83
because the state had yet to be built. But we had all
failed; that was an undeniable truth.
We still had few functioning roads, virtually
no connectivity, inoperable hospitals comparable
to international standards, substandard schools,
no electricity, not enough water, and substandard
sanitation. We still had few teachers, accountants,
lawyers, and doctors. Our standard of living was of
the fourth world, and while so much money had
been spent, so little had changed.
I still believe the majority of the perception
of the western world is that donor aid is handed
to recipient governments to spend as they wish.
But the reality is, governments in fragile states do
not see aid money. It does not go into our coffers,
it does not go through our systems to strengthen
our capacities or align to our programs and service
delivery, it does not go into our budgets; it is for the
donors to spend on projects, programs, and techni-
cal assistance (usually sourced from their own coun-
tries). Imagine having technical assistance at any
one time speaking some 30 different languages, not
one of which is the local language. Program work-
ers cannot converse with local staff, and they are
promoting different ways of thinking. This further
fragments capacity-building efforts and governance
structures and systems that are weak to begin with.
If we did have a better vision of donor aid, I
believe we would have roads, electricity, water, and
proper sanitation. The fact is, we in fragile states
rarely know how donor aid is spent. Donors often
bypass the state agenda to pursue their own agen-
das, delivering services directly to our people, at
times, without our knowledge and often without
our consent. This not only causes fragmentation
and proliferation in development but also weakens
any legitimacy we as representatives of and for
the people have in building viable institutions or
leading a national vision and inclusive agenda for
peace. This way of doing business must change.
Harmonization and alignment between
recipient states and donor countries has yet to
become a reality to make long-lasting change to
fragile states. We have achieved little results for
those who matter the most—our people. When
things go right, the international community is
the first to take the credit. When things go wrong,
the government is the target of blame. This is the
way of the world, and the world must now be re-
educated on the aid paradigm so together we can
get it right.
In Timor-Leste, we quickly learned not to
focus on the past; it was now about creating a
future. If Guilherme could wake up every morning
and plant seeds despite the challenges, so could
we as a government. But we also knew that any
chance we had to localize peaceful states through
inclusive politics must first be socialized at the
global level. In my country, we began with the first
coalition of five political parties. Commentators
said it would never last, and I sit here today, five
years on, with continued peace—writing proudly
and confidently that we still are a functioning
brethren of ministers that put our politics aside for
the bigger picture of peace, stability, and develop-
ment. We as a cabinet decided to strive for one
thing internationally:
Inclusive politics must
be globalized before it is localized.
And so our
agenda for fragile states began, with peacebuilding
and statebuilding at the forefront.
For decades, fragile states have been seen as a
minority, when in the global context, we are the
majority. We represent the critical mass, the 1.5
billion people (or 20% of the global population)
who live among the most extreme situations of
poverty and are affected daily by current or recent
conflict. We are the voiceless, the under-repre-
sented, the ones discriminated against because aid
architectures that apply to “normal” developing
nations don’t consider or calculate the unique
4 | USAID FRONTIERS IN DEVELOPMENT
76
challenges that we, in the fragile context, face. In
fact, one cannot even be labeled a “fragile state”
when there is no globally accepted definition of
“fragility.” We also learned recently that fragile
states are disadvantaged, by no fault of their own,
receiving 5 cents per capita in aid compared to
other developing countries that receive 11 cents
per capita.
1
Interestingly enough, statistics show
that aid to fragile states is an investment with a
greater return. This is a simple equation. Billions
are spent on defense each year by the global com-
munity. When development can act as a catalyst to
peace, funnel it to where it counts the most.
Politically, the word fragility has become akin
to a curse word. The technocrats understand the
word relates to institutions yet to be established,
low capacity, lack of an established justice system,
lack of infrastructure, lack of systems—all charac-
teristics that have nothing to do with strength of
sovereignty. Politically, the word must be embraced
for what it is. I often describe fragility as a fine
champagne flute, something that is beautiful but
easily broken and therefore must be handled with
care. Imagine the citizens of the United Kingdom
with little to no access to schools, health care,
water, social security, police, or banks. It is easy to
see then how conflict erupts. This is fragility.
Less than two years ago, a milestone was
reached when representatives of several frag-
ile countries sat together in a room and talked
about our commonalities and our challenges. As
colleagues from Burundi, the Central African
Republic, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, Liberia, Nepal, Solomon Islands, Sierra-
Leone, South Sudan, and Timor-Leste spoke
around one table, we discovered that, although
we had our differences in regards to region,
1 “Chapter 3: Trends in official development assistance” in Resource
Flows to Fragile and Conflict-Affected States (OECD, 2010), 49–59.
linguistics, culture, historical backgrounds, and
our root causes of conflict, we had much more
in common than we could have ever anticipated.
Through this solidarity we formed a deep bond,
and after hours together of sharing our experi-
ences, we acknowledged that in order to emerge
from fragility, it would take a consolidated forum
to make a tangible difference both in our own
countries and in the way we do business with the
international community. We needed a united
and shared voice. We needed our own poli-
cies; we needed the international community to
understand our unique challenges and shared
objectives—and so the g7+ group of fragile and
If we did have a better vision
of donor aid, I believe we would
have roads, electricity, water,
and proper sanitation.
conflict-affected states was born and rapidly grew
from 7 to 19. The g7+ symbolizes the first time
in history that we, as fragile states, have a voice
in shaping global policy, advocating our own
country-led and country-owned transitions out of
fragility and, most importantly, identifying that
peacebuilding and statebuilding are the funda-
mental foundations to transition from fragility to
the next stage of development, the ultimate aim in
reaching the Millennium Development Goals.
Peacebuilding means that inclusive politics,
security, and justice are the cornerstones of building
stable and long-lasting states. Statebuilding means
that donors can no longer bypass our state institu-
tions, weakening our ownership and hindering our
nations from building the institutions and capacity
DEMOCRACY AND SECURITY | 5
66
Internally displaced Sudanese from the south pack their belongings in Khartoum on October 27, 2010,
as they prepare to return home in preparation for South Sudan’s referendum on independence on
January 9, 2011. | AFP Photo: Ashraf Shazly
necessary for strong bureaucracies to serve the needs
of our people. We ourselves must take responsibil-
ity for developing economic foundations, quality
resource management, and service delivery with the
support of the international community.
Together with the international commu-
nity and through the International Dialogue on
Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, the g7+ created
a new aid architecture for fragile states called the
New Deal. We made it simple, clear, and concise
with three simple elements: the Peacebuilding
and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs), FOCUS, and
TRUST. The PSGs are the goals that will allow
us to transition to the next stage of development.
FOCUS is a new way of engaging, and TRUST is
a new set of commitments.
The five goals are
Legitimate Politics
—to
foster inclusive political settlements and conflict
resolution,
Security
—to establish and strengthen
people’s security,
Justice
—to address injustices
and increase people’s access to justice,
Economic
Foundations
—to generate employment and
improve livelihoods, and
Revenues & Services
—
to manage revenue and build capacity for account-
able and fair service delivery.
The letters of the word FOCUS stand for:
UÊ
À>}ɼʃɼÌÞ
>ÃÃiÃÃʇiʌÌ°
7i
Üɼʃʃ
Vʐʌ`ÕVÌ
>
«iÀɼ-
odic country-led assessment on the causes and
features of fragility and sources of resilience as a
basis for one vision, one plan.
UÊ
"ʌi
ÛɼÃɼʐʌ]
ʐʌi
«ʃ>ʌ°
7i
Üɼʃʃ
`iÛiʃʐ«
>ʌ`
ÃÕ«-
port one national vision and one plan to transi-
tion out of fragility. This vision and plan will be
country-owned and -led, developed in consulta-
tion with civil society, and based on inputs from
the fragility assessment.
6 | USAID FRONTIERS IN DEVELOPMENT
135
UÊ
UÊ
UÊ
ʐʇ«>VÌ°
Vʐʇ«>VÌ
ɼÃ
>
ʂiÞ
ʇiVɹ>ʌɼÃʇ
Ìʐ
implement one vision, one plan. A compact will
be drawn on a broad range of views from mul-
tiple stakeholders and the public, and be subject
to an annual multistakeholder review.
1Ãi
*- Ã
Ìʐ
ʇʐʌɼÌʐÀ°
7i
Üɼʃʃ
ÕÃi
Ìɹi
*-
Ì>À}iÌÃ
and indicators to monitor country-level progress.
-Õ««ʐÀÌ
«ʐʃɼÌɼV>ʃ
`ɼ>ʃʐ}Õi
>ʌ`
ʃi>`iÀÃɹɼ«°
7i
will increase our support for credible and inclu-
sive processes of political dialogue.
The letters of the word TRUST stand for:
UÊ
UÊ
UÊ
UÊ
UÊ
/À>ʌë>ÀiʌVÞ°
7i
Üɼʃʃ
iʌÃÕÀi
ʇʐÀi
ÌÀ>ʌë>ÀiʌÌ
use of aid.
,ɼÃʂɻÃɹ>Àɼʌ}°
7i
>VVi«Ì
Ìɹi
ÀɼÃʂ
ʐv
iʌ}>}ɼʌ}
during transition, recognizing that the risk of
non-engagement in this context can outweigh
most risks of engagement. We will identify
context-specific, joint donor risk-mitigation strat-
egies, which will require different approaches to
risk management and capacity development. We
will conduct joint assessments of the specific risks
associated with working in fragile situations and
will identify and use joint mechanisms to reduce
and better manage risks to build the capacity of
and enhance the use of country systems, to step
up investments for peacebuilding and statebuild-
ing priorities, and to reduce aid volatility.
1Ãi
>ʌ`
ÃÌÀiʌ}Ìɹiʌ
VʐÕʌÌÀÞ
ÃÞÃÌiʇð
7i
Üɼʃʃ
jointly identify oversight and accountability
measures required to enhance confidence in and
enable the expanded use and strengthening of
country systems.
-ÌÀiʌ}Ìɹiʌ
V>«>VɼÌɼið
7i
Üɼʃʃ
iʌÃÕÀi
ivwVɼiʌÌ
support to build critical capacities of institu-
tions of the state and civil society in a balanced
manner, increasing the proportion of funds for
capacity development through jointly adminis-
tered and funded pooled facilities.
/ɼʇiʃÞ
>ʌ`
«Ài`ɼVÌ>Lʃi
>ɼ`°
7i
Üɼʃʃ
`iÛiʃʐ«
and use simplified fast-track financial manage-
ment and procurement procedures to improve
the speed and flexibility of aid delivery in fragile
situations, and review national legal frameworks
to support our shared objectives. We commit to
increase the predictability of aid, including by
publishing three- to five-year indicative forward
estimates (as committed in the Accra Agenda
for Action), and to make more effective use of
global and country-level funds for peacebuilding
and statebuilding.
These interrelated and interdependent prin-
ciples are established through a tangible working
model that each state and its partners can work
through on a matrix that is both fluid and reflec-
tive of the fragile circumstances—and can be the
foundation of a compact between the country and
the international partners. In the Busan IV High
Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, the New Deal
was endorsed by 32 countries and 5 major interna-
tional organizations, with a trial that includes the
UK, Australia, Denmark, Afghanistan, Timor-
Leste, and South Sudan. The agreement will
change the way aid is configured, managed, and
delivered—and most importantly, make a change
in the outcomes of aid on the ground. What mat-
ters is results.
We Say We Are Now Making the
New Deal a Real Deal
I have the honor of being the chair of the g7+ and
the co-chair of the International Dialogue from
where the agreement for the New Deal gained
consensus. Coming from Timor-Leste, I knew that
the only way we could make long-lasting change
on the ground on inclusive politics, the founda-
tion of the PSGs, is pushing forward the agenda
of globalizing inclusive politics. This is not an easy
process because it requires changing the attitudes,
perceptions, and way of doing business between
DEMOCRACY AND SECURITY | 7
75
the fragile states, the international community,
and the public.
I will use my own country as an example.
This year we celebrate 10 years since the formal
restoration of our independence. In 1999, after the
national referendum that set us on this course, we
were a country that was devastated by war. Most
of our infrastructure and the homes of many of
our citizens were burnt to the ground. Between
1999 and 2007, despite billions being spent on
Timor-Leste, as our President His Excellency Jose
Ramos Horta often says, very little had been spent
in Timor-Leste. When I assumed my mandate
as Minister of Finance, time was not on our
side. Accelerating development and fast-tracking
It might take generations to
change traditions and cultures
but the will is there, and our
partners in development must
take the journey with us.
reforms, especially in public financial manage-
ment; establishing institutions to manage our vast
resources in oil and gas; and ensuring that trans-
parency and inclusivity led our actions in imple-
menting social and fiscal expansionary policies was
a core element to transforming our small nation.
The international community often had a
different view of how we as a government should
act and what we should do, and they were vocal
in their interventions. For instance, with 15%
of our population displaced, development could
not progress. We were told it would take 10 years
to resettle the displaced. However, we in govern-
ment knew that 10 years was not an option.
Through dialogue with local actors and cash pack-
ages for families, we resettled all 150,000 IDPs in
2 years, closing 65 IDP camps and reintegrating
families back into communities across the nation
without conflict or dispute. We were accused of
buying peace.
At the same time, we entered into conflict
resolution with the rebels, former members of
the army who had been released from duty by
the previous government. From the mountains
where they once threatened to destabilize national
confidence, they returned to the capital, peacefully
disarmed, and reintegrated into communities. We
were accused of not providing justice.
The government promised pensions to the
elderly, the disabled, mothers, veterans, and
orphans. This, we believed, was the obligation of
the state for the sacrifices our people had made
over the 24-year struggle for independence. We
believed it was the responsibility of the state
to take care of our most vulnerable as in other
socially compassionate nations, such as Australia,
the UK, and many countries throughout Europe.
We were accused of being fiscally irresponsible.
My point is that there is no price for peace,
and governments of fragile states have one main
objective—that is to keep peace and stability.
Without peace, services cannot be delivered, and
without services delivered, there can be no peace.
We as government know our people and the
political complexities. Often these complexities
go back generations, and few outsiders can navi-
gate the political landscape. They must simply
trust that with a constitution and the concept of
democracy, a nation will find its way, but always
with peace at the forefront of its journey to
emerge from fragility.
Timor-Leste is a nation blessed with natural
resources. We have $10 billion in the bank and
no debt, with growing capacity to execute. Our
8 | USAID FRONTIERS IN DEVELOPMENT
Documents you may be interested
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