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Little Red Beans
DangerousFood?
BYTHE
WFP
NICARAGUA
T
EAM
Nicaragua
I
nGenara’skitcheninMatagalpa,Nicaragua,her
familyenjoysthisseason’sfirstplateoffreshred
beans.Thesuccessfulbeanharvestthisyearwas
especiallyjoyousafterexperiencingfiveyearsof
drought. MotherNaturefinallycooperatedwith
Matagalpanfarmers,andprovidedaseasonof
abundantraintoproducethefruitoftheirlabor:the
smallredbeanthatisperhapsthemostimportant
stapleoftheNicaraguandiet.
InMatagalpa,astherainscontinuetofall,Genara’s
practicedhandsshellherfamily’sfirstbusheloflittlered
beansbycandlelight.Thesebeanswilldryinthesunand
bestoredinsmallgrainsilosinsidethehousetoprovide
foodforthefamilyyear-round.Comingfrom
generationsofbeanfarmers,Genaraisusedtodealing
withtheweather,naturaldisasters,andinsectplagues
thatthreatenherharvesteachyear.
OnemightbesurprisedthatinNicaragua,acountry
wherefarmersfaceboththeharshestdroughtsand
mostdestructivefloods,agreatthreattoGenara’s
survivalasasmallfarmermaybealittleredbeanfrom
theUnitedStates. Thisbeansitsinalaboratoryat
WashingtonStateUniversity.ItsnameisRojo
Chiquito,or“littlered,”anditlooksalotlikethe
beansthatGenaragrowsinMatagalpa.
Whyisthislittleredbeansuchathreattoruralfamilies
likeGenara’s?Thebean’screator,researchgeneticist
PhilipMiklasexplains,“wereleased'RojoChiquito'...the
firstcultivardevelopedintheU.S.specificallyforthe
‘CentralAmericanSmallRed’drybeanmarketclass.
Thisbeancultivarwillbeproducedprimarilyforexport
toCentralAmerica.”Inotherwords,thislittleredbean,
onceitbecomeswidelyavailableontheglobalmarket,
couldputsmall,traditionalbeanproducerslikeGenara
outofbusiness.
TheRojoChiquito,developedinpartbytheU.S.
DepartmentofAgriculture,willgrowwellinU.S.soils,
especiallyinthePacificNorthwest.Itwasengineeredto
resistcertaindiseasesandgrowinnarrowrowsforan
increasedyield.FarmersintheUnitedStatesbenefit
fromgovernmentsubsidiesandaccesstothelatest
technology,soU.S.companieswouldbeabletoexport
thishighqualitybeancheaplyandefficiently.
TheunfairpracticeofsubsidizingU.S.farmerswhile
expandingfreetradeagreements—whichwouldrequire
LatinAmericannationstoessentiallyeliminateany
remainingagriculturalsubsidies--willlikelyallowRojo
Chiquitotoruinthelivelihoodofthousandsof
Nicaraguanfamilies.FarmersintheU.S.willbeexcited
toknowthattheyhaveapromisingnewproductandthe
possibilityofanewmarketundertheCentralAmerican
FreeTradeAgreement(CAFTA)thatwillbenegotiated
betweentheU.S.andCentralAmericainJanuary.But
whatmightthislittleredbeanmeanforthefood
securityandlivelihoodofNicaraguanfarmers?
LocalFoodSupplyInCrisis
“Thislittlebeanwillbecomethegreatestthreatthat
Nicaraguawilleverface,”commentseconomistÁlvaro
Fonseca.ThepotentialimpactsofimportingRojo
Chiquitoarehard tofathom,butitsintroductionto
theNicaraguanmarketcouldhaveadevastatingeffect
onthealreadyweaksmallfarmereconomy.
Nicaragua’sfoodsupplyislargelybasedonsmall-scale
localproductionofstaplecropslikecornandbeans.
Mostfarmersgrowcropsfortheirownconsumption,
andselltheirsurplusinlocalmarkets.Because
productionandconsumptionislocal,smallfarmers
havenotbeendependentontheinternationalmarket
todeterminetheirsuccessortheirabilitytoprovide
foodfortheirownfamilies.
Bycurrentestimates,afloodofcheap,importedbeans
couldwipeout200,000Nicaraguanfamilyfarms,
affectingnearly1.5millionpeople,aquarterofthe
population.Inacountrywheretheunderand
unemploymentrateisover60percent,financially
burdenedconsumerswillchoosethecheapestbeanson
themarket,regardlessofwhethertheyweregrowninthe
mountainsofNicaragua,orthePacificNorthwestofthe
UnitedStates.Andwhileprovidingcheaperbeansfor
impoverishedNicaraguanconsumersisagoodidea,itis
importanttoconsidertherealcostofthesesavings.
WithafloodofRojoChiquitofromsubsidizedU.S.
farms,smallfarmerslikeGenarawouldnolongerbe
abletoselltheirsurplusbeancrop toprovidefortheir
families'manyneeds.Mostlikely,theywillbeforced
to taketheadviceofneoliberaleconomists,who
wouldsuggestthatGenarafindanewcroptogrow
forexportnowthatherbeansarenolonger
profitable. Genarawouldcompeteinafreemarket,
wherealackoftradebarrierswouldsupposedlyhelp
hertoexportanewcrop,whileshebuyscheap
importedbeansfromtheUSA.
ButinorderforGenaratoswitchfrombeanfarmingto
asuccessful,differentcrop,shewouldneedfinancing,
accesstomarketinformation,technicalassistanceand
time—fourthingssmallNicaraguanfarmerscanonly
dreamofhaving. Evenifshecouldmiraculouslychange
crops—andgrow,say,cantaloupes—shewouldlikely
faceseasontradebarriersimposedbytheU.S.toprotect
theirlocalproduction.Withitsenormousnegotiating
leverage,theU.S.cankeepsuchprotectivetariffs,while
demandingcountrieslikeMexicoandNicaraguadrop
theirs. So, evenchangingcropswouldlikelydoomthis
smallfarmertofailure.
Ratherthanswitchingtoadifferentcrop,Genara
mightbemorelikelytosellherlandtoabiggerland
owner,whilesheandherfamilymovetothecity,along
withthousandsofotherlandlesscampesinos. There,
shemightfindworkintheinformaleconomyorina
textileassemblymaquila,anindustrythatexploits
Nicaragua’s“comparativeadvantage”:cheaplabor
providedbyadesperateworkforce. And,ofcourse,
anotheroptionwouldbeemigratingtoCostaRicaor
theUnitedStatesinsearchofenoughincometosend
hometosupportherfamily. Butinspiteofallthe
negativeeffectsforordinaryNicaraguanslikeGenara,
theU.S.governmentcontinuestopushtoformalize
freetradeagreementsthatwillimpactcountrieslike
Nicaraguaforyearstocome.
DoAsISay,NotAsIDo
InFebruary2002PresidentBushannouncedhisplan
toexpandfreetradethroughoutCentralAmerica
underCAFTA,asasteppingstonetothehemisphere-
wideFreeTradeAreaoftheAmericas(FTAA).
SecretaryofStateColinPowellclearlydeclaredthe
intentoftheFTAAto“assureforAmerican
corporationscontroloftheterritorythatrunsfromthe
NorthPoletotheAntarcticfreeaccesswithoutany
hindranceordifficultyforourproducts,services,
technologyandcapitalthroughthehemisphere.”1 Free
tradeagreementsseektoopenforeignmarketsby
eliminatingtariffsand“barriers”totrade,underthe
pretextoffairandequalcompetitioninopenmarkets.
WhileBushandPowellbeganpromotingCAFTAin
CentralAmerica,Congresswasbeginningtodebatethis
year'sfarmbill,whichwillgiveU.S.farmers$100billion
dollarsinsubsidiesoverthenext8years.Smallfarmers
inbothNicaraguaandtheU.S.arelosersinthecurrent
system. U.S.subsidizedagriculturedoesnotgenerally
benefitsmallU.S.farmerseither,astheyreceiveamere
16%ofallsubsidies,whiletheyhavetocompetewiththe
mega-productionofthemuchmoreheavilysubsidized
corporateagribusinesses.
Thus,U.S.-grownproducts—especiallythosefarmed
primarilyonlargecorporatefarms—suchascornand
rice, canbeexportedatartificiallydepressedpricesto
countrieslikeNicaragua.Thesepricesdonotreflectthe
realcostofproduction.“Wewouldhavetoseeifa
farmerfromthegreatprairiesoftheUnitedStatesinhis
airconditionedtractorwouldbecapableofproducing
withoutsubsidiesatthesamecostsasfarmersinthe
valleyofJalapa,Estelí,MuyMuy,orotherruralareasof
Nicaragua,”challengesÁlvaroFonseca.Asfreetrade
policiesbecomemorecomprehensiveandareexpanded
throughoutthehemisphere,inacountrywherethe
averageannualfamilyincomeisabout$430,Nicaraguan
farmerswillbeforcedtocompeteonanevenlargerscale
withU.S.farmerswhoreceivethousandsofdollarsper
yearinsubsidies.
Inthenameoffreemarketdevelopment,theUnited
StateshaspushedtoopenforeignmarketstoU.S.
exportsandinvestment.Freetradeagreementsforce
countrieslikeNicaraguatolowertariffsandtoeliminate
subsidiesandother“barriers”totrade. But,as
NicaraguaneconomistCarlosPachecopointsout,“The
attitudeoftheUnitedStatestowardsfreetradehasbeen
doasIsay,notasIdo.”
AlthoughtheU.S.pledgedtoreduceagricultural
subsidiesduringthelastroundofWorldTrade
Organizationnegotiations,therecentFarmBillflewin
thefaceofthatcommitment.Furthermore,therecent
increaserepresentsjustoneofmanythathaveoccurred
overthelastdecade,astheU.S.andotherindustrialized
nationscontinuetoincreasetheirleveloffarmsubsidies.
GiventhecloutoftheU.S.inthemajorInternational
FinancialInstitutions,andgiventhelargescaleofthe
U.S.economy,theUnitedStateshasnotbeenforcedto
keepitsownpromisesorfollowitsownrules. By
subsidizingU.S.agricultureandmaintainingsome
tariffs,theU.S.continuestoprotectitselffromthe
international“barrier-free”competitionitpromotesand
demandsofitsimpoverishedneighbors.
Genaraisthankfulthatupuntilnowherfamilyhasbeen
abletosurvivebyproducingthefoodtheyneedand
sellingsomeoftheircroptolocalmarkets.“Thisyear
willbebetterthanthelast,andrightnowthat'sallwe
canhopefor.”Smallfarmersconfrontthechallengesof
MotherNaturetoprovidefortheirfamiliesandlocal
communities.Astronglocalfoodeconomyhasallowed
smallNicaraguanfarmerstogetby,whiletheU.S.
government’sfreetradeagendathreatensthefood
securityofNicaragua,andthewholeofLatinAmerica.
WherewouldGenaraturnwithoutalocalmarketfor
herbeans?Failingfarmswillcontinuetoproducethe
massmigrationofunemployedworkerstothecities
andtotheUnited States,hopingtosupporttheir
familiesandcommunitieswiththehardwonwages
theysendhome.
Onlythestrongsurviveinexporteconomies,and
impoverishedNicaraguanfarmersarenotequipped
withthenecessarytechnology,financing,and
protectionneededduringthetransitiontoanewstyle
ofproductiontocompetewithlargereconomies.The
logicofimportingproductssuchasRojoChiquitoto
Nicaraguathatcouldbegrownlocally,puzzles
professorBayardoOrtiz.“Whybringbeansfrom
anotherplacetoreplaceourtraditionalbean?Why
don’ttheyhelpourfarmerstoplantthebeanthatour
landhasproducedforcenturies?Whywouldyoubring
themfromanotherplacewhenwehavetheseedand
thelandhere?Whydon'twegrowourownbeansso
continuedonpage9
MelindaSt.Louis
InruralNicaragua,thewholefamilyparticipatesinthecultivationofredbeans.
1“OtraAméricaesPosible.”CentrodeEstudiosInternacionales. Managua,Nicaragua. 2002.
Thislittlebeanwillbecome
thegreatestthreatthat
Nicaraguawilleverface.
–economistAlvaroFonseca
4
Colombia
U.S.MilitaryForceinColombia
ProtectingOilInterests
BYTHEWFPCOLOMBIA TEAM
continued onpage10
I
nthe provinceof AraucaintheNortheasterncorner
ofColombia wherethe Orinoco Riverdrainsthe
jungle plains,U.S.SpecialForcestrainColombian
soldiers inthecraftof counterinsurgencywar.It’snot
thefirsttimethatU.S.soldiershave instructedtheir
Colombiancounterparts.Only thistime the focus isn’t
comb atingdrug trafficking.
U.S.Ambassadorto Colombia,Anne Patterson,explains
growingUSinterestintheregion:“To speak frankly,
afterSeptember11th,theissue ofoilsecurity has
become apriorityfortheUnitedStates…Thisis
somethingwemust do.It’simportantforour oilsources
andthe co nfidenceofour investors.”
Deepwithinthe subso iloftherichOrinoco basinare
some ofColombia’s largestoilreserves.Since1985
OccidentalPetroleumof LosAngeles hasbeenoperating
over200wellsintheCañoLimónfield,atone time the
largestoilfieldinColombia,throughapartnershipwith
theColombianstate-ownedoilcompany,Ecopetrol.In
ordertotransportthe oilfro mthefields inAraucatothe
Caribbeancoastwhereitcanbe refinedandcheaply
exportedto theUS,itmustbepumpedthrougha 470
milelongpipelinecrossing the jungle,upandoverthe
Andes,downthecoastallowlands,andfinally to theport
atCoveñas.
Weavingits waythroughregionsofintense conflict,the
Caño Limón-Coveñas pipeline is the targetoffrequent
guerrillaattacks.Recentlythe guerrillas haveintensified
theircampaigntodisablethe pipeline,culminating last
yearinarecord170 attacks.By blowingupthepipeline
theguerrillasstrikeone ofCo lombia’s mostimportant
resourcesandincrease theirleveragetoextortOccidental
andother multinationalsoperatinginthe region.
Citing the UnitedStates’increasedneedforsecure oil
sources,lastwintertheBushAdministrationannounced
aproposaltotheUSCongressto initiate aprotection
planspecifically forthe Caño Limón-Coveñaspipeline.
The pro posalwouldsendnearly $100milliontobolster
theColombianArmybrigadesincharge ofsafeguarding
thepipeline.Theplanprovidestrainingandequipment
to theexisting18thBrigadeandto thenewlyformed5th
MobileBrigade.TheBushAdministrationmanagedto
pushthrougha$6 millio n“jumpstart” for the pipeline
protection plan this last summer,and in late Octo o ber
U.S.GreenBeretsstartedtraining Colomb iansoldiers
fromthe18thBrigade.
Operating atmaximumlevels,thepipeline iso nly able
to provideone halfo fonepercentof totaloil
consumptionintheUnitedStates.Thisalone doesnot
seem to meritthe$98 millioninvestmentthatthe
BushAdministrationwants to putintoprotectingthe
pipeline.However,between1995 and2000Occidental,
who co-owns the pipeline,spent$1.5 millionin
congressio nalandpresidentialcampaigncontributions
andanother $8.7 millioninlobbying efforts,primarily
regardingColombia.
Until2000,theColombianTaxCodeincludeda wartax
to bepaidbyforeignoilcompaniesoperating in
Colombia.Thetaxrequiredoilcompanies to pay$1.25
perbarrelof oilproduced.Interestingly,itwas the U.S.
government,throughtheOfficeof the U.S.TradeRepre-
sentative,whichcalledforthe Colo mbiangovernmentto
eliminate thispolicy. Complaining thatthe Colombian
government“hasnottakenstepstomake[oilo perating
fields]moreprofitable to investo rs,”in1996 theOffice of
the U.S.Trade Representative urgedCo lombia to
withdrawthe“wartax”becauseit“actsasaneconomic
disincentive”to foreigninvestment.
Today the U.S.government,after lobbyingthe
Colo mbiangovernmentto remove wartaxes on
multinationaloilcorporations,iscallingonU.S.
taxpayers to paytheminstead.Infact,notonlywould
U.S.citizensbecalledonto assumeOccidental’ssecurity
costs,but,inaddition,rather thana$1.25per barrel
security tax,theBushAdministrationwouldhave U.S.
taxpayers paya$3.70subsidyforeverybarrel.Occidental
itselfpaysonly50 centsper barrelforsecurity even
thoughitpostedanetincomeofmorethan$1.1billion
in2001.
Clo se examinationofthepotential l recipientsof this
aidandthe dangerinherentto anyU.S.military
involvementinColombia revealsthatto sendthis
money wouldbea grave error.
Due to theirhistoricinvolvementinhumanrights
violationsandcollaborationwithillegalarmedactors,
ColombianArmedForcesunits that receive military
aidfromthe UnitedStatesmustmeetasetofthree
conditions.Theseconditions,whenenforced,ensure
thatifColombianArmy forceshavecollaboratedwith
the paramilitary orhave co mmittedgrossviolationsof
humanrights they will notreceivemilitary aidfrom
the UnitedStates.
Theprimary paramilitaryforce,the UnitedSelfDefense
ForcesofColombia(AUC),hasbeenincludedonthe list
ofU.SState Department-designatedForeignTerrorist
Organizations for itsconsistentandbrutalvio lations of
humanrights;estimatedtobe approximately70%of all
violationsinColombiaduring2001.
Itistheo pinionofmanyhumanrightsorganizations
includingWitnessforPeace,thatthe18thBrigadefails
to meet at leastone ofthethreeconditions andshould
therefo re beineligible to receivemilitaryaidfromthe
UnitedStates,includingany aidunder the pipeline
protectionplan.Theconditio nstatesthatthemilitary
mustbe actively severinglink sto theparamilitary
groups.There is noindicationthat the commandersof
the 18thBrigadearesevering links,andinfactan
ab undanceof evidence indicates co ntinued
collab orationb etweenthe18thBrigade andtheAUC
paramilitary block operating inthearea.
Recently,WitnessforPeacedocumentedColombian
armymovementsapparently coo rdinatedwiththeAUC.
UribeConsolidatesPower
“You havesetup averyeffectiveexample ofth eway weneed to goo ntofigh tandto defeatterrorism,”Colombian
presidentAlvaroUribetold GeorgeBush in arecent meeting at the OvalOffice.Uribe’scommentscameinrespon se to
Bush’sassertion that,“Theonlypathtopeaceand security isthepath ofaction.”
Bush’scallto“action” hasnotgone unheed ed byhisColombian co unterpart.
In May Colombianselected apresidentwhocampaigned ona“firmhand anda big heart.”So fartherehasbeenn o
signof abigheart.Sin n ce hisAugust7th inauguration,Uribe’slistofactionsreflectsthemodelthatBush hasestablished
in the U.S.Uribehas declared a“state ofpublicun rest” thataffordshimsignificantlygreaterexecutivepowersand
reducescongression alauthority.BypresidentialdecreeUribeann ounced that state securityforces may,without
warrant,searchand seizeprivateproperty,tap communication sdevices,and detaincivilians.In certain areaso fthe
cou ntry,denoted Rehabilitationand Consolidation Zones,theColombian Presidentauth orizes amilitarycommander
to su percedetheauthorityofthelocalgovernors,mayors an dtown councilmembersinissuespertainingtothe
operations ofthe statesecurity forces.Th enewgovernmentalsoh as senta clearmessagetotheinternational
communityworking forp eaceinColombia.In the firstmonthand ahalf,ad ozen Spanish and Canadiancitizens have
been deported,three Belgian shave beendetained,andColombian consulates in th eexterior have refused visasto
chu rch an dNGOrepresentatives.
Thecentralargument ofthe Uribe Administrationisthatth enewmeasures areessentialto ensure avictoryoverthe
illegalarmedgroups.Yet,Colombiananalystsclaimtheywilld olittletocurb the action softheillegalarmed grou ps
an dinsteadwilljeopardized emocracy andsacrificecivilliberties.GustavoGalló noftheColombian Commission of
Juristscallsthestateofpublic unrest“cowardly,u seless,anddangerous.”“Itdoesn’tconfron tthe combatants,but
instead [itconfronts]thecivilpopulation…opening upColombians’homesto theArmed Forces.”
These newmeasures have already affectedgroupsworking forp eaceinthe coun try.At4:45on the morningof October
25th,forty members ofthe JudicialPolice,the ColombianArmyand the DepartmentofSecurityraided and searched
the officesofthePerman ent Assembly forPeaceinBogotá.Thiscoalitionh as been workingforsix yearstobrin gpeace
to Colombia.Witn essforPeaceregularlyp articipatesinthePerman entAssembly’s meetings.Thesearch oftheiroffices
wastragicand gainedmuch mediaattention –whatdidn’tgain mediaattention weretheover200 raidsofhomesin
Bogotá’spoorneighborho odsth at sameweek.
US GovernmentreactiontoUribe’smeasureshasbeen supportive.Whenaskedwh ethertheUSGovernmentsu pports
Uribe’sn ationalsecurityplan,MarcGro ssman ,UndersecretaryofState forPoliticalAffairs,responded,“I imagine
Colombianswillusethison CapitolHillto showtheyaredefend ing theirown democracyand wewillsupportthat.”
Above:OneofOccidental'sprocessingfacilitiesinCañoLimon. Below:Bombedpipeline,2002.
TwoPhotos:JessHunter
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