com/node/387238?liv.
41
“Internet Enemies, Saudi Arabia,” Reporters Without Borders, 2012, http://bit.ly/JrLevJ.
42
“CITC closed down Haraj site after advertising half kilo Hashish”, [in Arabic], AlSharq Newspaper, March 30, 2013,
http://www.alsharq.net.sa/2013/03/30/783097
43
“Saudi Arabia closes 52 sites violated intellectual property copyrights” [in Arabic], Ameinfo.com, October 16, 2012,
http://www.ameinfo.com/ar‐248952.html
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Information also closed down an online discussion forum, “the Global Club,” after a sports
journalist who rooted for al-Nassr soccer team complained that forum members had been verbally
abusing him and his family.
44
There were several incidents in which pressure from social media users and online newspapers led
to users deleting “controversial” tweets, disassociating themselves from their accounts, or even
deleting their accounts. For instance, Twitter user Hesaah al-Sheikh disassociated herself from her
account after public anger erupted over her tweet in which she equated listening to the singer
Mohamed Abdo as listening to Allah.
45
Disassociating oneself from a Twitter account is common in
Saudi Arabia, particularly when simply deleting a controversial tweet is not enough to calm public
anger. Users who are deemed to have acted inappropriately often publicly declare that the account
does not belong to them and that another user is using their name to impersonate them, a common
occurrence in Saudi Arabia.
46
Similarly, the government also responds to take-down notices from members of the public, who
can use a web-based form to submit a complaint regarding undesirable material.
47
Sites can also be
unblocked through a similar process.
48
Once an individual completes such a request, a team of
CITC employees determines whether the request is justified. The manager of public relations at the
CITC said the commission receives about 200 requests each day, though he would not comment on
how often the CITC unblocks a site based on such an appeal.
49
In one example, the CITC
unblocked the website “Mustamel” after the owners obeyed a request from the CITC to remove
illegal advertisements.
50
The government is somewhat transparent about what content it blocks. Users who attempt to
access a banned site are redirected to a page displaying the message, “Access to the requested URL
is not allowed!” Still, a full list of banned sites is not publicly available. The country’s two data
service providers must block all sites banned by the CITC,
51
and failure to abide by these bans may
result in a fine of up to SAR 5 million ($1.33 million), according to Article 38 of the
Telecommunication Act.
52
It should be noted, however, that many Saudi internet users have
become savvy at using circumvention tools such as Hotspot Shield, which allows users to access a
virtual private network (VPN) to bypass censorship.
53
44
“A Nasrawi journalist won his case against an online discussion forum” [in Arabic], Sabq.org, December 27, 2012,
http://sabq.org/a7ifde.
45
“Writer Hessa Al‐Sheikh explains to ‘Sabq’: Twitter account impersonated my personality” [in Arabic], Sabq.org, December
26, 2012, http://sabq.org/Uuhfde.
46
“Saudi Minister of Culture and Information criticizes impersonation of intellectuals” [in Arabic], AlArabiya.net, March 2, 2013,
http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/11/20/250707.html
47
The CITC block‐request form is available at http://bit.ly/aRBpYa.
48
The CITC unblock request form is available at http://www.internet.gov.sa/resources/block‐unblock‐request/unblock/.
49
“About 300,000 requests to block sites in Saudi Arabia annually” [in Arabic], Ajl.com.sa, January 13, 2010,
http://www.burnews.com/news‐action‐show‐id‐12100.htm.
50
“For the second time Haraj site blocked in Saudi Arabia” [in Arabic], Qbas, March 26, 2013,
http://qbas.org/home/news.php?action=show&id=3585
51
CITC, “General Information on Filtering Service,” September 30, 2010, http://bit.ly/yhOPwD.
52
Telecommunication Act found here [in Arabic]: http://bit.ly/16Jzjj5.
53
Saudis refer to this circumvention tool as a “proxy breaker.”
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In addition to government censorship, self-censorship by online journalists, commentators, and
social media users is widespread. For example, the owner of the popular “3al6ayer” YouTube
channel admitted that he avoids crossing certain “red-lines” over fears of “getting into trouble with
the authorities.”
54
Online commentators who express support for extremism, liberal ideals,
minority rights, or political reforms, in addition to those who expose human rights violations, are
closely monitored and often targeted by the government. Questioning religious doctrine is strictly
taboo, particularly content related to the Prophet Mohamed.
These limitations are compounded by the self-censorship that online news moderators and site
owners must exercise. Gatekeepers frequently delete user-generated content that could be deemed
inappropriate or inconsistent with the norms of society, as they can be held legally liable for
content posted on their platforms.
55
In one case that highlights the degree to which moderators pre-
censor, user comments on the news site Sabq.org were full of praise for the poem “al-Haboob,”
written by Prince Khalid al-Faisal, even though it was clear from Twitter that the majority of Saudis
were making fun of him.
56
The recent amount of controversial tweets that have been reported may reflect a decrease in
Saudis’ willingness to censor themselves over Twitter. Indeed, many readily take to social networks
to criticize problems in the country or government ministers so long as no references are made to
the king or to religion. Users often employ hashtags to inspire a national debate on a certain
political issue, including the tags “Breaking the fences”
57
and “elected Consultative Council” to
expose corruption by public officials or call for reforms.
58
Prominent religious scholars, such as al-
Awdah, have even contributed to these debates on Twitter.
59
With so much activity occurring on social networks, the Saudi government maintains an active
presence online as a means of manufacturing consent for its policies. It is believed the government
employs an “electronic army” to constantly post progovernment views, particularly on social
media. Progovernment trolls have taken to “hashtag poisoning,” a method of spamming a popular
hashtag in order to disrupt criticism or other unwanted conversations through a flood of unrelated
or opposing tweets. Through the use of a “bot,” such as those provided by Yoono.com, one
individual can send thousands of tweets to a hashtag at the same time.
60
While the tweet may
contain the same message, the bot sends the tweet on behalf of numerous fabricated accounts,
created by combining random photos of faces with names searched from the internet. The
54
“Idaat with Turki Al Dakheel” [in Arabic], AlArabiya.net, May 18, 2012, http://bit.ly/LdV6EO.
55
“Raif Badawi’s wife provides “Anhaa” with the list of charges against her husband and calls for his release [in Arabic], Anhaa,
April 25, 2013, http://www.an7a.com/102662.
56
“’Al‐Haboob’by Khalid Al‐Faisal received high praise and harsh criticism on Twitter” [in Arabic], Sabq.org, January 1, 2013,
http://sabq.org/IWtfde.
57
#ميطحت_كوبشلا
58
#بختنم
_
ىروش
_
سلجم
59
“Salman Al‐Awdah calls for an elected Consultative Council in Saudi Arabia [in Arabic], Watan.com, December 29, 2012,
http://www.watan.com/news/world‐news/2012‐12‐29/18048.
60
“Fake accounts and drowning the hashtag in Twitter [in Arabic], Osama Al Muhaya, March 16, 2013,
http://osamh.me/blog/wp‐content/uploads/2013/03/twitterstudy.pdf
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government also influences online news reporting by offering financial support to news sites such as
Sabq.org and Elaph.com in return for coordination between site editors and the authorities.
61
Whereas the authorities provide monetary support to progovernment websites, the owners of
opposition websites can come under strong financial pressures as a result of the country’s
environment of censorship. Revenue from third-party advertisers can be heavily impacted by a
government decision to block a website. The government can also request advertisers to cancel
their ads on a particular website in order to pressure the website to close. Restrictions on foreign
funding further inhibit the sustainability of websites that are critical to the ruling system.
Whereas opposition blogs and online forums were once the main instrument for discussing political
and social matters, most Saudis now use social media to share information and express opinions.
According to Abdul Rahman Tarabzouni, the Head of Emerging Arabia at Google, Saudis
collectively watch 190 million YouTube videos per day, the highest amount of views per capita of
any country in the world.
62
There are now dozens of comedic channels on YouTube, the most
popular being “Eysh Elly,” “La Yekthar,” and “3al6ayer,” which respectively have around 126
million, 51 million, and 39 million total views.
63
One reason for the success of these videos is their
engagement in cautious rather than harsh criticism and their restraint against pushing the limits too
far.
Similarly, Twitter continued to grow as a platform for expressing sensitive issues. Indeed, when
interviewed, one Saudi described the country’s Twitter environment as a sort of virtual parliament
“where people from all political sides meet and speak freely.”
64
Saudis are the largest adopters of
Twitter in the Arab world, with the number of users reaching 2.9 million, or slightly over 10
percent of the population, as of October 2012.
65
Facebook is the third most visited site in the
country
66
with 5.9 million local users, or 23 percent of the population.
67
A myriad of Facebook
groups have been recently active in organizing low-level demonstrations in cities throughout the
country.
68
The banned Islamic Umma Party also uses its official website to call for sit-ins and
protests. While disparate protests do occur, these demonstrations generally have low attendance
and do not lead to substantial political or social changes.
61 “Othman Al‐Omair in Turning Point 8‐5” [in Arabic] MBC (YouTube), December 24, 2012,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=r9oqwtWiSYA.
62
“The emergence of Google”, Arab News Newspaper, November 27, 2012, http://www.arabnews.com/emergence‐google.
63
Other popular channels include ‘Quarter to Nine,’ ‘Sa7i,’ ‘Masameer,’ ‘Eysh Elly,’ ‘Fe2aFala,’ ‘Hajma Mortadda’ ‘Just For
Wanasah,’ and ‘Eysh Sar Fi Twitter.’ “Twitter usage in KSA grows ’10 times’ the world average,” Saudi Gazette, January 6, 2013,
http://www.saudigazette.com.sa/index.cfm?method=home.regcon&contentid=20130106148256.
64
“Twitter Gives Saudi Arabia a Revolution of Its Own,” Robert F. Worth, The New York Times, October 20, 2012,
http://nyti.ms/ORCPoc.
65
“Saudis Cross Social Boundaries on Twitter”, New York Times, October 20, 2012, http://nyti.ms/S3hBS7.
66
“Twitter usage in KSA grows ’10 times’ the world average,” Saudi Gazette, January 6, 2013,
http://www.saudigazette.com.sa/index.cfm?method=home.regcon&contentid=20130106148256.
67
“Facebook Statistics by country,” Socialbakers, December 23, 2012, http://bit.ly/fyo6Id.
68
These include ‘Islamic Umma Party’, ‘Kulna Hasm’ (which is associated with ‘Saudi Civil and Political Rights Association’),
“Rajab Revolution 1432 in Holly Mosques Land”, “Day of Anger in Saudi Arabia”, “the coalition of free youth”, “The national
campaign for supporting detainees in Saudi Arabia”, and “The Coordinating Committee for the Youth movement in Saudi
Arabia”.
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However, more recently, the robustness of security forces in dismantling demonstrations has
forced many Saudis to devise more creative forms of organized protest. Facebook is commonly
used to specify the date, time, and place a protest or sit-in will take place, while YouTube has been
instrumental in documenting the demonstrations and attracting media attention.
69
Videos
documented a protest on June 6, 2012, in which a group of detainees’ families carried out a
demonstration inside a shopping mall after initially pretending to be regular customers.
70
Later that
summer, demonstrators “marched” together in their cars on a highway.
71
In March 2013, 182
family members, including 15 women and 6 children, participated in a 12-hour sit-in in the central
city of Buraidah. Police arrested 161 of the protestors
72
and blamed social media for stirring up the
protests (for more on the arrests of users, see “Violations of User Rights”).
73
In addition to documenting protests, users secretly film officials engaging in inappropriate behavior
at work. Footage is uploaded to YouTube and then disseminated via Twitter. In a recent case from
December 2012, Abdullah al-Sheri (@Abdula73), a Saudi doctoral student in the United States,
tweeted out the names of dozens of high-profile Saudi citizens who had obtained fake post-graduate
university degrees. By matching information in the public domain against a Ministry of Higher
Education list of universities that offer fictitious qualifications, al-Sheri was able to back up his
claims with evidence.
74
His tweets caused a huge uproar, attracting media attention and putting
pressure on the Consultative Council (Majlis al-Shura) to enact laws that would deter businesses
from dealing with fictitious universities and punish those who obtained fake degrees.
75
Significantly,
no complaint has been lodged against al-Sheri for his actions thus far.
Similarly, the anonymous Twitter user “@Mujtahidd” continues to criticize high profile members
of the royal family
76
and to provide detailed descriptions of state corruption.
77
The popularity of the
account has more than doubled over a short period, increasing from around 410,000 Twitter
followers in June 2012 to over 960,000 as of March 2013.
78
More recently in 2013, he shared the
tweets of dozens of users who defended the government using the exact same wording, thus
evidencing the presence of an MOI Twitter army.
79
Due to his insider knowledge, the person(s)
behind the Mujtahidd account is believed to be a disgruntled member of the Saudi royal family.
69
“Ministry’s appeal: Ignore rumors, maintain peace”, Arab News Newspaper, March 8, 2013, http://bit.ly/1eQ61Z0.
70
“Saudi activists stage rare protest march in Riyadh”, USA Today, June 7, 2012, http://usat.ly/16TutAS.
71
e3teqal YouTube Channel (http://www.youtube.com/user/e3teqal/videos), August 1, 2012,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VKF0MPbiRxY
72
“161 arrested in Buraidah”, Arab News Newspaper, March 2, 2013, http://bit.ly/1azlEz2.
73
Angus McDowall, “Saudi accuses activists of lying to stir protests,” Reuters, March 7, 2013, http://reut.rs/Z39vMW .
74 “The fictitious qualifications scandal” [in Arabic], Alriyadh Newspaper, November 30, 2012, http://bit.ly/UfQyUS.
75
“Defaming ‘fake degrees’ holders puts pressure on Al‐Shura to implement more deterrent laws” [in Arabic], AlSharq
Newspaper, December 27, 2012, http://www.alsharq.net.sa/2012/12/22/637690.
76
“Twitter Gives Saudi Arabia a Revolution of Its Own”, York Times, December 27, 2012, http://nyti.ms/RmDtYD.
77
“Mujtahidd,” Twitter, accessed on February 12, 2013. http://bit.ly/MtgI50.
78
“ ‘Mujtahidd’ exposes secrets of Saudi royal family on Twitter,” LBC International, June 24, 2012,
http://www.lbcgroup.tv/news/37984/mujtahidd‐exposes‐secrets‐of‐saudi‐royal‐family‐on
79
https://twitter.com/assaflovhotmail/status/307325546847694848/photo/1.
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The legal environment surrounding online expression remains a significant impediment to internet
freedom in Saudi Arabia. While there have been no reported instances of users being physically
attacked for online posts over the past year, authorities have become more proactive in prosecuting
citizens using the country’s restrictive laws. The MOI has introduced a new method for users to
report offensive comments made toward them by other users, opening the door for an upsurge in
defamation lawsuits that may ultimately have repercussions for freedom of expression. Overall, the
MOI continues to enjoy relative impunity over its abuses of online users. Some have reported that
authorities have confiscated their cars, computers, and other personal items indefinitely. Online
commentators are often detained without specific charges and denied the right to an attorney. New
registration requirements have also harmed the safety of using ICT tools anonymously and free
from government interference.
The Basic Law of Saudi Arabia contains language that calls for freedom of speech and freedom of the
press, but only within certain boundaries. The 2000 Law of Print and Press also addresses freedom
of expression issues, though it largely consists of restrictions rather than protections. Online
journalists employed at newspapers and other formal news outlets maintain the same rights and
protections as print and broadcast journalists, and like their counterparts, are also subject to close
government supervision. Similarly, laws designed to protect users from cybercrimes also contain
clauses that limit freedom of expression. The 2007 Anti-Cyber Crime Law assigns jail sentences
and fines for defamation; the unauthorized interception of private e-mail messages; the hacking of a
website to deface, destroy, modify, or deny access to it; or simply the publishing or accessing of
data that is “contrary to the state or its system.”
80
In late 2012, after an upsurge in defamation cases stemming from Twitter and the popular
messaging service WhatsApp, the CITC deployed a large-scale media campaign to remind Saudis
that “anyone who re-sends messages (via mobile phones and smart phone applications) that violate
the sanctity of the private lives of citizens through insult, mockery, and violation of the sanctity of
public morals, religious values and public order, will be sentenced to five years in jail, in addition
to a fine of SAR 3 million ($800,000).”
81
On August 8, 2012, the MOI also introduced a new web-
based form on its official website allowing internet users to complain about offensive comments
made online about them.
82
Many online commentators have been imprisoned for publicly defaming other citizens. For
example, a 25-year-old man was sentenced to four months and fined SAR 10,000 ($2,666) by a
court in the Eastern city of al-Qatif for publicly vilifying and defaming another man on Twitter after
80
http://bit.ly/VWXEmI.
81
“Privacy violators on Web face tough punishments”, Arab News Newspaper, December 27, 2012,
http://www.arabnews.com/privacy‐violators‐web‐face‐tough‐punishments.
82
“’Interior’ confronts social networking sites abuse.. electronically”, [in Arabic], Aleqtisadiah Newspaper, March 9, 2013,
http://www.aleqt.com/2012/08/08/article_681378.html
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a dispute erupted between the two.
83
Significantly, laws regarding libel and defamation are not
equally applied when it comes to the country’s Shi’a minority. For example, after a prominent
Saudi lawyer insulted Shi’as on Twitter by claiming that they are the “children of adultery and of
unknown descents,” authorities did not act to arrest him. Over ten thousand citizens in the Eastern
province had signed a petition to call for a lawsuit against him.
84
Twitter users who expose the misdeeds of government officials or public sector employees are
often targeted by authorities. While there were no charges issued against al-Sheri for exposing the
fake university qualifications of government officials (see “Limits on Content,” above), authorities
arrested an undisclosed Twitter user in late 2012 for frequently criticizing known public figures.
85
While the government stated that the user is a former public official, Twitter users believed that
the user in question was @Saryat_Aljibal and discussed the user’s arrest using a Twitter hashtag.
The account—well-known for frequently criticizing the President of the Royal Court—
disappeared from followers’ lists around the same time as the news of the arrest.
86
In September 2012, Bader Thawab (@Bader Thawab) was arrested after tweeting “down with the
House of Saud.” He was put on trial in early 2013 for using social media to disturb “national unity,”
among other charges.
87
Prominent writer Turki al-Hamad was also arrested in December 2012
after tweeting “…we need someone to rectify [the Prophet] Mohamed bin Abdullah’s doctrine.”
88
Any discussion that questions an aspect of how Islam is practiced in society commonly leads to
arrest. The incident inspired its own hashtag on Twitter and drew large amounts of both support
and criticism. After five months in detention, al-Hamad was finally released on June 5, 2013.
89
Following the latest wave of low-level demonstrations in the country, the number of online
political activists that have been arrested has increased significantly. On March 9, 2013, a court in
Riyadh disbanded the human rights organization ACPRA and sentenced two of its members,
Abdulah al-Hamid and Mohammed al-Qahtani, to 11 years and 10 years of jail time respectively, in
addition to a travel ban equal in length to their jail sentences.
90
Five years of their sentences were
based on Article 6 of the Anti-Cyber Crime Law,
relating to the creation of a website that could
disturb social order.
91
Five founding members of ACPRA are also currently in detention.
92
Two
founding members of the Islamic Umma Party’, al-Wahiby and al-Gamidi,
93
have been in prison
83
“Jailing a Saudi youth and fining him SAR 10000 because of ‘Twitter’” [in Arabic], Alarabiya.net, December 27, 2012,
http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/09/16/238303.html.
84
“Bin Zahim Recedes and Shiites Refuse to Step Down”, Saudi Shia, April 24, 2012,
http://saudishia.com/index.php?act=artc&id=281&hl=sultan
85
“Riyadh Security (authorities) toppled a Twitter user from those threaten public order” [in Arabic], Sabq.org, December 27,
2012, http://sabq.org/2iqfde.
86
http://bit.ly/1azm6NT.
87
“Saudi Charged for “Down with the House of Saud” Tweet”, GlobalVoices, February 16, 2013, http://bit.ly/Xfj7UE.
88
“As ordered by the Minister of Interior. Turki Al‐Hamad arrested because of his “offensive tweets” against doctrine” [in
Arabic], Sabq.org, December 24, 2012, http://sabq.org/Ygtfde.
89
“Turki Al‐Hamad released after 5 months from his dentition” [in Arabic], Sabq.org, June 5, 2013, http://sabq.org/O65fde.
90
“10 years jail for Al‐Qahtani and 11 for Al‐Hamid in the ACPRA case” [in Arabic], Sabq.org, March 9, 2013,
http://sabq.org/onyfde.
91
Anti‐Cyber Crime Law, MOI [in Arabic], March 2, 2013, http://bit.ly/19JUq7S.
92
Those members are Suliaman Al‐Rushoody, Mansour Al‐Awth, Mousa Al‐Garni, Mohamed Al‐Bijadi and Saleh Al‐Ashwan.
93
Islamic Umma Party page on Twitter, [in Arabic], December 22, 2012, http://twitter.com/islamicommapart.
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since February 2011.
94
Both the ACPRA and the Islamic Umma Party base many of their operations
online.
In the most high-profile cases from the past, Hamza Kashgari and Raif Badawi continue to be held
on charges related to their online activities. Kashgari, a young Saudi writer, published three tweets
detailing an imaginary conversation with the Prophet Mohammed on February 4, 2012, causing
tens of thousands of Twitter and Facebook users to call for his execution. King Abdullah reportedly
ordered his arrest on charges of “disrespecting Allah” and “insulting the Prophet.”
95
After fleeing the
country, he was immediately extradited from Malaysia despite pressure from international human
rights groups.
96
The decision was heavily shrouded in controversy, as Malaysian authorities denied
him access to his lawyers and refused requests from the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR)
to interview him.
97
In the case of Raif Badawi, authorities have targeted the “Free Saudi Liberals” website co-founder
repeatedly since March 2008, when he established the forum for discussing political and religious
topics. He was arrested on June 17, 2012 and initially faced up to five years in prison and a hefty
fine for “insulting Islam through electronic channels” and “going beyond the realm of obedience.”
However, in December 2012 a court elevated the charge to apostasy, which is punishable by
death.
98
While the apostasy charge has since been dropped, Badawi is still in prison facing other
charges.
99
As previously mentioned, the Ministry of Culture and Information requires that all blogs, forums,
chat rooms, and other sites obtain a license from the Ministry to operate online, thus putting more
pressure on online writers to self-regulate their content.
100
While the law has not yet been widely
enforced, it is a serious threat to anonymity online. Users are also legally required to use their real
names and register with the government when purchasing mobile phones. In 2012, the CITC
introduced a new law making it mandatory to enter a user’s ID number to recharge a prepaid
mobile card, rendering it virtually impossible to use prepaid mobile phones anonymously.
101
Nevertheless, a black market has since emerged in which vendors sell new SIM cards and prepaid
refill cards with pre-existing ID numbers.
102
To stop this lucrative practice, the government is now
considering linking these cards to fingerprints.
103
94
Islamic Umma Party official webpage, [in Arabic], March 10, 2012, http://www.islamicommaparty.com/Portals/default/
95
Tehmina Kazi, “Those who threated ‘Twitter blasphemy’ writer Hamza Kashgari should stop and remember what Islam is for,”
The Guardian, 17 February 2012, http://bit.ly/zsZOyo.
96
“Malaysia deports Saudi in Twitter posts row,” Al‐Jazeera English, 13 February 2012, http://aje.me/wCHThO.
97
“Saudi Arabia: Writer Faces Apostasy Trial,” Human Rights Watch, 13 February 2012, http://bit.ly/xZmdHx.
98
“Saudi Arabia: Website Editor Facing Death Penalty”, Human Rights Watch, December 27, 2012,
http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/12/22/saudi‐arabia‐website‐editor‐facing‐death‐penalty, and “Saudi Arabia: Free Editor Held
Under Cybercrime Law,” Human Rights Watch, July 17, 2012, http://bit.ly/Pb4Oxy.
99
“Apostasy Case against Saudi Activist Dismissed”, GlobalVoices, January 23, 2013, http://bit.ly/149EutE.
100
“Internet Enemies, Saudi Arabia,” Reporters Without Borders, 2012, http://bit.ly/JrLevJ.
101
“User’s ID number now required to recharge prepaid mobile phones”, Arab News, July 4, 2012, http://bit.ly/1azmvzS.
102
“Black market for SIM cards with ID thriving”, Saudi Gazette Newspaper, December 31, 2012,
http://www.saudigazette.com.sa/index.cfm?method=home.regcon&contentid=20121231147657
103
“Study to link SIM cards with fingerprints”, Arab News Newspaper, June 20, 2013, http://www.arabnews.com/news/455594.
624
Documents you may be interested
Documents you may be interested
