57
24
3. Responsibility to Protect
and the Military
1
Dwight Raymond
1. Introduction
Most references on the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) stress that coercive
military intervention is but a narrow aspect of R2P, applicable only in limited
and extreme circumstances.
2
For example, in 2001 The Responsibility to
Protect Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty (ICISS) distilled R2P into the three elements of prevention, reac-
tion, and rebuilding. Subsequently, the 2005 United Nations General Assem-
bly World Summit Outcome Document articulated what later became known
as the “three R2P pillars” consisting of a state’s responsibility to protect
its population, the international community’s commitment to assist states,
and the responsibility of member states to respond when a state is failing to
provide protection.
3
1 Disclaimer: This paper reflects the author’s personal opinions and is not the official view of
any U.S. governmental organization.
2 R2P may be interpreted as the idea that sovereign states have a responsibility to protect
their own citizens from avoidable catastrophe, and that when they are unwilling or unable
to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the broader international community. Derived
from International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (Evans and Sahnoun,
2001), R2P is normally restricted to the four major crimes of genocide, war crimes, crimes
against humanity, and ethnic cleansing. A related, but different, term is the Protection of
Civilians (PoC) which may be defined as “Efforts to protect civilians from physical violence,
secure their rights to access essential services and resources, and create a secure, stable,
and just environment for civilians over the long term.” (U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability
Operations Institute, 2013).
3 Also see Evans, G. (2008). For the UN’s framing of R2P, see United Nations (2005); Ban Ki-
-moon, address on “Responsible Sovereignty: International Cooperation for a Changed World”
(Berlin, 15 July 2008), available at: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/sgsm11701.
doc.htm; and UN General Assembly, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Report of
the Secretary-General, 12 January 2009, A/63/677, available at: <www.unhcr.org/refworld/
docid/4989924d2.html>.
• Pillar One: The enduring responsibility of the State to protect its populations, whether
nationals or not, from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against huma-
nity, and from their incitement.
• Pillar Two: The commitment of the international community to assist States in meeting
those obligations.
• Pillar Three: The responsibility of Member States to respond collectively in a timely and
decisive manner when a State is manifestly failing to provide such protection.
Col (Ret) Dwight Raymond is with
the Peacekeeping and Stability
Operations Institute at the U.S.
Army War College. He is one of the
primary authors of the Mass Atrocity
Response Operations (MARO)
Military Planning Handbook, the Mass
Atrocity Prevention and Response
Options (MAPRO) Policy Planning
Handbook, and the Protection of
Civilians Military Reference Guide.
.
35
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AND THE MILITARY
25
Despite the emphasis that R2P has much broader aspects, there is nevertheless a persistent and widespread perception
that R2P is essentially synonymous with military action in response to mass atrocities. This has unfortunately contribu-
ted to resistance to R2P from some quarters, and may also create a tendency to overlook the importance of non-military
efforts to mitigate mass atrocities. Military activities (or their threat) can indeed be useful to prevent or halt mass atroci-
ties and, with the caveat that R2P is more than military action, this paper will discuss military considerations within the
context of R2P and related concepts such as the Responsibility While Protecting (RwP). It contends that RwP should
best be viewed as a comprehensive approach to mitigate significant R2P risks.
2. The Military and Prevention
Mass Atrocity Response Operations (MARO) refer to “military activities conducted to prevent or halt mass atrocities”
4
and closely align with the use of the military in an R2P context. It is important to note that international military resources
can be employed in a preventive mode short of a coercive military intervention. Some potential objectives for this use
of the military may include:
• Mitigate conditions that make mass atrocities more likely;
• Expose/discredit perpetrators and enablers;
• Establish credibility/capability of international community and potential intervention;
• Protect potential victims;
• Dissuade/stop/isolate/punish perpetrators and enablers;
• Diminish perpetrator motivation or capability to conduct mass atrocities;
• Build/demonstrate international resolve; and
• Convince bystanders and negative actors not to support perpetrators and take constructive action to mitigate mass
atrocities.
Prevention includes both long-term “structural” efforts as well as “direct” efforts when a crisis is imminent, and in-
ternational military forces can contribute to both (Bellamy, 2011). Military structural preventive measures may include
security cooperation that can help reduce the likelihood of mass atrocities and identify potential flashpoints, while direct
prevention may include using military forces in an emerging crisis to deter perpetrators and shield vulnerable popula-
tions. Indeed, military activities may be relevant during all three stages of the ICISS R2P framework and in support of the
UN’s second and third pillars.
5
4 For more information on MARO, see Sewall, S.; Raymond D. and Chin S. (2010).
5 See Raymond, D., Cliff Bernath; Don Braum; and Zurcher K. (2012) for further elaboration on employment of military forces during all stages of
a mass atrocity situation. Generally, MARO refers to military prevention and response operations while MAPRO refers to military and non-military
efforts, including policies and programs, with MARO as a subset.
56
26
IMPLEMENTING THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR PEACE AND SECURITY?
Table 1: MILITARY EFFORTS DURING R2P STAGES
PREVENT
REACT
REBUILD
Structural Prevention
Direct Prevention
Area Security
Establish/Maintain Security
Security Cooperation
Deployments
Shape-Clear-Hold-Build
Peacekeeping
Exercises
Shows of Force
Separation
Enable Humanitarism
Assistance
Security Assistance
Preparations
Safe Areas
Support Governance, Rule
of Law, Social Well-Being,
Economic Development
Monitoring
Force Mobilization
Partner Enabling
Support SSR, DDR, TJ
Blockades, No-Fly Zones
Containment
Unexploded Munitions
Clearance
Strikes, Raids
Defeat Perpetrators
Enable Humanitarism Assistance Non-Combatant Evacuation
Potential challenges include differentiating between “prevention” and “response,” as there could be overlap between the
two (for example, a country may respond to a disturbing situation with military forces in order to prevent conditions from
deteriorating). Additionally, preventive efforts are difficult to organize because of the multiplicity of relevant actors with
their own dissimilar interests, objectives, constituencies, attention spans, and lines of authority. Long-term structural
prevention strategies may easily be neglected because there will always be other issues that are more urgent. It may be
difficult (and inappropriate) to separate mass atrocity prevention efforts from broader contexts and agendas. For exam-
ple, structural prevention efforts are likely to be conflated with general developmental programs, and there can never
be too much development. Some correctly argue that “managing diversity” is an important approach to prevent mass
atrocities (Baker, 2012).
6
Finally, mass atrocity situations are likely to be intermingled with other complexities such as
conflict situations including insurgencies.
3. The Military and Response
As noted in the ICISS report, response measures are not limited to military ways and means, and military efforts may be
significantly less than a coercive intervention, as some of the preventive activities discussed earlier may have continued
utility. When robust military force is committed to a mass atrocity situation, there are seven conceptual approaches for
their employment (the approaches are not mutually exclusive and can be combined in a variety of ways). All of the
approaches have advantages and disadvantages, and have variable appropriateness in different circumstances (Sewall
S., Raymond D. and Chin S., 2010).
6 This theme has also been repeatedly emphasized by Dr. Francis Deng, the former UN Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide.
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45
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AND THE MILITARY
27
• Area Security - secure a large area with sufficient force deployed in unit sectors.
• Shape-Clear-Hold-Build - systematically secure limited areas and expand when able.
• Separation - interpose forces between perpetrators and victims through the establishment of a de-militarized zone
or similar buffer zone.
• Safe Areas - secure concentrations of vulnerable populations such as displaced persons camps or enclaves.
• Partner Enabling - provide advisors, equipment, or specialized support to other actors such as security forces,
coalitions, or victim groups.
• Containment - influence perpetrator behavior as necessary with measures such as overwhelming presence, strikes,
blockades, or no-fly zones (perpetrators might not be targeted as long as they behave themselves).
• Defeat Perpetrators - attack and defeat key perpetrator assets such as leadership, forces, and logistics to neutralize
or remove the capability to conduct mass atrocities.
Military operations are problematic when there is an imperfect mandate or other strategic guidance, and inevitably such
direction will to some degree be incomplete, vague, or late. Proactive military leaders will (for better or worse) take action
based upon circumstances in the operational environment; cautious leaders given inadequate guidance will refrain from
acting. Or, to put it another way, “Some commanders will find a way to do what is necessary; others can always find an
excuse to do nothing.”
In addition to concerns caused by inadvertent civilian casualties and other collateral damage, military actions have other
political impacts. In order to retain flexibility that is inevitably critical for successful military operations, commanders will
prefer to expand their freedom to operate, seize and maintain the initiative, and generate options. This implies a tendency
to remove or roll back targetable adversary capabilities during fleeting windows of opportunity, and potentially creates
political complications. Because of the potential infeasibility of attacking only perpetrators that are directly committing
atrocities (especially if operations are exclusively conducted by air forces), it is often desirable from a military standpoint
to attack other targets further up the “threat chain” (staged forces, logistics, command and control facilities, military
leadership, political leadership). At some point, such targeting will have a political dimension.
Image 1: Threat Chain
It is also important to plan for, prepare for and effectively conduct the transition to a post-conflict aftermath. Military ac-
tors tend to give this consideration short shrift because the “kinetic” phase is more immediate and in any event primary
responsibility for the “rebuild” phase rests upon political decision-making and the pursuit of non-military outcomes, with
Direct
Threat
Imminent
Threat
Future
Threat
Threat
Logistics
Threat
Command &
Control
Threat
Enablers
Threat
Leadership
33
28
IMPLEMENTING THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR PEACE AND SECURITY?
the military largely in a supporting role. Note that suitable post-conflict “lines of effort” are probably identical to those
during pre-conflict prevention, and should not be overlooked during an intervention. Upon entering a post-intervention re-
building period, the international community is invariably in a “prevent” mode regarding future potential mass atrocities.
Image 2: Lines of Effort
7
PREVENT
REACT
REBUILD
4. R2P Risks
Preventive and reactive international R2P efforts have numerous risks. The main potential problems generally include
the following:
• Ineffectiveness - Efforts may be inadequate due to insufficient resources, ineffective implementation, or because
they are too late.
• Unintended Escalation - R2P efforts can result in expanded or protracted conflict and the pursuit of other objectives.
• Collateral Damage - Military actions can result in inadvertent civilian harm. Economic sanctions may also have a
greater impact on populations than on the intended targets.
• Anti-Intervention Sentiment - Actors and populations in the country of interest, the international community, and do-
mestic polities may oppose R2P efforts because of their extent or nature or a perceived lack of compelling interests
to justify action or sustain the necessary political will.
• Quagmire - Because of the likely intractable problems, extended efforts may be required to prevent, react to, and
rebuild societies. An intervention that was originally envisioned as short, simple, and straightforward may encounter
“mission creep.” Failure to address the entire scope of the problem adequately (including a realistic assessment of
post-intervention requirements) will contribute to a protracted and potentially futile quagmire.
7 “Lines of effort” refer to major elements that are necessary and generally sufficient for success. The lines shown here are similar to those pre-
sented in numerous documents related to stabilization and reconstruction. See especially United States Institute of Peace and United States Army
Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (2009).
Safe and Secure Environment
Good Governance
Rule of Law
Social Well-Being
Sustainable Economy
38
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AND THE MILITARY
29
• Stalemate - If crises are not decisively resolved or root causes are not redressed, a situation in which the threat of
future mass atrocities could exist. This could also result in de facto partition of the host state which may or may not
be permanent.
• Losses - Military forces employed in support of R2P will likely suffer casualties, and may be defeated when small
forces are quickly committed or are in isolated locations.
• Increased Resistance because of Pride or Nationalism - Actors and populations in the country of interest may incre-
asingly oppose “foreign occupation,” even if they do not support the perpetrators of mass atrocities.
• International Community Fissures - International actors may disagree over objectives, mandates, means, implemen-
tation, and burden sharing.
• Politicization of R2P Efforts - Civilian protection concerns will likely be interwoven with other political issues. R2P
efforts (including humanitarian assistance) will likely have controversial political implications.
• R2P Hijacking - Malevolent actors (including perpetrators) may attempt to cloak their goals with R2P principles (e.g.,
use Protection of Civilians as an excuse to crush a rebellion or suppress demonstrations).
• Negative Second-Order Effects - R2P efforts can create subsequent problems, including:
. Negative impact on region;
. Reluctance to take future action;
. Deterioration of relations between global and regional actors; and
. Government collapse (whether intended or not).
• Risks of Inaction - Inaction can be due to lack of political will or flawed decision-making processes. Consideration of
the above risks may inspire caution, inertia, and inaction. Collective action might not happen if it is conditional upon
a UN Security Council Resolution which is blocked by a permanent member.
8
In addition to considering the risks that
may arise from taking action, it is always important to weigh the risks of inaction or token efforts when civilians are
at risk from mass atrocities.
5. Responsibility While Protecting (RwP)
After the 2011 Libya intervention, the “Responsibility While Protecting (RwP)” concept emerged due to concerns about
potential deviation from UN Security Council mandates, civilian casualties resulting from military operations, and NATO’s
reporting to and communication with the UN during the operation (Hamann, 2012). While it has been welcomed by
many, RwP has been skeptically interpreted as, at best, essentially equivalent to adherence to the Law of Armed Conflict/
International Humanitarian Law (LOAC/IHL) or, at worst, international backsliding to create further institutional impedi-
ments to R2P.
As discussed earlier, R2P entails a wide range of risks. RwP could be constructively applied as a comprehensive ap-
proach to implement R2P effectively and mitigate these risks. RwP measures could include but would not be limited to:
8 The requirement for UN Security Council authorization is a highly contested topic. See discussion in Evans, G. and Sahnoun M. (2001), pages
47-55.
34
30
IMPLEMENTING THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR PEACE AND SECURITY?
• Adherence to LOAC/IHL;
• Planning and preparation for likely contingencies, branches, and sequels;
• Routine coordination between OSAPG and national focal points for mass atrocity prevention;
• Effective coordination between a “deputized” political authority (e.g., a regional organization, coalition, or national
government(s) and UN Secretariat;
• Exchanges of liaisons between the UN and the military force as well as its own political authority (when a military
force is not subordinate to the UN);
• Efficient reporting (what has happened, what is happening, future intentions);
• Timely supplemental UNSC Resolutions as the situation evolves;
• Preparation for post-intervention transition, which may include a provision for temporary Executive Authority if such
a requirement is likely;
• Quick termination of military operations and withdrawal of forces, if directed; and
• Continual nurturing of all lines of effort addressed earlier (safe secure environment, good governance, sustainable
economy, rule of law, social well-being) which are commonly applicable during all R2P stages (prevent, react,
rebuild).
6. Conclusion
It is commonly accepted that mass atrocity prevention is preferable to response; less commonly understood is that R2P
includes prevention and that military efforts can play a role in both. It is important to learn from previous experiences
(including Libya and other cases), as the possibility of future military intervention unfortunately still exists. Moreover, a
credible international intervention capability (particularly if demonstrated in the past) can deter future perpetrators, and
reduce the need for actual future military intervention. RwP can be a helpful concept to shape R2P efforts effectively
(including military measures) and mitigate the risks of action and inaction. The key challenge is that efforts to reduce
some types of risk will inevitably generate others, and an effective RwP approach will have to balance these multi-faceted
risks appropriately.
References
Baker, P. (2012) “Managing Diversity for Atrocity Prevention in Socially Divided Societies.” Muscatine, Iowa: The Stanley Foundation.
<www.stanleyfoundation.org/publications/pab/BakerPAB912.pdf>.
Bellamy, A. (2011) “Mass Atrocities and Armed Conflict: Links, Distinctions, and Implications for the Responsibility to Prevent.”
Muscatine, Iowa: The Stanley Foundation. <www.stanleyfoundation.org/publications/pab/BellamyPAB22011.pdf>.
Evans, G. (2008) “The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and For All” Washington, DC: Brookings Insti-
tution Press.
Evans, G. and Sahnoun, M. (Co-Chairs), (2001) “Report of the Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) - The res-
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