67
10.5 ENTREPRENEURIALFINANCE
329
rate spreadsbetweentheir (risky)borrowing g and lending rates.Of course, their
promisedborrowinginterestratesarealittlehigherthanwhattheycanreceivein-
vestingtheirmoneyinTreasurybonds.Yet,giventhattheystillhavesomepossibility
ofgoingbankrupt,largefirms’requiredexpectedborrowingcostsofcapitalareproba-
blyfairlyclosetotheexpectedratesofreturntheycouldearniftheyinvestedinbonds
withcharacteristicssimilartothebondsthattheythemselveshaveissued.Thus,large
publiccorporationscanoftenpretendtoliveinareasonablyperfectmarket.Thisalso
meansthattheyhavetheluxuryofseparatingtheirprojectchoicesfromtheirfinancial
needs.
➤
Altmanstudyofbond
defaultrates,Section6.2D,
p.148
Intheworldofindividuals,entrepreneurs,andsmallcompanies,however,itis
Forentrepreneurs,aperfect
marketassumptionis
problematic.
quiteplausiblethatthecostsofcapitalareoftenhigherthanequivalentexpectedsav-
ingsinterestrates.Infact,themostimportantdifferencebetween“ordinarycorporate
finance”and“entrepreneurialfinance”arethedegreetowhichtheircapitalmarkets
areperfect.Almostallentrepreneursfinditverydifficulttoconveycrediblytheirin-
tentandabilitytopaybackloans.Andanycreditthatentrepreneursreceiveisusually
alsoveryilliquid:Lenderscannoteasilyconvertitintocash,shouldtheneedarise.
Therefore,theydemandahighliquidityspread,too.Manyentrepreneursevenend
uphavingtoresorttofinancingprojectswithcreditcards,whichmaycharge1,000
basispointsormoreaboveTreasury.
Insum,smallfirmsoftenfaceextraordinarilyhighdifferentialsbetweenexpected
Theexpectedcostsofcapital
areoftenveryhighfor
entrepreneursneedingcapital.
borrowingandlendingrates.Entrepreneurs’highborrowingcostscanthusprevent
themfromtakingmanyprojectsthattheywouldhaveundertakeniftheyhadthe
moneyalreadyonhand.Cash-on-handcanbecomeaprimedeterminantofalltheir
decisions.Moreestablishedfirmsorwealthierentrepreneursshouldoptimallytake
moreprojectsthanpoorerentrepreneurs.Yes,theworldisnotfair.
However, becareful inthereal worldbeforeyoubelievetheclaimsofentre-
Becareful:Don’tbelieve
entrepreneurialclaims!Often,
highborrowingratesarejust
promised,notexpected.
preneurs.Entrepreneursalsotendtohavenotoriouslyoveroptimisticviewsoftheir
prospects. Evenventurecapitalists, , the e financing g vehiclefor manyhigh-tech en-
trepreneurialventures, which advertiserates ofreturnof30%per yearor more,
seemtohavemanagedtoreturnonlyacoupleofpercentagepointsabovetherisk-
freerateoverthelast30years.Adjustingforthecorrectdefaultratesmayactually
meanthatentrepreneursfaceonlyhighpromisedborrowingcosts,nothighexpected
borrowing costs. Thus, , thelarge e quoted spread betweenentrepreneurs’ borrow-
ingandlending rates, whichisreallyall that youcaneasily observe, likely hasa
largecomponentthatisduenottoinformationdisagreementsbutsimplytocredit
risk.
Thisissueofhowtodealwithmarketimperfectionsforsmallfirmsalsoarises
Thecourtsapplyanadhoc
discounttothevaluesof
entrepreneurialcompanies
basedontheirlimitedaccess
tocapital.
frequentlyinthecourts,whereacost-of-capitalestimateisnecessarytocomputethe
valueforanentrepreneurialenterprise—forexample,forpurposesofassessingthein-
heritancetaxorresolvingdisputesamongformerbusinesspartners.(Suchvaluation
servicesareanimportantrevenuebusinessformanyfinanceprofessorsandconsult-
ingfirms.)Ithasbecomecustomaryandlegallyacceptabletocomputefirstthevalue
ofanequivalentpubliclytradedbusinessorcompanyasifitfacedaperfectmarket,
andthentoapplya“privatediscount”ofaround10%to30%offirmvalueinorder
toreflectthelimitedaccesstocapital.Theamountofthisdiscountisadhoc,butitis
betterthannoattemptatall.